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ABSTRACT 
Unreliable homodiegetic narration presents a unique mode 
of narrative transmission which demands the encoding within 
the text of 'translational indices ' , that is, signifiers of 
several kinds which justify the reader/receiver in 
over-riding the sincere first person avowals of the apparent 
mediator of the discourse. The argument establishes the 
presence of an epistemologically primary 'immanent' 
narrative situation within an ostensibly unitary narrative 
situation. Such a stereoscopic perspective upon the 
presented world of the literary 'work provides the 
reader/receiver with a warrant for a rejection of the 
epistemological validity of the homodiegetic narrator's 
discourse. Moreover, the thesis advances a typology of such 
translational indices as they occur in the dense ontology of 
the literary work of art. The narratological theory of 
unreliable homodiegetic narration developed in the first 
half of the dissertation is applied in the second half to 
selected exemplars of such narrative transmissions, 
demonstrating thereby the theoretical fecundity of the model 
for the discipline of narratology. 
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Narratology has gained both its name and its status as a 
discipline only fairly recently, with students of narrative 
the first beneficiaries of the more rigorous and 
theoretically sophisticated engagement of critics with 
literary texts. It has become imperative, if a serious 
investigation into any aspect of narrative is to be 
undertaken, to acquaint oneself not only with the 
structuralist explications of texts and the 
post-structuralist disenchantment with what they have come 
to regard as the futility of the enterprise, . but with the 
historical/materialist thrust which has shaped literary 
criticism, in the Anglo-American field in particular, over 
the last two decades. Infusions of theoretical insights 
from individuals and Schools on the continent have 
challenged and at times threatened latter-day complacency in 
Departments of English, but, since my experience in 1974 of 
an Honours course in Literary Theory at Rhodes University, 
devised and co-ordinated by H.G. Ruthrof · ( and my 
introduction, there, to Franz Stanzel~s - at that time -
recently transiated Narrative Situations in the Novelr1971l 
) my interest in the theory of narrative has remained a 
primar~ academic concern, often in the face of resistance to 
what has been derisively termed ~theoreticism~. 
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Familiarity with the work o~ a broad range o~ theorists 
is the initially daunting prospect facing the narratologist, 
for the specialists ( Stanzel, Ingarden, Cohn, Chatman, Bal, 
Rimmon-Kenan, Ruthrof, Genette, Iser, De Man or Derrida ~or 
example) share a focus in their study o~ narrative per se, 
but write from theoretical positions as widely diverse. as 
those o~ phenomenology and deconstruction. However, and this 
element of the study of narrative proves appealing, the 
models being developed, from whatever theoretical matrix, 
all issue in an application to texts which we hold to some 
degree in common. 
My own enterprise in this thesis is an attempt to 
illuminate a small area of the vast field o~ narrative 
theory: though essentially a 'text-immanent' critic 
( Fokkema,1984) my position embraces that of some aspects of 
Reception Aesthetics, in that in positing and arguing for an 
immanent voice in an immanent narrative Situation, the role 
of the reader ( receiver ) must, I have discovered, be 
accorded significance. 
DECLARATION 
Unless specifically indicated to the contrary in the text, 
this whole thesis is my own original work. 
vi 
INTRODUCTION 
The thesis addresses the problematic of unreliable 
homodiegetic narration. While offering an essentially 
"narratological analysis, it focusses, nevertheless, upon the 
system of compositional and thematic conventions which 
control the production of a text that is usually intended to 
be received by readers familiar with sustained ironic 
delivery. It is, however, not so much to the effects wrought 
by such a mode of transmission but to the mechanics involved 
in the control of such effects that the dissertation 
addresses itself. 
The central problem confronting the theorist in this 
field when he/she turns to an analysis of just how it is 
that such a complex production as unreliable homodiegetic 
narration can be controlled can be quite simply stated. In 
pure homodiegetic narration the Ausgangstext or artifact 
comprises all and only those utterances made by the first 
person ( homodiegetic ) narrator. This extended conjunction 
of judgements admits of no failure conditions; that is, the 
narrator~s assumed sincerity simply and directly imposes on 
the reader/receiver the requirement that the narrator"s 
judgements be taken as they are intended to be understood. 
The narrator~s judgements in such a narrative situation mean 
. just what he/she intends them to mean, his/her position 
being, so to speak, epistemologically privileged. The 
reader/receiver is not in a position to over-ride what are 
to be taken as the narrator's sincere avowals. The 
presentational process is identified with the telling of the 
narrator's tale ( as in, for example, Great Expectations, 
where Pip's narration provides the text with both its 
process - the activity of telling - and its world - that 
which is narrated. ) 
No such straight-forward account of 'unreliable~ 
homodiegetic narration can be offered. Here the narrator's 
sincerity may be granted by the reader/receiver, but what is 
required is that the failure conditions for his referential 
acts must be specified. The reader/receiver, that is, must 
now legitimately be able to over-ride the narrator's 
descriptions of his/her world and of the events that occur 
in it. But the question ( and its apparent simplicity is 
deceptive ) as to how this is possible arises. Because the 
narrative act is presided over by a homodiegetic narrator 
the entire Ausgangstext is still co-extensive with the 
complex conjunction of the narrator's judgements, which mean 
exactly what they are intended to mean. Where, within the 
parameters of this Ausgangstext, can the reader/receiver 
find the evidential base which will ground his/her judgement 
that the narrator is unreliable? There appears to be no 
vehicle within the artifact itself which is able to carry 
such markers of unreliability. 
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It is possible that this felt ~absence~ within the 
artifact has led theorists to attempt to identify the 
implied presence of the author as the touchstone for the 
judgement of unreliability. However, just as literary 
criticism abandoned the writer as the dominant reference 
point of textual interpretation, so, in this thesis, the 
argument avoids any attempt to seek the imprint of the 
writer, or such normative patterns as might emanate from 
his/her domain. 
It thus becomes the task of this enterprise to identify, 
within the Ausgangstext itself, those markers that provide 
the reader/receiver with the evidential base for the 
judgement that in this instance the homodiegetic narrator is 
~unreliable~. The identification of these markers, which I 
term ~translational indices~, requires the construction of a 
new theory of narrative transmission for unreliable 
homodiegetic narration; and it is such an enterprise that 
forms the substance of this dissertation. 
As epistemological relativism, especially that strain 
emerging from the Anglo-American school of deconstruction, 
threatens a new iconoclasm, an exploration of modern 
~evelopments in the semantics of reference is manifestly 
required. If the argument in chapter 1 succeeds, 
post-structural thinkers such as those of the Yale school 
have underestimated the quality of argumentation that 
philosophers of language have brought to bear in the last 
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decade. The chapter argues for the necessity for 
narratological exegesis of placing the artifact within a 
mimetic situation, and attempts to reveal the self-defeating 
assumptions concerning the nature of reference held by the 
extreme relativists of the post-modernist movement. Where 
such representatives of this movement as Derrida play down 
the radical nature of the modernist/post-modernist fissure, 
the thesis finds itself in essential agreement. Modernist/ 
post-modernist developments are treated as forming a 
continuum in the twentieth century~s flight from certainty, 
without accepting the solipsistic position that having lost 
touch with the noumenal world we have automatically lost 
touch also with our phenomenal world. 
Having surveyed developments in semantics in the twentieth 
century and having thereby defended the right of the critic 
to talk about ~the~ world that is narrated by an 
anthropomorphically conceived character construct, utilising 
language that remains pragmatically stable within an 
intersubjectively interacting speech community, the argument 
is able to progress using concepts which before might have 
appeared superseded by the general wave of meaning 
iconoclasm that made claims upon the theoretical high 
ground. 
In chapter 2 the ontological status of unreliable 
homodiegetic narration is analysed building on the 
foundations l~id by Roman Ingarden and utilising the 
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narratological typology advanced by Franz Stanzel. Starting 
out from the concept o~ mediation the chapter argues that in 
ordinary homodiegetic narration no possibility exists for 
drawing the distinction between the way that which is 
narrated ( the presented world of the literary work) 
appears and the way that which is narrated is. This follows 
from the fact of the epistemologically privileged position 
of a first person narrator. However, with unreliable 
homodiegetic narration, one must draw the distinction 
between how the presented world ( that which is narrated ) 
appears to the homodiegetic narrator and how it, in fact, 
is. That is, the possibility for over-riding the 
homodiegetic narrator's referential acts can now be 
demonstrated. In our normal world sincere avowals are 
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sometimes over-ridden on the basis of independent 
examination of the facts referred to by the original utterer 
of the judgement. No such manoeuvre is, of cour~e, available 
to the reader/receiver of unreliable homodiegetic narration. 
The presented world of the literary work remains, always, a . 
mediated one. Thus the argument contends that, if the first 
narrative situation is shown to be unreliable ( that is, as 
a source of information about the presented world >, this 
can only be the case if the reader/receiver has access to a 
master narrative situation that is epistemologically 
primary. 
As the Ausgangstext of unreliable homodiegetic narration 
is nothing but a conjunction of the first-person narrator's 
5 
judgements which comprise the presentational process, any 
epistemologically 'meta' presentational process cannot 
operate through the explicit judgements themselves. Rather, 
this silent narrative situation must be immanent in the 
Ausgangstext. It is to this, the immanent narrative 
situation ( or, as it may also be termed, the immanent 
voice >, that the reader/receiver turns in order to find the 
evidential base which justifies the judgement that the 
homodiegetic narration, in this instance, is unreliable. 
The thesis argues further that, where the 
epistemologically primary immanent narrative situation is 
present, certain fecund possibilities exist for the 
revelation of character ( by a process best described as 
7showing7 rather than 7telling' ). The reader/receiver is 
offered a stereoscopic perspective on the presented world 
where the deviations introduced by the unreliable 
homodiegetic narrator are dramatically employed to reveal 
the hidden structures of motivation. Such deviations are 
never able to be directly addressed within the secondary 
narrative transmission. 
The very notion of unreliability in the context of 
narrative transmission requires, it is argued, -the 
postulation within the Ausgangstext of the logically primary 
immanent voice. However, any such postulate must be defended 
in the critical arena and, consequently, evidence need be 
adduced that would support such a postulation in any 
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· particular case of homodiegetic narration. The 
identification of such patterns of encodement as reveal the 
presence of the immanent voice is a challenge addressed in 
chapter 3. 
Here a theory of non-denotational reference is advanced 
utilising Nelson Goodman~s profound insights into the way 
worlds are made (1978). A typology of translational indices 
is proffered and defended thereby meeting the demand that, 
if the immanent voice is a necessary requirement for the 
possibility of unreliable homodiegetic narration to exist, 
then it must be possible to identify the patterns of 
encodement of this silent but controlling voice. 
In chapters 4, 5, and 6, various types of unreliable 
discourse are identified and, by the application of the 
theoretical principles argued for in the first chapters, are 
analysed both to expose the subtle me~hanisms of control 
wielded in these narrative situations and to vindicate their 
deployment as one of the most sustained forms of irony 
available to the modern novelist. Hence a theory developed 
largely abstractly in the first half of the thesis 
concerning the narratological nature of unreliable 
homodieg~tic narr~tion finds in its application in the 
second half the exemplars of unreliability it was formulated 
to account for. 
Finally, I hope that while my critical approach may be 
closer to text-immanent criticism than that of either 
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Reception Aesthetics or the discredited biographical method, 
the role of the reader/receiver ( a compound construct which 
I deploy, advisedly, as it contains both an active and a 
passive quality which I deem relevant for the activity of 
receiving the literary text) has been demonstrated as 
crucial for the realisation in the fullest sense - of the 
literary work of art. The analyses of ~You Should Have Seen 
the Mess!~, ~X~, ~Haircut~, ~My Last Duchess~ ~nd The Aspern 
Papers indicate that the application of the theoretical 
principles developed earlier achieves an expansion of 
meaning, which of itself provides a prima facie argument in 
favour of my essentially modernist context as critic. 
Throughout the thesis I have adhered to a slightly 
modified version of the Harvard Style ( footnotes have been 
incorporated, as far as possible, into the body of the text 
and reference details, including page numbers, are to the 
editions of texts cited in the bibliography). In the 
interests of greater clarity, moreover, I have divided each 
chapter into its pertinent subsections, providing them with 
k~y-pointer headings. The loss of a discursive style will, I 
trust, be compensated for in the achievement of greater 
clarity for the argument. 
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Chapter 1: A Survey of the Developments 
of Semantics in the Twentieth Century 
By briefly referring to the major 
philosophical moves made by the 
leading thinkers in the field, a 
context is provided which allows 
for the legitimate posing of such 
questions as are of crucial significance 
when exploring the notion of un-
reliable, homodiegetic narration. 
1. Introductory remarks 
It is the contention of this chapter that, because of 
significant developments in the philosophy of language 
especially in that area concerned with the semantics of 
reference, literary criticism is in a position ( however 
unwitting, at present) to address itself to questions that 
are central to an understanding of the concept of a 
7presentational process 7 (Ruthrof,1981:p 22). A working 
knowledge of current developments in the philosophy of 
language is, I shall demonstrate, a necessary pre-requisite 
for the activity involved in formulrtin~ legitimate 
questioni that may be addressed to the literary work and 
which could not formerly, given the persuasiveness of 
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contemporary post-structuralist thinking (especially as it 
has manifested itself in the writings of the Anglo-American 
school of deconstruction >, receive comprehensive 
articulation. 
Chapter 1, thus, traces in broad outline current trends in 
the contemporary semantics of reference, placing them in 
their historical context and exploring their ramifications 
especially as they pertain to literature. Such an 
undertaking has enabled me to address questions to the 
phenomenon of the literary work whose answers, in the first 
instance, radically reconstitute the literary critic~s 
understanding of certain ~narrative situations~ 
(Stanzel,19SS, transl.1971> and, moreover, provide the basis 
for a fuller comprehension of the structures of intentional 
irony. -Discussi~n, here, is of necessity merely preliminary, 
limning in the boundaries within which the epistemological 
questions are to be situated: a more complete articulation 
of the theoretical implications for narrative occurs in 
chapter 2. 
2. Modern developments in the semantics of reference 
In the philosophy 0+ language our century can be said to 
have been dominated by investigations into that field which . 
has concerned itself with the semantics of reference. Frege; 
with his distinction between ~Sinn~ and ~Bedeutung~ (1892, 
25-50), focussed philosophical enquiry with a hitherto 
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unknown intensity upon this area of semantics. In the early 
writings of Bertrand Russell (1905; 1911-12a;1912b) and 
finding their parallel~ subsequently, in the Tractatus 
Logico Philosophicus of Wittgenstein (1922), questions of 
metaphysical system-building dictated the form that was 
imposed upon enquiries into the problematic area concerning 
the relation of language to the world. Philosophers now 
grappled with the problem of how the cycle .of meaning could 
be brpken, that is, of how language secured reference to the 
world. 
In the spirit of the seventeenth century Port Royal 
logicians concepts were hypostatized and their subsequent 
~mysterious~ link to reality vindicated by being declared, 
by virtue of the requirements of the metaphysical systems to 
which they were handmaidens~ a logically primitive 
necessity. Thus, Russell with his logical atomism 
constructed a hierarchy of being isomorphically lacked fnto 
its equivalent semantic hierarchy. 
Wittgenstein~ in the Tractatus, required of language that 
it ultimately 'simply' be related to the world. His 
~simple> names merely stood for 'simple' objects, unmediated 
. by any set of descriptions. In order to break the circle of 
meaning within a closed semantic system just such a 
metaphysical necessity was required. Gilbert Ryle, 
developing and expanding the spirit of this claim in his 
search for the structure of an ideal language, spoke of the 
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~logical form of the fact~~ all too often unhappily encoded 
in its superficial and distorting grammatical form (1963: 
33). The philosopher's task ( but not the layman's who, for 
Ryle, as a result of his/her theoretical naivety remained 
clear-eyed ) was to extract the pristine logical form 
through conceptual analysis which would, of itself and 
unambiguouslY~ secure reference to the world. The latter 
would be such as described by the, now, pristine judgement. 
Here is evidenced the t~nacious ~meaning empiricism~ 
(Bennet, 1971:p 225) that has been part of British philosophy 
since Hobbes and Locke. More deeply encoded than the 
mythical 'logical form of the fact', however, was the 
vicious circularity that such a programme of reference 
embodied. The ~logical form of the fact' is said to be that 
which isomorphically maps onto reality; and . reality, it is 
claimed, is that which is isomorphically mapped by the 
~logical form of the fact~. Obviously~ what was clearly 
required was some form of ~error' theory that would be able 
to re-introduce criteria of success or failure into the 
quest for the achievement of reference. 
Wittgenstein, in his later writings, was responsible for 
a shift in the paradigm governing our notions of semantic 
intelligibility. Language was de-reified and functionalised. 
His famous maxim: ~Don't ask for the meaning, ask for the 
use', was to influence a generation of philosophers of 
language. With the inception of this approach, where stress 
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was placed upon the use of language rather than on language 
itself, a new 'actor' stepped out of the wings and took up a 
position centre-stage which he has never since left: this 
was the agent or speaker. The burden of reference was lifted 
from the shoulders of language and placed within the sphere 
of those things which are don~, either well or badly, by 
man. In this way, the quest for the 'grail' that had 
consumed philosophers of language during the early part of 
the twentieth century, that is, for a disambiguated, 
logically pristine, 'ideal' language, mapping onto and 
mapped by the world, was abandoned. Reference henceforth was 
secured by a speaker in one of two ways: 
(1) by ostensive definition or 
(2) by sets of definite descriptions where the 
success/failure conditions are determined within the context 
of the speaker/hearer situation. 
With this fundamental translocation of the responsibility 
for reference from language to the speaker of the language, 
the referential link postulated by the 'ideal language' 
theorists ( Russell, Carnap and Schlick, for example) for 
reasons of metaphysical system-building as holding between 
language and the world, was now seen to hold, rather, 
between referrer and referent. Sir Peter , Strawson, in his 
famous debate with Russell (1950: 320-44), drew the 
distinction between sentences' and asserted sentences or 
judgements, with only the latter capable of having assigned 
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to them the values of truth or falsity. Kant~s stress on the 
primacy of judgements as the bearers of truth or falsity was 
thus revitalized; truth or falsity becoming once again the 
property of judgements. 
Reference~ now~ could be secured via the referential 
devices of indexicals and/or clusters of descriptions. The 
use of self-reflexive tokens located the speaker in the 
here-and-now; and definite descriptions eliminated 
unintended candidates~ leaving the referent to be selected 
by virtue of its unique satisfaction of the relevant 
criteria expressed in the cluster of descriptions offered by 
the speaker to his audience. The securing of reference had, 
in this way, clearly become subject to a ~co-operative 
principle~ making demands on the participation of both 
speaker and hearer in a conventionalized context. 
The first victim of this new and humbler pragmatism was 
the precision that had been regarded as one of the defining 
characteristics of the ideal language which philosophers, in 
the early part of this century, had sought. The open texture 
of concepts, their ill-defined parameters, were seen to 
provide both the strength and the challenge of a living~ 
evolving language. Wittgenstein ~ s talk of ~family 
resemblances' (1968:p 32e #66) had accustomed philosophers, 
owing to t~e homely quality of his metaphor, to a degree of 
semantic imprecision. The loose set of definite descriptions 
such as that suggested above proved intractable to tight 
14 
organization. Shifting clusters of these descriptions were 
all that emerged and with them - the best that could be 
wished for - philosophers simply had to be satisfied. This 
new linguistic orthodoxy, however, was to be confronted in 
the writings of Saul Kripke, by a challenge that was to 
unsettle the complacency that had descended upon the earlier 
paradigm • Mustering powerful arguments to support his 
philosophical objections, their lin~age capable of being 
traced back through John Stuart Mill to Plato, he forced 
philosophers of language to abandon their newly secured 
positions of complacency. 
Kripke argued cogently that reference could, in many 
cases, be s~cured and maintained in the face, not only of a 
significant proportion of the definite descriptions 
constituting the cluster proving themselves to be false, but 
even in the more radical situation of the entire cluster of 
descriptions itself proving to be false. This fundamental 
challenge to the so-called ~cluster theory' (1980:p 63) had 
to be met if the entire paradigm of reference was not to be 
overthrown. The force of Kripke's position was readily 
acknowledged and it became apparent that if the anomalies in 
it were to be accounted for, the 'cluster theory~ would 
require a degree of augmenting (1980: p 63). 
Kripke argued that reference could be secured utilizing a 
set of entirely false descriptions and that, thus secured, 
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it could be maintained by means of what he postulated was a 
basic link ( which he thought could be causal in 
nature ) said to hold between name and referent. This is 
clearly in the tradition of the primitive referential link 
advanced by Mill (1843) and Russell (1905; 1911-12a; 1912b). 
Thus, to give a Kripkean example, a speaker could refer to a 
woman in a crowded room by describing her, definitely, as 
~the one drinking champagne', even though, in fact, she were 
drinking lemonade. Reference could, nevertheless, be secured 
for the hearer by means of this false definite description 
and the example could be elaborated to shaw that such 
reference could be maintained through a 'chain~ of contacts, 
all of which might have utilized entirely false sets of 
definite descriptions to underwrite them. 
Saul Kripke's critique, like Wittgenstein's before him, 
was nat to remain unquestioned. Recognising the validity of 
much of his criticism, the defenders of the old orthodoxy 
sought to accommodate their theory by the adaptation of 
their position to that of Kripke. The writings of the late 
Gareth Evans (1982), together with those of John Searle 
(1983) on intentionality, recast the position held by the 
'cluster theory' adherents. Recognition, it was argued, had 
to be given to the agent's ability to situate himself within 
a spatia-temporal field. The primitive capacities of an 
organism which enabled it to achieve such orientation, and 
which had provided much of Kripke~s criticism with its 
intuitive appeal, had to be acknowledged and incorporated 
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into any adequate theory of reference. Recognitional skills 
existing, even at a pre-verbal stage of an organism~s 
development, had to be integrated; a pre-verbal child~s 
capacity to identify and re-identify its mother could not 
presuppose advanced manipulation of such referential devices 
as clusters of definite descriptions. The primitive ability 
evinced, therefore, by the pre-verbal child, for example, to 
locate and orientate himself in space and time needed to be 
accommodated within the parameters of the ~cluster theory~. 
Searle, with his talk of ~a network of other intentional 
states~ and ~a background of practices~ (1983:p 19); and 
Evans, with his ~information-based thought~ (1982:p 131) 
were able to accommodate such a phenomenon. Thus, the 
pre-conceptual encounter of the small child with its world, 
or the adult~s unarticulated recognitional cues, embedded in 
his ability to recognise that this person, for example, is 
the person he saw yesterday, was seen ~o establish an 
agent/object link able to provide the fundamental basis for 
such referential skills as are used by articulate adults in 
their attempts at finding their way around their world and 
in ensuring that their fellows, too, recognise selected 
parts of that world. Here the communication chain that 
Kripke emphasised (1980:p 91) was robbed of its adhesive 
power and was now seen to be constituted by those primitive 
sets of skills that underlie our natural recognitional 
capacities. To return to the Kripkean example quoted above 
( where reference was secured through the use of a false 
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description: she is drinking lemonade and not champagne) it 
can be seen that such referential links as are established 
in personal encounters within our shared world can assist in 
maintaining reference,even if subsequently , defective 
clusters of descriptions are encountered. 
Re-interpreted, it can be stated that the basic 
referential link is no longer in opposition to the 'cluster 
theory~ but is regarded ( and ' should be incorporated into 
the theory accordingly) as a sub-set of those natural 
abilities that we, as human beings, must have, if at our 
most basic level we are to participate in the ~life-form~ of 
our species. The cluster theory finds its role and its 
justification when s~curing reference need be achieved 
within a fully articulated linguistic setting: a setting 
necessary for the securing of any object not of our time or 
of our place. For example, we can no longer encounter the 
emperor Nero and, consequently, he can only be referred to 
by the referential devices ensconced within our language. 
This less primary form of reference cannot be either secured 
or maintained when confronted by the systematic failure in 
the truth claims of its relevant cluster of descriptions. My 
thesis will utilise the distinction between basic and 
secondary forms of reference in its e xplanation of the 
nature of the co-text ( a term used by Butler [1984] and 
its refer.ence to the truth conditions that obtain in the 
e x ternal world. 
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Contemporary developments in the semantics of reference, 
then, as evinced by the writings of Searle and Evans, can be 
seen to be taking place within a paradigm sympathetic to 
mimesis. In other words, in defending the ~cluster theory~ 
against Kripke's criticisms, reference can still be seen to 
be fundamentally a function initiated by a speaker and 
directed at his audience,with language operating as the 
vehicle while remaining essentially situated in its 
extra-linguistic (mimetic) setting; that is, between speaker 
and hearer. Speakers are able to orientate themselves within 
the public world and, using the referential devices of 
language, can align their orientations with those of their 
fellow man. Language can be used to refer to enduring 
objects, identifiable and re-identifiable,situated in an 
intersubjectively accessible world. But, although reference 
within this theoretical model can be both secured and 
maintained, it remains essentially defeasible. As one moves 
from the position of centrality as regards one's primitive 
orientation in space and time towards the more rarified 
reaches of the literary work of art , the conditions for the 
successful achievement of reference become progressively 
more etiolated. At the secure end of the spectrum, where the 
success/failure conditions are relatively easy to specify 
within the bounds of the contemporary paradigm, we would 
find the literally rendered declarative sentence, ~The la~ge 
black cat sat on the mat'. This assertion, bounded by such 
constraints as are set forth by Grice in what he calls a 
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'co-operative principle' (1967. See Pratt, 1977:p 125) and 
which govern truthfulness, appropriateness and 
informativeness, for example, can have its mimetic 
commitment fairly readily exposed. It is realised in a 
speaker-hearer situation, with shared conventions available 
to be called upon and ~hich enable the hearer to identify 
which particular 'cat' and which particular 'mat' the 
speaker intends to refer to. The challenge fo~ 
interpretation, however, is foregrounded and is given a 
sense of increasing urgency as the use of language begins to 
depart more and more from its literal base. ( Butler,1984: 
chapter 2.1 and 2.2.) 
The specification of the presented world of the literary 
work thus highlights the problematic relationship that 
obtains between meaning and reference. The non-literal 
statement must have its meaning accessible if the necessary 
concomitant referential acts are to be 'read off' as it 
were. The process of refining this accessibility requires a 
theoretically informed re-reading of the literal base of the 
assertion, as the relationship said to hold between an 
assertion and its truth conditions becomes gradually more 
attenuated the more metaphorical the assertion. To reach an 
understanding, though, o~ the non-literal _assertion, 
requires an act of interpretation dependent upon a range of 
decisions. that must be made concerning which implications of 
the central metaphor must be disengaged and which must be 
affirmed. In addition, if that interpretation is to be a 
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critical one, it must manifest the ability - upon demand -
to justify the suspension of those implications which are 
usually taken to hold for the concept in its literal 
deployment. 
The question of a concept~s implications is, however, an 
extremely vexed one, especially as semantic entailments 
follow from judgements and not, strictly speaking, from the 
individual concepts themselves. " Kant's dictum that a concept 
is nothing but a ~predicate of a possible judgement~ 
(Critique of Pure Reason. Kemp,1964:p 106 ) need be 
recollected and its force acknowledged. Philosophers have 
conventionally accepted that the implications of a concept, 
especially when they are regarded as logical entailments, 
are self-evident to any mature native speaker of the 
language. Such self-evidence ( of what have been termed 
'analytic' truths) and the foundation of any hierarchy of 
conceptual implications have been dealt a severe blow in the 
form of an argument first advanced by Willard van Orman 
Quine in his famous paper 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' (1953). 
The main consequence of this argument was to be that the 
mimetic situation of language, under the dominant paradigm 
of the twentieth century, was to feel its first shivers of 
apprehenSion; for if referential acts are 'read off' 
judgements, and judgements can themselves take no univocal 
reading, ~he movement from language to the world can "no 
longer be tracked. 
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Quine argued that a tautological truth such as ~a = a 7 or 
a tautological declarative statement such as ~a bachelor is 
a bachelor 7 , generates an analytic truth when a cognitively 
synonymous term is substituted, salve veri tate, into the 
original formulation. Thus, if 'bachelor' is cognitively 
synonymous with 7unmarried man', one can generate from a 
tautology, ~a bachelor is a bachelor', an analytic truth, 7a 
bachelor is an unmarried man' by substitution. That is, we 
can get from 7a = a' to 'a = b' by substitution of a 
cognitively synonymous term for one of the terms of the 
original tautology. This procedure adequately recapitulated 
our intuitive sense of the etiology of analytic truths. The 
core of the critique against the epistemological stability 
of our notions of analytic entailment was, however, to lie 
in the next stage of the argument. 
Quine had shown that our grasp of analyticity was 
dependent upon our prior grasp of cognitive synonymy. He now 
proceeded to put pressure on our understanding of the nature 
of cognitive synonymy. He asks when we can say of two 
expressions that they are cognitively synonymous, and 
replies to the question posited with a pertinancy, which was 
to disturb empiricist complacency, that this may be done 
only when one term substituted for another in a tautology 
generates an analytic truth. Cognitive synonymy is, thus, 
suddenly.revealed to be dependent upon our prior grasp of 
analyticity-: the vicious circle is closed. Analyticity, 
which has, traditionally, been defined in terms of cognitive 
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synonymy has been shown to be a requirement for its 
definition. The circle can only be broken, Quine insists~ by 
the development of a fully articulated semantic theory from 
whose axioms the analytic truths of the language can be 
generated. Unfortunately for twentieth century philosophers 
of language such a theory does not yet exist and, it is 
feared, can not even be adequately formulated. 
The prospect, then, of formulating a fully developed 
semantic theory was met with skepticism but although 
philosophers of language recognised, on the one hand, the 
enormous difficulties involved in the articulation of such a 
theory; on the other, they knew what rigorous demands it 
would have to satisfy. In this regard one should look at, 
for example R.M. Kempson (1977), especially his 
introduction, pp 1-10. Utilising a finite set of rules it 
would have to explain the generation of word and sentence 
meaning as well as specify the nature of the dynamics of 
their interaction. It would have to account for the 
possibility of word and sentence ambiguity as well as 
articulate the generation of such linguistic phenomena as 
synonymy, entailment, contradiction, implication and so on. 
While the theory of syntactics needs to specify not only 
the vocabulary of that language but also its syntax, with 
its concomitant tra~sformational and recursive rules 
specifying which of the formulae shall count as well-formed 
within the language, the semantic theory must, among other 
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things, be able to specify the truth conditions of the 
well-formed formulae generated by the syntactics of the 
language. 
This link, between truth conditions and meaning, was 
explored by Donald Davidson (1967: 304-323). He hoped that 
the formula devised by Tarski (1944) for a theory of truth 
might provide the basis for a theory of meaning. His goal 
was to explain the obscurity of concepts such as ' ~meaning~ 
in terms of clearer concepts ( philosophically speaking, 
that is ) like ~truth~. Tarski had claimed for example that 
~Snow is white~ is true, if and only if snow is white; ~snow 
is white~ being the name of the sentence, snow is white, 
where the predicate,~is true~, al~ays takes as subject an 
element of the meta-language. 
The early verificationists (Ayer,1936; Carnap,1936 and 
1937; Schlick,1936) had tried to capture the meaning of a 
sentence through its method of verification and their 
programme involved the exploration of the practical ways one 
went about establishing the truth conditions of a sentence. 
Now, Tarski had paired the name of the sentence with sets of 
conditions guaranteeing the truth of that sentence. However, 
if we know under what conditions a sentence is true, or 
conversely, under what conditions it would be false, then, 
Davidson realised, we can be said to know its meaning. If 
these truth conditions constitute the meaning of the 
sentence, we can refer to them by using the sentence itself 
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in its material mode where the formal/material mode 
distinction parallels the meta-language/object language 
distinction. 
Thus, ~s means that p' becomes equivalent to's is true 
if p'. The advance that was made by the introductio~ of this 
formulation was that the problematic term, 'means', was 
eliminated. Unfortunately, because of peculiarities within 
the -truth-table by- which the sign for material implication 
is defined, too much, semantically speaking, is 'let 
through'. In our world, 'water is wet~ and 'snow is cold' 
always have the same truth value and, in an extensional 
logic ( by which is meant a logic that ignores the 
intensional occurrences of expressions - what Frege terms 
sense or 'Sinn', and Mill calls connotation - and only deals 
with the expression's denotation or reference >, they can be 
substituted for each other with the resultant sentence, 
'snow is cold if water is wet', being true. We need, 
however, to be able to distinguish sentences that 
co-incidentally share the same truth value from sentences 
which necessarily share the same truth value. In an attempt, 
therefore, at a more restrictive matching, the formula was 
changed to: ' s means that p' is equivalent to ' necessarily 
s is true if and only if p'. The formulation suggests that 
the meaning of a sentence can be specified if one gives the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for - the truth of that 
sentence. Such a specification of meaning would allow all 
relevant inferences to be drawn; relevant, that is, to the 
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notion of logical truth. But the notion of logical truth is 
merely another way of talking about analytic truth, and once 
again we are brought face to face with Quine. The obscurity 
of a notion such as meaning has been 'explained' by means of 
the at least equally obscure notion of analyticity. 
To return to the challenge of mapping a concept's 
entailments - required, it will be recalled, for the task of 
identifying those implications of a metaphor which must be 
disengaged in order to understand which of the literal 
entailments of the term used, in the first instance 
metaphorically, must be activated for us to grasp its force 
- it now appears that we have lost ( at least given the 
state of contemporary debate ) our theoretical right even to 
talk about self-evident analytic truths; and the manoeuvre 
suggested by Davidson, to handle the problem of the 
specification of meaning in terms of truth conditions, no 
longer appears a viable one. This is largely because he was 
forced to invoke some modal concepts which threatened his 
attempted advance of understanding with the accusation of 
circularity. 
Even the notion of entailment, perhaps less problematic 
than that of analyticity, involves one in the introduction 
of modal terms like necessity; for p entails q if and only 
if it is true that necessarily not both p and not q. ( To 
make the point in more accessible prose: ~If running entails 
having legs, this would only be true if it was necessarily 
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the case that the claim that one could run while lacking 
legs was always false.~ ) Again the closure of the circle 
of language threatens~ owing to an inability to give any 
theoretical account of how univocality of meaning is 
possible. 
A truth-based theory of meaning attempted to construct a 
set of semantic rules which would map an interpretation ( a 
set of truth conditions) onto an uninterpreted sequence of 
symbols organised into well-formed formulae by the rules 
embodied in the syntactics of the language and thereby 
conferring a meaning upon that sequence. Davidson~s 
programme, even if it were able to overcome the central flaw 
outlined above, would still be merely a specification of 
meaning~ not an explanation of it. The crucial dimension of 
understanding meanings seems unaccounted for: and meaning is 
at the centre of this whole debate. 
Eschewing theory construction, arguments have been 
mounted by, for example~ Strawson and Grice (1956;1967) and~ 
most recently, by Swinburne (1984), that it is possible to 
widen the circle of definitions, on a wholly pragmatic 
basis, to such a degree that all mature speakers of the 
language will be able to achieve satisfactory agreement 
about the analytic truths in a language. Thus, while 
c6nceding to Quine the point that 'No statement is immune to 
revision~ <1953: 41 ) these philosophers maintain, in 
general, that the distinction between those truths which are 
27 
analytic and those which are synthetic can be drawn; such a 
distinction being vindicated on pragmatic grounds, because 
of its fecundity for philosophical debate. 
This pragmatic justification of the analytic/synthetic 
distinction becomes even more respectable if the mimetic 
nature of language is acknowledged. In his later writings 
Wittgenstein argued that the fundamental nature of meaning 
the ~understanding' component ignored in Davidson~s theory 
is exposed within language games that provide one with the 
co~ventions governing usage constitutive of the terms' 
meaning. These langua.;je games are themselves .~rounded in a 
shared form of life which enables its players, via those 
sets of shared natural capabilities to ' know how to go on' 
when otherwise the circle of language would have run its 
full course to closure. This account of understanding, with 
its base in the human repertoire of natural expressions and 
actions, provides the grounding for intersubjective 
agreement which is indispensable if the debate about the 
nature of conceptual entailment is even to begin to take 
place; with man's shared corporeality emerging as that 
component of commonality which provides him with the ability 
to share both his significations and his world. The mimetic 
commitment of language remains, therefore, albeit in a more 
sophisticated and complex fashion, the leading paradigm 
within th~ field of contemporary semantics. The " 
deconstructionists themselves are forced to concede the 
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importance of this paradigm in the categories they use when 
mounting their skeptical attack. 
This journey through the landscape of developments in 
modern semantic theory vindicates a qualified adherence to 
the belief that the essentially mimetic nature of language 
is still intellectually respectable; a belief which is of 
central significance if my theoretical enterprise is to be 
validated. 
3. The relevance of the concept of mimesis for 
narrative situations 
Debate about the mimetic nature of literature has formed 
the subject of critical enquiry since Aristotelian times and 
is currently, in the hands of the deconstructionists, 
receiving short shrift. However, the history of the term 
mimesis indicates that it has undergone radical conceptual 
shifts in different periods so that to grapple with the 
notion at all, a sophisticated understanding of its etiology 
is a fundamental pre-requisite. A consequence of ignoring 
the evolutionary development of the term mimesis is the 
premature rejection of its validity as a critical concept 
before its value has been assessed properly: often the 
movement away ~rom mimetic readings is occasioned by 
normative pressures that are the product, of a particular 
kind of critical ~rientation in a particular age 
(Abrams, 1953). 
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It is vital to be clear about the fact that ~theories of 
Mimesis function in and are determined by an entire 
philosophical system~ (Politi, 1976:p 18). From Plato and 
Aristotle we have inherited the theory of mimesis that 
suggests that what is meant by the term is, fundamentally, 
"to be assessed in terms of what is meant by the 'real'. 
Though Politi argues that there are two variables in the 
analogy - on the one hand there is mimesis, on the other, 
what is to be understood by the 'real'- the concept of 
mimesi~ is better conceptualised, I believe, in terms of a 
dyadic relationship, where mimesis is a theory of the nature 
of the relationship postulated to hold between two entities, 
namely the artwork and the world. Critics of literature have 
often applied the concept without, perhaps, adequately 
understanding what philosophers, at the time, have meant by 
the 'real'. 
Mimesis thus specifies the nature of the relation holding 
between art and the world. This relationship is intended as 
a mirroring one: in other words, formally it could be 
expressed as the demand that the literary work 
isomorphically map the nature of the real world. However, 
our grasp of the 'real' world is itself mediated by the 
theories we construct to explain this world to ourselves. 
Our world is a function of what our best theories about it 
embody. These theories have ranged from the purely 
.idealistic, where the category of space is entirely 
dispensed with, to theories of naive realism, where it is 
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believed that the world is as it is perceived and that 
perception is itself direct and non-inferential. Thus the 
two terms of the mimetic relationship are both equally 
mutable. 
When we turn to the twentieth century, especially to its 
latter half we discover that because of philosophers such , . 
as Foucault, Goodman, Rorty, Quine and Feyerabend, whose 
theories underpin the post-modernist movement in 
epistemology, recent developments in the theory of knowledge 
have led to a fairly extreme form of relativism 
(D'Amico,1986:135-145). Truth no longer appears attainable 
and our theories of the world, and consequently our grasp of 
it, have become tenuous in the extreme. It is against this 
intellectual climate of doubt and uncertainty that we must 
place the post-modernist developments in literature. If art 
is thought to stand in some relationship to our world, this 
thesis need not be given up because one has become 
disillusioned with a particular theory of the nature of this 
relationship. The discontinuities and uncertainties that 
are the hallmark of all post-modernist thought (Fokkema, 
1984) may truly indicate that the belief in a rigid, 
isomorphic, one-on-one mapping of the world by art can no 
longer be seriously advanced; but this does not entail that 
the thesis that art relates to its world must be given up. 
On the contrary, the post-modernist movement is clearly a 
response to, and a depiction of, such a grasp of the 
twentieth century mind upon its world. A theory of 
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reference has been found wanting through the deliberations 
of meta-theoretical thinking and it is this thinking, as we 
have seen above, that has reshaped a new tentativeness in 
our commitment to the world. These meta-theoretical 
deliberations are themselves grounded in modern explorations 
into the nature of meaning which, as we have seen, situate 
semantics in a public world of action. It would be a 
damaging form of inconsistency if the conclusions of the 
modern enquiries into epistemology and semantics were to be 
used to take issue with the presuppositions of the theories 
that establish their validity. 
In rejecting a simplified world-language connection 
theorists like those of the Yale school of 
deconstructionists ( especially, for example, Paul de Man, 
J. Hillis Miller and Geoffrey Hartman) who dispense with 
the notion of reference have re-sealed the circle of 
meaning. Terry Eagleton in summarising Anglo-American 
deconstructionism is moved to say that for them, 
Literature is the ruin of all 
reference, the cemetery of 
communication •••. [It] sees social 
reality less as oppressively 
determinate than as yet more 
shimmering webs of undecidability 
stretching to the horizon. 
(1983: p 146) 
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Such an option betrays its literal-mindedness: for, while 
one can obviously be skeptical of any naive mirroring of 
reality by language, the notion of reference has proven 
itself vital for the formulation of any theory of semantics; 
and an explanation of its pre-conditions ( that is, a 
speaker-hearer situation, the co-operative principle and 
so-on) has led to postulates that will prove invaluable in 
the formulation of questions to be directed at the co-text 
of any literary work. 
The development of my thesis in the following chapters 
will demonstrate that any mapping of an interpretation onto 
the sequence of symbols making up the text must allow, at 
some juncture, for a type of mimetic commitment ( in the 
sense of the necessary activation of referential functions ) 
by the text to a world or worlds beyond its closed circle of 
meaning,if the implications that flaw from the text and 
which generate its semantic richness are to be 
intersubjectively deducible. 
The Searle/Evans defense of the 'cluster theory', arising 
in response to Kripke's barrage against it, as well as the 
pragmatic defence of analyticity mounted by Grice and 
Strawson, underwrites, I believe, the argument I develop in 
chapter 2 for the exi~tence in a literary work of a 
narrative voice, guiding the mimetic commitment of the 
receiver of the textual signals; a voice which has, until 
now, remained unidentified by contemporary critics. 
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Contemporary developments in the semantics of reference, 
then, as evinced by the writings of Searle and Evans, can be 
seen to be taking place within a paradigm sympathetic to 
mimesis. Speakers are able to orientate ·themselves within 
the public world and, using the refere~tial devices of 
language, can align their orientations with those of their 
fellow man. Language can be used to refer to enduring 
objec~s, identifiable and re-identifiable, situated in an 
inter~ubjectively accessible world. But, although reference 
within this theoretical model can be both secured and 
maintained, it remains fundamentally defeasible. As one 
moves from the position of centrality as regards one's 
primitive orientation in space and time towards the more 
rarified reaches of the literary work of art and its 
essentially mediated co-text, the conditions for the 
successful achievement of reference become progressively 
more etiolated. This etiolation is largely a function of the 
reader/receiver occupying a position ontologically distinct 
from that of the presented world, and if reference is to be 
secured for the reader/receiver, this can only be done by 
means of the clusters of descriptions offered by the 
mediator. 
Because of the uniquely privileged epistemological 
position occupied by the first person narrator vis-a-vis the 
presented world, the reader/receiver is forced to accept any 
sincere description of the presented world of the literary 
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work given by the homodiegetic narrator as a true 
description, if for no other reason than that all of his 
sincere descriptions of the presented world, given his 
privileged epistemic position, are simply incorrigible. Thus 
the success conditions for the first person narrator~s acts 
of reference are simply the assumed sincerity of all of his 
avowals. If~ in a fictional work, the narrator avows~ for 
example, that the world was a sad place in 1944, that is how 
we must take it to be. The failure conditions for his acts 
of reference, however, cannot be specified in conventional 
homodiegetic narration. 
In unreliable narratives the mediator 7 s referential acts 
do not automatically succeed, and this must be because it 
now becomes possible to specify the faiiure conditions for 
his acts of reference. The unreliable narrator, to state it 
differently~ has been rendered corrigible. A necessary 
condition, though, for the correction of the unreliable 
narrator 7 s description of the presented world is that the 
reader/receiver must have access independent of the mediator 
to the world as it is rather than as it appears to the 
mediator. But as the reader/receiver is ontologically 
divorced from this world~ it is still necessary that such 
access as is now required be essentially mediated. Thus, an 
alternative form of mediation must be present in narrative 
situations of this kind. This mediator I have termed the 
~ immanent~ narrator (1986a:41-56). Of course, as this 
narrator does not speak, its discourse must be qualitatively 
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of a different nature. It can only involve the control of 
our beliefs concerning its intentions, a control manipulated 
by the encoding of what I term ~translational indices' 
throughout the presentational process. That any such 
pattern exists in any particular work and that such a 
pattern justifies the beliefs which the reader/receiver has 
gained about the intentions of the immanent narrator will 
requir~ grounding in a sustained argument to this effect. It 
is this sustained argument, 1 believe, that constitutes the 
interpretation of the work. 
I have argued that the immanent narrator must manifest 
its intentions in the presentational process of the literary 
work via translational indices which govern the formation of 
the relevant beliefs in the reader/receiver. These are not 
to be found, however, within the semantic stratum 
(Ingarden,transl.1973) of the work, for these words are 
those of the unreliable homodiegetic narrator and mean 
precisely what they are intended by him to mean. The 
translational indices in question, as 1 have argued 
elsewhere (1986b: 49-55), must be realised in other ways, 
their variety and complexity ranging from those encoded in 
the syntactics of a literary work to those encoded in the 
dramatic configurations of the presented world. 
Reference, as I have gone to some length to est~blish, is 
a function involving both speaker and hearer. Thus, merely 
to engage with the presented world of the literary work 
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requires o~ the reader/receiver o~ the text the imaginative 
postulation of a speaker who is the source o~ its central 
unity. That is, it is only subsequent to this postulate~s 
being made that all the sentences which may be deemed to 
constitute the text are rendered as judgements. Just as it 
is possible to re~rain from making this postulate, with the 
result that the text becomes merely a string of sentences, 
so it is possible in cases of unreliable homodiegetic 
narration to refuse to acknowledge the immanent voice. This 
is another way of simply denying that the mediatpr in a 
particular instance is unreliable. The loss, radical in the 
former instance but still major in the latter, is one of 
significance. The ultimate appeal given any interpretative 
strategy is to the gain in significance of a literary work 
of art; assuming that such a strategy is employed by the 
critic to the effect that, at any point, he/she would be 
prepared to defend the appropriatene~s o~ the 
interpretation. 
The dramatic juxtapositions between elements of the text 
and components o~ the co-text ( such as the framework of 
beliefs that situate the hypostatized reader ) provide the 
main field for the control of what I have termed 
translational indices. These essentially extra-semantic 
considerations reveal the necessity, where any case of first 
person n~rration is to be deemed unreliable, of placing the 
entire text within a mimetic situation. As argued above, 
mimesis is a dyadic relationship, which relates the literary 
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work to the world. However, the world is itself complex and 
the mimetic relationship holding between the lit~rary text 
and the world could be expected, sometimes, to relate to 
different aspects of it. This has been demonstrated in the 
discussion of the ultimate grounding of meaning in ~forms of 
life~ above. But the literary text can also stand in a 
mimetic relation to other extra-semantic aspects of the 
world. For example, 1 argue in chapter 2 that one of the 
indices operating in Muriel Spark's short story, 'You Should 
Have Seen the Mess!'~ requires for its activation that the 
reader/receiver should judge the homodiegetic narrator's 
social values as limited against his/her own conception of 
the worth of such values. Thus . the extra-semantic beliefs of 
the reader/receiver are essential for the 'correct' grasp of 
the presented wor.ld of this work. This relationship of the 
text to its co-text follows from the final interpretation 
settle~ on, but qualified, of course, by the degree to which 
one's argument underwrites that final interpretation. The 
epistemological point, here, is that interpretations can be 
held; but 'in fear and trembling'. 
Unreliable narration can be seen to be perhaps the most 
sustained realisation of structural irony available to an 
author. The argument for the essentially mimetic nature of 
narrative transmission, as 1 have advanced it in this 
chapter, .is an especially cogent one. In those narratives 
which are characterised by both an overt and a tacit 
mediatory presence, certain fundamental elements coerce the 
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reader/receiver towards a recognition of the conditions 
necessary for the existence in this narrative situation of a 
voice other than that of the homodiegetic narrator. In other 
words, the reader/receiver becomes aware of the necessity 
( if the full significance of the narrative is to be 
experienced ) of giving credence to the controlling immanent 
voice in what amounts to a stereoscopic narrative 
transmission; a recognition, moreover, of the translational 
indices whereby the existence of the immanent voice within 
the complex and problematic matrix of relationships 
comprising the text ( which itself stands in some set of 
·definable relations to the external world) is corroborated. 
This world must not be naively conceived of as the 
~Ding-an-sich~: the history of epistemology since Kant has 
revealed the essentially elusive nature of the noumenal 
world. With Quine (1961:16) we must learn to live with the 
world as described by our dominant paradigms, fleeting 
though they may prove themselves to be: 
Our acceptance of an ontology is, I 
think, similar in principle to our 
acceptance of a scientific theory, say a 
system of physics: we adopt, at least 
insofar as we are reasonable, the 
simplest conceptual scheme into which 
the disordered fragments of raw 
experience can be fitted and arranged. 
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It is to this human world, imbued with its values, and 
including the people that inhabit it ( with their beliefs 
and their socia-culturally influenced perspectives), that 
the text makes reference. How it achieves this is 
problematic, but that it does, is shown by the argument to 
be simply a requirement for the possibility of unreliable 
narration.The main ~ntagonists of this view correctly 
perceive that there can be no relationship holding between 
the text and the external noumenal world, but incorrectly 
deduce from this that there can therefore be no relationship 
holding between the text and its extra-semantic co-text. 
If, i~ the eyes of the deconstructionist critics, all in the 
final analysis is merely 'play', then it is 'play' of a kind 
that nevertheless permits of interpretation, acknowledging 
the force and mimetic nature of the complex bond holding 
between the text and the phenomenal world. 
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Chapter 2: The Immanent Voice 
(i) The construct of an immanent voice 
is elaborated and closely argued for 
establishing the context of an immanent 
narrative situation where the presence 
of two mediatory voices suggests a 




(ii) The reliable/unreliable distinction is 
suggested as pertinent to an under-
standing of the mechanism of the 
immanent narrative mode. 
1. Introduction: mediacy and narration 
Analysts in the field of narrative since Percy Lubbock 
(1921) whether writing in the Anglo-American tradition or 
that of the continent have recognised, implicitly, the 
centrality of the notion of mediacy or indirectness to 
narrative: 
(War and Peace] is rendered by the story 
teller, whole, as a scene directly 
faced by himself, instead of being 
reflected in the experience of the 
rising generation. It is true that Tol-
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stoy~s good instinct guides him ••• 
away from the mere telling of the story 
on his own authority; at high moments 
he knows better than to tell it himself. 
(Lubbock, 1921:p 38) 
Lubbock~s normative criticism here aside, he implicitly 
recognises what has . come to be regarded as the 
distinguishing feature of narrative (Stanzel, transl.1971 ). 
It is discernible in neither the lyric nor in dramatic works 
where immediacy or directness of presentation are 
characteristics of the forms, separating them from their 
more recent sibling. The concept of mediacy, thus, must 
provide the narratologist with his/her point of departure: '-
however,there are yet elements of the concept that warrant 
greater clarity if its usefulness for criticism is to be 
extended. 
It is a truism then but nevertheless worth repeating that 
a story requires a story-teller; a presence of whatever kind 
that performs the function of relaying the tale to the 
listener. The story-teller, or narrator, performs a pivotal 
function in the sequence involving, finally, the 
apprehension by the reader/receiver o~ the narrative: it is 
this 'presence' that filters the details of the narrative; 
whose varying and variable aspects impose differing 
dimensions of complexity on the nature of the relationship 
between the reader, the narrated events, and the author. The 
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narrator 'mediates the potential fictional world' and it is 
in him/her that 'the reader's mental illusion finds the 
bridge and the road which lead into the land of fiction' 
(Stanzel,1971:p 6). Narratologists largely agree that the 
reading act involves the concretization of this mediator on 
the part of the receive~ of the tale ( by exactly what 
process is the business of Reception Aesthetics and, though 
the ensuing chapters provide some insight into the 
mechanisms of the particular narrative situation that 
provides this dissertation with its focus, no claim is made 
for a comprehensive account of reception); and thus is 
established the intricate matrix of relationships central to 
narrative of whatever kind: between the author of the 
fiction, the implied author, the narrator, the narratee, the 
projected fictional world(s), the hypostatized reader and ) 
the reader/receiver of the tale. Such complexity, because of 
the absence of the defining variable, the narrator, is 
ineVitably missing from the technical landscape of the lyriC 
or of dramatic works. 
The theoretical point of departure, thus, lies well within 
the mainstream of critical debate on narrative (1); and it 
is my intention here to assess, critically, some of the 
accepted precepts of narratology as it now stands and to 
offer a refinement of certain concepts in current usage 
within the discipline. With Gerard Genette (1980) I am under 
no illusion that my analysis of selected texts will have 
clarified with any finality a particular area of narrative 
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discourse, but I hope that what I shall bring to the surface 
will provide an insight into an increasingly intriguing area 
of the mechanics of narrative. The pioneers in the field 
set discourse in motion by providing sweeping typologies: 
the focus of this and the ensuing chapters is, however, kept 
deliberately narrow so that greater clarity may be brought 
to certain areas of narrative discourse, thereby 
illuminating more sharply such features of narrative as have 
not yet been fully examined ( or which have not received 
adequate attention at the hands of critics.) In doing so I 
hope, with Genette, to ~have furnished the theory of 
literature ••• with some objects of study that are no doubt 
minor, but a little trimmer than the traditional 
entities ••• ~ (1980:p 264). 
2. The literary work of art as a stratified intentional 
object: some objections to Ingarden~s model 
Fundamental underpinning of my theoretical position ( as 
I indicated in the introduction ) is provided by Roman 
Ingarden who, while concerned to explore the field of 
aesthetics rather than that of narrative per se, 
nevertheless has bequeathed to the discipline a wealth of 
incisive analyses o~, and philosophical insight into, the 
mode of being and the formal structure of works of 
literature (1973). His phenomenological account of the 
literary work of art as a stratified intentional object 
comprising, minimally, four inter-related ~layers~ is 
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unparalleled. (2). It is perhaps essential though that I 
list these strata here because they are not yet widely 
understood and, at a certain juncture, I find myself 
challenging his account of the mode of being of the literary 
work of art. 
Ingarden's four strata, then, which he regarded as 
minimally requisite for a literary work to come into 
existence, are: 
1. The stratum of verbal sounds and phonetic formations 
2. The stratum of semantic units. 
3. The stratum of schematized aspects where states of 
various kinds portrayed in the work come into appearance. 
4. The stratum of the objectivities portrayed in the 
intentional states of affairs projected by the sentences. 
Each stratum, moreover, has what he terms an aesthetic value 
of its own and contributes to what Ingarden calls the 
'polyphonic harmony' and therefore to the aesthetic value of 
the entire structure. A fifth, metaphysical, stratum 
(arguably a component of, say, Lardner's 'Haircut' or 
James's The Aspern Papers ) can be discerned in great works 
of literature, but Ingarden rules it out for the literary 
work of art as being desirable, but non-essential. From the 
outline of this schema, sketched above, one is made aware of 
the fact that Ingarden's invesitigations are, in the first 
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instance, broadly philosophical, operating at the macro, 
rather than the micro level which, o~ necessity ( the broad 
demarcation of the field having been accomplished ), is the 
domain o~ more recent theoreticians in the ~ield o~ literary 
studies. Thus, while taking issue with the minutiae of his 
theoretical postulates as regards the literary work o~ art, 
the modern critic must, I believe, accord Ingarden the 
respect due to a predecessor o~ his stature; one whose reach 
has proved no less than remarkable. 
For Ingarden, as indeed, for any critic sympathetic to 
his model, the second stratum is central since it requires 
the other three and yet determines them so that they have 
their ontic bases in it. He devotes a great deal of 
attention to the meaning units and it is at this ~undamental 
stratum that I wish to level criticism. (3) With the 
introduction of sentences into the schema a number o~ issues 
are raised. They are, in the main, problems for semantics 
( their existence and complexity -lending supportive weight 
to the importance of contextualising the- debate within the 
development o~ semantics as I have in chapter 1 ), the 
primary one of concern, here, being Strawson~s distinction 
between asserted and non-asserted sentences, which focusses 
upon the differences between sentences on the one hand and 
judgements on the other (Strawson,1950: 320-44). Judgements 
we construe as asserted sentences, reference being activated 
by a speaker. It is only - and significantly - at this 
juncture, and within the context established in chapter 1, 
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that questions of truth or falsity come into play, as only 
an assertion or statement ( and not a mere sentence ) can be 
described as having the property of truth or falsity. 
Now, as the transition from sentences to judgements 
presupposes a speaker, the reader, when treating the 
sentences that constitute the ~iterary work as judgements, 
has to postulate a ficti~e speaker ( or voice ). For 
example, the simple declarative sentence, ~The cat is on the 
mat' has no existential commitment: that is, no-one is 
committed to any particular cat or mat: whereas, when 
someone asserts that sentence, at least he/she commits 
him/herself to accepting the existence of a cat and a mat to 
which the sentence makes reference. To react, therefore, at 
what may be termed the 'judgemental' level commits the 
reader to the postulation of fictional characters; a 
commitment whose validity is essential to the argument being 
advanced here. Ingarden's stratum of portrayed objectivities 
does not, in fact, accommodate the subtle logical 
presuppositions involved in the transition outlined above. 
To be called in the first instance into fictional being, 
characters who will occupy the presented ( fictional) world 
( and who form part of what Ingarden designates his realm of 
portrayed objectivities >, may be given as the referents of 
the judgements being made in the work. This is not, 
however, the only means by which they can be summoned into 
fictional being: in homodiegetic narratives whether the 
mediator occupies a central or a peripheral position with 
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regard to the presented world, the homodiegetic narrator is 
automatically conjured into being ( or, as Ingarden would 
put it, concretized) within the presented world once the 
reader treats as judgements the sentences that constitute 
the ~presentational process~ (Ruthrof,1981:p 26) of the 
homodiegetic discourse. It is, significantly, only in 
homodiegetic narration th"at the narrator occupies a position 
within the presented wor~d of the narrative. In authorial, 
figural and - as I shall demonstrate below - immanent 
narration, while a fictive speaker is necessarily posited by 
the reader, he/she occupies a separate ontological realm, 
rarely entering that of the presented world ( except in 
extraordinary narrative situations such as, for example, 
John Fowles~ The French Lieutenant~s Woman [1969] and Salmon 
Rushdie~s Midnight~s Children [1981] ). In narratives such 
as these it could, however, be countered that the first 
p~rson narrator is not postulated within the recollected 
presented world. However, with a minor modification, namely 
that the speaker must at least be temporally and spatially 
contiguous with that presented world ( or in other words, 
peripheral to the world in question ) the general principle 
will hold. Post-modernist writers exploit the technical 
possibilities inherent in such situations. 
There are, then, two ways in which individual characters 
may be realised in the presented worlds of narrative 
fiction: 
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1. When they appear as the referents of sentences which are 
construed as judgements. 
2. When the very act of treating the sentences of the 
literary work of art as judgements ( as in first person 
narrative) entails a commitment by the reader to the 
fictive speaker ( or first person narrator.) 
These ways of realising character cover, in fact, the 
broadly demarcated narrative situations that Stanzel ( 1971; 
1984 ) calls authorial, first person and figural. However, 
it is only in first person narration ( a concept referred to 
~ ~ 
by Genette [1972, transl. 1980J as ~homodiegetic narration~, 
and which I use interchangeably with first person 
narration ) that both these means of conjuring character are 
operative: in the other modes of narration, the second is 
inoperative. Moreover, in these modes ( authorial and 
figural ·) the reader~s commitment to the postulation of a 
fictive speaker as an entailment of treating the sentences 
as judgements does not conjure up the fictive speaker 
( narrator/mediator ) within the presented world. The 
narrator in these instances stands in a relation to the 
presented world that is not spatially or temporally 
contiguous and which is perhaps best understood using 
Genette's term, ~focalisation~ (Rimmon-Kenan, 1983:chapter 
6, espe~ially). For example, there is the authorial 
commentary of the kind prevalent in much eighteenth century 
fiction and of the kind currently prevalent in metafictional 
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works: In Tom Jones, to name only one example where 
spatio-temporal contiguity between narrator/mediator and 
presented world has been forsaken by the author, there are 
comments such as: ~To say the truth, Mr. Allworthy's 
situation had never been so bad, as the great caution of the 
doctor had represented~ (1966:p 23). Commentary of this 
kind, with its authorial overlay, causes 
( among other things) as Stanzel puts it, ~tension to arise 
between the characters' own interpretations of their 
experiences, and the authorial narrator's comments and 
reflections' (1971:p 49) upon them. 
Whether the speakers are realised in the fictional worlds 
of prose narrative by means of either 1. or 2. above, the 
important consideration for this theoretical position is 
that it is only with the recognition by the receiver of the 
narrative of an implicit speaker that, in our cognition of 
the literary work of art, we are able to move from the 
semantic stratum ( Ingarden~s second level ) to that of the 
portrayed objectivities ( Ingarden's fourth ). What emerges 
from the above as a critical construct of some force is what 
1 call the notion of 'ontic ascent~, comprising a series of 
conditioned levels which, when clearly apprehended by the 
critic, precludes the blurring of boundaries on his/her 
part. This conditioned relationship, as I see it, provides 
the the.oretical bonding for Ingarden's four discrete strata 
and it is these theoretically bonded, impacting levels that 
constitute, then, the literary work of art. 
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A pertinent question ( one which is largely overlooked, 
except by post-structuralist critics who fail to engage with 
it adequately) that must be addressed to the literary work 
of art is: How can it cope with its threatening solipsism? ~ 
That is, how, as readers of such narratives as may be 
designated - unreliable and homodiegetic, do we introduce a 
principle that will allow us to draw the distinction between 
~way of seeing~; that is, the subjective perspective of the 
homodiegetic narrator and ~thing seen": that is~ the world V 
of the narrative which may be objectively construed. 
Solipsism threatens because the presented world of a novel 
stands in no readily accessible relation to our world. The 
subjective perceptions of the narrator cannot, for example, 
be corrected for bias: we are unable, on the basis of 
independent evaluation of the facts of the presented world, 
to correct the narrator"s account of those facts ( as we 
might correct another person"s distortions or -
misinterpretations of events in our world ). This is so 
because we have no access to the facts of the presented 
world of a novel other than through a mediator~s ostensibly 
incorrigible rendition. To gloss over what occurs under 
certain narrative conditions as merely ~inference~, which it 
appears is what Ruthrof is doing when he states that: "The 
reader must assess the narrator~s mental short-comings and 
shift t ,he misinterpreted world so that it coincides with 
what he infers to be the implied authorial stance~ (1981:p 
131), seems to be to ignore an intriguing aspect of the 
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presentational process in narrative. Clearly, narrative 
allows for this distinction, between the presented world as 
it appears to the narrator and the presented world as it is, 
to be drawn. In the example which I have selected for the 
purpose of demonstrating this feature of narrative, Muriel 
Spark~s, ~You Should Have Seen the Mess!~, the problem as I 
see it is to explain the mechanics of an achievement that 
allows the reader ( where there is no apparen mediatory 
/ 
presence other than that of a limited or ~unreliabIe~ 
narrator) to correct distortions and to arrive at what ~he 
infers to be the implied authorial stance~. In chapter 3 I 
offer a brief typology of what I term translational lndices 
whose presence in the text alerts the reader to the possible 
existence of an ~immanent~ v6lce from which is inferred the 
existence of the immanent narrative situation. 
3. ~You Should Have Seen the Mess!~: the immanent 
narrative mode 
In Spark's short story, the implied reader moves rapidly 
to a vantage point that encompasses and exposes the naivety 
( or limitations) of the ( ostensible) homodiegetic 
narrator. The grounds for this perspective, whereby the 
conventional epistemic relationship of inferiority ( on the 
part of the receiver) to superiority ( on the part of the 
narrator ) is inverted, inhere in what is essentially ( but 
looseli ) defined as the ironic mode. The New Criticism with 
its focus upon the text-as-text, and a concomitant search 
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for internal patternings and consistencies of form, in the 
ultimate interests of ~objective7 criticism, was especially 
concerned to explicate irony; the literary device, that is, 
which allows for the registering of distance ( or 
disjunctions) between the view of the ~er/receiver and 
that of the narrator. A number of internal clues would 
reveal the irony in anyone narration: in Spark 7s short 
story the discrepancy between the narrator~s values, for 
example, and those central to the immanent narrative 
situation is responsible for generating ironic tension. But 
pointers of this kind may be more or less subtle with, 
perhaps, authorial interjection redirecting or shaping the 
reader/receiver~s responses to the thoughts and utterances 
of the narrator. The controlling ironic mode creates what 
, 
may be regarded as a ~stereoscopic7 perspective for the 
reader. As will be shown, the world presented by the 
limited first person narrator ( in 7you Should Have Seen the 
Mess!7 ) is juxtaposed to a distinctive mode of narrative 
transmission which I term the 7immanent 7 narrative 
situation. This comprises a ~voice7 - for it engenders a 
discourse - of a unique kind, guiding the reader to a 
perspective upon the presented world which is distinct from 
that of the first person narrator. Hence it can be seen that 
in first person or homodiegetic fictional prose narrative 
the solipsistic status that threatens can be avoided on 
those occasions when the dual ~erspective on the presented 
world is made possible by the presence in the text of the 
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voice ~f the immanent narrator. However, solipsism must 
~ 
inevitably result if an immanent narrator~s ~ence cannot 
be detected in the unfolding presentational process. The 
solipsistic state itself in homodiegetic narration is by no 
means to be regarded as defective: the point is that 
unreliable homodiegetic narration cannot be realised where 
the receivec is prohibited from drawing the ~way of 
seeing~/~thing seen~ distinction referred to above. 
It appears that despite the subtlety of their theoretical 
positions critics like Stanzel and Booth, and more recently, 
Genette, Ruthrof and Rimmon-Kenan, have not perceived the 
the existence of such a narrative situation: and, in 
referring to what has become known in accepted terminology 
as the omniscient or authorial narrative mode, have failed 
to recognise an important distinction as I see it between 
the so-called omniscient (authorial) third person narrative 
situation and that which I term the immanent narrative 
situation. (4) This is a distinction which my theoretical 
/ 
postulate of translational indices will allow me to draw. A 
further important consequence of this postulate is that it 
allows me, contra Ingarden, to relocate, radically, the 
logical space of the presented world allowing the 
reader/receiver an enriched perspective on ( or a 
~ 
stereoscopic vision of ) the presented world. Ingarden, 
together with other critics in the field, is, in fact, 
compelled by the logic of his model to accept only that 
world which is projected by the first person narrator. 
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Obviously, especially when the narrator~s account is being 
received as tangibly unreliable in some fashion, such a 
position is untenable and I suggest that the postulation of 
an immanent narrative voice resolves a felt dilemma. 
The notion of stereoscopic vision which I have mooted 
requires, I believe, some refinement. I have briefly 
presented a situation ( with regard to the Spark short 
story ) where the reader/receiver moves to a vantage point 
whi.ch allows for the correction on his/her part of 
subjective descriptions or accounts of events by the 
~ 
homodiegetic narrator. Translational indices in the text, 
provided by the author in the act of creation, permit -
indeed coerce the reader/receiver towards - a corrected 
reading of the limited homodiegetic narrator~s commentary. 
At first glance this claim may threaten to lead to some 
ontological confusion and it therefore requires 
clarification. The authorial realm is necessarily distinct 
from that of the mediator in fictional prose narratives of 
whatever kind ( even when the narrative exhibits the 
presence of an authorial mediator as in the authorial 
narrative situation) and the author, Muriel Spark in the 
above instance, can by no stretch of the imagination inhabit 
the realm o~ the narrative, or for that matter of her 
narrator: such a feat is logically impossible. Even were she 
to adopt the guise of the authorial narrator no transition 
from one realm to another occurs - they remain ontologically 
discrete with Muriel Spark inhabiting the one domain, her 
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authorial narrator, another. In bringing into being the 
presented world of this narrative, however, Spark has 
selected a ~~ator of a particular kind: that is, 
homodiegetic, and limited. Now while the narrative details 
that comprise the presented world remain constant, subtle 
shifting of the focus can ' gradually be discerned so that 
emergent features are perceived by the reader as being 
inconsistent with the possible perceptions of the 
homodiegetic narrator. In this instance the reader is being 
drawn toward an overview by the careful and systematic 
'" 
guidance of a second~iscernible mediatory voice; and it is 
this ~voice~ which I have designated ~immanent~. 
The nature and complexity of this voice~s status is 
clarified to some extent by an understanding on the part of 
the critic of the subtleties inherent in Ruthrof~s neat 
distinction between, on the one hand, the presentational 
process and, on the other, the presented world (1981:22). 
His concepts are useful in that they are able to enhance our 
understanding of the ontological separation of author, 
narrator(s) and presented world. Narration ( the act of 
telling) aligns itself pre-eminently with the 
presentational process, and is, thus, ontologically separate 
from the realm which is projected by the narrative. There 
are, however, certain precedents for a fusion or overlapping 
of thes.e normally disparate realms in narrative which are of 
interest. Some of them are suggested below: 
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3.1. Presentational process and presented world: some 
instances of their merging in narrative situations 
1. Autobiography provides, superficially, one of the more 
intriguing mergers of author and presented world. But the 
questions may be"eliminated as they arise; for such a 
narrative as Down Second Avenue (Mphahlele, 1959) functions 
less as fiction than as quasi-factual record of real events. 
Ontological consistency is retained by an apparently 
autobiographical work such as David Copperfield where the 
homodiegetic narrator is a fictive persona; and no matter 
how similar ( and biographically verifiable ) his 
experiences, he can never be confounded with Dickens 
himself. Thus the realm of the author and that of the 
narrator remain separate. 
2. The merging of presented world and presentational process 
occurs most tangibly, perhaps, in ostensibly authorial 
narratives such as Tom Jones or Don Qixote. Here there often 
occurs that temporal (if not spatial ) contiguity which 
permits of authorial commentary of the kind remarked upon 
earlier. In fact, as Stanzel points out, the deliberate 
attempt at the merging of these realms is a large feature 
o~ Fielding's virtuosity as an author: 
••• The picaresque adventures of Tom Jones ••• 
could -not conceivably have captured the 
interest of adult readers for two centuries 
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if these readers were not concerned with observing 
the high intellectual play of the narrator in his 
attempt to make the rather coarse experiences 
of Tom Jones literarily presentable ••• In 
Tom Jones one can observe that the narrator 
in such a novel does not make .merely auto-
biographical remarks about an otherwise very 
simple story, but rather he arouses the 
reader~s interest above all in the narrator 
as the ~one who evaluates, senses, visualizes. 
He symbolizes the epistemological view 
held since Kant that we do not apprehend 
the world as it is in itself, but as it has 
passed through the medium of an observing 
mind.~ [Quote from Friedemann, Kaete. 1910. 
Die Rolle des Erzaehlers in der Epik: p2bJ 
(1971:p 50) 
What Stanzel isolates here is one of the primary advantages 
of the authorial narrative situation, one which seems to 
gainsay any normative critique which would reject such a 
narrative situation because of its apparent simplicity or 
lack of sophistication. At its best, authorial narration, 
with its possibilities for the subtle interlocking of realms 
in a fictional work, can be extraordinarily evocative. 
3. Overlapping of presentational process and presented world 
occurs most explicitly when the first person narrative 
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situation is the mediatory mode of a fictional work~s 
presentation. Given the pressure on the novel ( during the 
last century particularly) of verisimilitude the profound 
and lasting legacy of ~realism~ - it became necessary in 
first person narratives for the narrator, to some extent at 
least, to have participated in the narrated events. Problems 
of consistency arise even in a work such as Moby Dick when, 
with the changing emphasis of his vast landscape, Melville 
allows Ishmael, his initially central homodiegetic narrator, 
to occupy a more and more peripheral role, so that, when 
Ahab~s consciousness is being explored (in what has become 
an omniscient-authorial manner, externally focalised) the 
splendour of the narrative must quell any niggling doubts as 
to Melville~s technical control of the material. Ideally -
our ideological underpinning derived from nineteenth century 
realism - we demand that the first person narrator must, 
minimally, have had some means of gaining access to the mind 
of a character whose thoughts he is mediating. In Wuthering 
Heights, for example, Emily Bronte is compelled, by the 
realist canons of consistency to which she adheres, despite 
her novel~s palpably romantic generic affiliations, to 
resort to the rather clumsy technical device of the letter 
from the Grange in order to overcome a first person 
narrator 7 s limitations where spatial and temporal 
discontinuity between narrator ( Nellie Dean) and narrated 
events might call in question the ~validity~ of the account. 
When, however, the narrator of a first person novel is 
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manifestly central to the events being recounted, fusion of 
the two realms occurs ( that is, the presentational process 
merges with the presented world.> In other words, the 
experiencing self becomes indistinguishable from the 
narrating self ( as in, amongst other examples, David 
Copperfield ). 
If, then, it is possible for the normally distinct 
boundaries between apparently discrete realms ( those that 
comprise the matrix of fictional prose > to become blurred 
or indeterminate at times, it seems possible to assume at 
least the possibility of a similar contiguity between 
limited first person narration and an ~authorial-type~ 
presence such as the immanent voice. Precedents abound in 
literature. What might, perhaps, be argued is that, where 
the immanent voice is to be heard, the presentational 
process has assumed a degree of complex~ty and 
sophistication ( technically speaking) of an order not 
unlike that which is possible in commentary made by the 
authorial narrator in a novel like Tom Jones. But narrative 
criticism such as is involved in the interpretation of 
texts, does not specifically concern me here: it is on the 
technique itself and not on the dividends it might pay for a 
metaphysical fifth stratum that I concentrate although I am 
certain that such an analysis would in other circumstances 
prove profitable to the business of criticism generally. 
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Contiguity of normally discrete ontological realms, then, 
is certainly potentially a possibility, given literary 
precedent, but if 1 am to proceed fruitfully with the 
discussion of the contiguity of immanent narration and 
homodiegetic narration in particular works of literature 1 
believe it is necessary to set forth some of the gradations 
within the homodiegetic narrative situation which critics 
have already established and which form a part of our 
critical vocabulary. (5) Very broadly, then, these are as 
delineated in the ensuing section. 
3.2 Types of homodiegetic narration: reliability and 
vi unreliability 
1. A homodiegetic peripheral narrator whose vantage point is 
from the fringes of the presented world with, very often, 
only second-hand experience of the narrated events. The 
reader/receiver is made aware of his peripheral status by 
the deployment in the text of signifiers such as 71 assume7 
or 71 imagine 7 which serve to indicate that the narrator 7 s 
relationship to the narrated events is a tenuous one ( Mr. 
Lockwood in Wuthering Heights exemplifies this peripheral 
stance of the first person narrator. ) 
J 
2. A homodiegetic central narrator whose vantage point is 
patently from the centre of the narrated events; that is , 
he/she narrates, as David Copperfield does, from the centre 
of the presented world or from well within it. In this 
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instance, the narrator is the ~experiencing self~ whose 
consciousness is responsible for the focalisation of the 
presented world; and through whose perceptions upon those 
events, the reader/receiver is able to apprehend what is 
being mediated by the narrator. (6) 
3. A further possible subdivision first utilised with 
critical sophistication by Booth (1961) is that of the above 
homodiegetic narrators into reliable or unreliable. There 
are special consequences ( as Ruthrof, [1981:p 130] shows) 
for the reader/receiver when the conventional relationship 
of superiority and reliability with regard to the emergent 
presented world is undermined and the narrator is ~eveal~ 
as having an unreliable, naive o~ limited consciousness. The 
receiver of the narrative transmissiom, normally the 
~victim~ in a presentational process where the narrator 
dominates, assumes a position of unwonted authority, and is 
able to challenge and reassess the narrative material being 
~ 
filtered through the mediator. In order for this perspective 
to be achieved and for the inversion of the conventional 
role ( of the reader/receiver ) to occur, not one, but two 
narrative situations must be present as part of the 
presentational process: the one, a <limited ) homodiegetic 
narrative situation; the other, an authorial-like narrative 
situation whereby the authorial mediator patently, though 
implici~ly ~addresses7 the reader/receiver, providing a 
warning about the unreliable status of the ostensible first 
person narrator. ~ 
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However, a phrase such as ~authorial-like~ above, 
requires further explication. While it must be acknowledged 
that the central work done within the field of unreliable 
narration has involved a focussing down upon what is termed 
the ~implied author~, a concept utilized to grapple with the 
elusive control many critics correctly feel is at work in 
yI' 
unreliable homodiegetic narration, my thesis engages with 
the 'same central area of concern but in a manner 
conceptually at odds with the traditional understanding of 
the control exerted by the so-called implied author. In 
addition, an attempt is made to argue for the control being 
realised neither as a construct nor as an ~anthropomorphic ~ 
entity~ (Rimmon-Kenan,1983:p86) but rather as an active ~de 
of narrative transmission situated immanently in the text. A 
conceptual manoeuvre of this kind has its foundation in the 
typology advanced by Stanzel (1984) though it of course 
involves the postulation of a narrative situation, in short 
a new voice in narrative ( De Reuck, 1986 ) which augments 
his classificatory schema. To regard the concept of the 
immanent voice, though, as merely a renaming of a construct 
already current in narrative theory: that is, to view it as 
synonymous with the so-called ~implied author~ would, I 
believe, be to miss the essential contribution to the field 
of narratology which this thesis attempts to make. 
Whenever the question of r~liability has been raised <and 
it has been . . 1n varIous forms and with differing emphases, 
either intra- or extra-textually, by Booth 1961; 
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Romberg, 1962; Chatman,1978; Iser,1974; Sternberg,1978; 
Rimmon-Kenan, 1983; Stanzel,1984; Yacobi,1987; or 
Rabinowitz,1987 ) the interpretative pull has been toward 
some area of authorial intention; toward an explanation that 
departs more or less radically from a text-immanent critical 
engagement with the modes of narrative transmission. While I 
intend to delineate fairly comprehensively the relevant 
features of the narratological terrain which have a bearing 
on the thesis being proposed here, it is ultimately with the 
intention of rejecting such a notion as the implied author 
that I am preoccupied, and my reasons for doing so will be 
elaborated shortly. 
As is now fairly generally acknowledged, the concept of 
the implied author may be traced back to Wayne C. Booth who 
talks of 'the image [a writer] creates of himself, his 
implied author~ (1961:p39S). With Rimmon-Kenan ( 1983:p87) I 
agree that the identification of author and implied author 
in a loosely conceived anthropomorphic framework is fraught 
with epistemological dangers: merely to acknowledge the 
psychological complexity of the relationship of author to 
implied author on this model is to skirt a crucial critical 
area, one which with its intrinsic relativism and 
subjectivism must severely hamper objective, verifiable 
textual evaluation. Nevertheless, identification of author 
and -implied author, despite the ontological blurring this 
entailed, has been a feature of the etiology of this 
concept. 
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Bertil Romberg (1962), like Booth, conceives of the 
implied author as an aspect or manifestation of the author~s 
intentional act. In assessing a narrative which Booth would 
characterise as having an unreliable narrator, J.P. 
Marquand~s novel, H.M. Pulham, Esquire, he states: 
It must be emphasised once more that 
the narrator is not by any means 
presented as an empty or stupid . 
medium; it is only that he draws quite 
different conclusions from the facts 
communicated than the conclusions the 
author intends the reader to draw. 
~. when the reader 
over the narrator~s 
is given information 
head, so to speak, 
the narrator~s role as medium is 
generally emphasised thereby. And then 
the author can be discerned behind the 
narrator ••• 
(pp 119;123) 
Although he does not explicitly refer to an ~implied author~ 
it can readily be gauged that Romberg, here, relies upon a 
conception of authorial intention that aligns his 
theoretical position with that of Booth: in the refractory 
domain of psychological intention. This is true also of 
Iser (1974) who postulates a substitute or agent for the 
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author in the implied author. Meir Sternberg (1978), 
however, who talks of: 
The author or ••• "implied author" - the 
omnipotent artistic figure behind the 
work, incessently selecting, combining, 
and distributing information, and 
pulling various strings with a view tq 
manipulating the reader into the 
desired responses - is the creator of 
the artwork as well as its meaning, of 
its rhetoric as well as its normative 
groundwork and thematic 'pattern. 
<p254) 
provides a more complex presentation of the concept of the 
implied author, noting that it is not identical with the 
author but is ~another figure [interposed] between [the 
author] and the reader, namely, the narrator - the person or 
persona that actually does the telling.~ (1978:p 255). He, to 
my mind, rightly takes issue with the 7almost axiomatic 
presupposition of novel criticism since Lubbock that the 
omniscient narrator coincides with the author at all points 
or rather is the author~ (pp 255-56) stating that such a 
blending of omniscient narrator and author 7fails to stand 
up to the facts 7: 
the omniscient narrator is as much a 
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creation of the author~s as are 
dramatized narrators that are obviously 
distant from him. 
(p 256) 
For Sternberg, the implied author must not be identified 
with the author except ( and again there is evidence of the 
characteristic anthropomorphism first encountered in Booth~s 
analysis) as ~a certain kind of narrator' (p 256). This 
position is challenged by Rimmon-Kenan who locates the 
debate about the implied author fairly specifically, 
suspending it between the polarities, on the one hand, of 
those accounts which imply psychological identity between 
author and implied author ( Booth, Romberg, Iser >, and ~n 
the other, accounts such as that offered by Sternberg which 
identify the implied author with the narrator. (Sternberg 
suggests, for example, that the omniscient narrator is the 
type that ~most closely approximates the implied author~:p 
256). Chatman, however, proposes a schema which, though 
problematic, involves an extended and provocative engagement 
with the concept of the implied author. His diagram of the 
communicative process provides Rimmon-Kenan with an arsenal 
of critical ammunition but it must be accorded recognition 
as a statement that goes some way towards unpacking the 
complexity of the term. 
Rimmon-Kenan believes that if the implied author is only 
a construct ( as in Chatman~s diagram) having ~ ••• no voice, 
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no direct means of communicating' ( Chatman,1978: p148 >, 
then it seems 'a contradiction in terms to cast it in the 
role of the addresser in a communication situation' ( 1983:p 
88) • She prefers to see the implied author 'considered as a 
set of implicit norms rather than as a speaker or a voice', 
entailing, she believes, its literal exclusion as a 
'participant in the narrative communication situation' (p 
88), where she considers the narrator and narratee as 
'constitutive, not just optional, factors in narrative 
communication' (p 88). She defines the narrator, moreover, 
'minimally, as the agent which at the very least narrates or 
engages in some activity serving the needs of narration' (p 
88). 
It is at this juncture, where the concept of the implied 
author is suspended between the twin polarities of 
'anthropomorphic entity' and 'implicit norms', that the 
notion of an immanent narrative situation distinguishes 
V itself from the notion of the implied author. Unlike the 
notion of the implied author outlined above, the immanent 
narrative situation is conceived of neither as a personified 
consciousness nor as a 'construct inferred and assembled by 
the reader from all the components of the text' ( p 87 >; 
rather, I argue, it is realised as a legitimate narrative 
situation, immanent in the text and fulfilling the role of 




In chapter 3 it will be encumbent upon me to provide a 
~ 
theory that will explain just how a silent addresser is able 
to disclose its meaning and secure its referential acts, 
which form of ~utterance~ reveals its presence in the text 
as a logical presupposition. It will be argued that if 
referential acts are performed (albeit, as will be seen, 
of a nondenotational kind ) and if meaning can be disclosed, 
then the source or promUlgator of the transmission of 
reference must b~ a legitimate candidate for the role of 
addresser in a communicative situation. 
An analogy for my enterprise here, drawn from recent 
developments in the semantics of metaphor, may make my point 
clearer. Donald Davidson ( 1978:p 43) argues that 
metaphorical sentences do not ~"say something" special, no 
matter how indirectly. For a metaphor says only what it 
shows on its face ••• it is given in the literal meaning of 
the words.~ The reason for this is to be found in the 
necessary univocality of words. Sentence meaning is 
generated from the meanings that its constituent words 
conventionally have. Searle ( 1986 ) develops this point 
further when he argues that a distinction must be drawn 
between sentence meaning and utterer~s meaning. Utterer~s 
meaning, then, can be revealed through the devices 
standardly made use of in disclosing speaker-intention. 
Such ' distinctions carried across to narratology can 
expose the logical geography, so to speak, of the narrative 
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si tuation that compri ses unrel iable homodi egetic narrati ves-. 
The judgements of the unreliable first person narrator, 
analogous to the metaphorical sentences above, mean just 
what their speaker intends them to mean. However, another 
meaning is disclosed in certain of these transmissions and 
when this occurs, we are obliged to ground this ~new~ 
meaning in a more primary set ofa different utterer's 
intentions. This parallels the requirement of positing the 
utterer's meaning in accounting for what is accomplished by 
metaphor. Corresponding to the case for a recognition of the 
utterer's intentions in metaphoric speech, the ensuing 
argument seeks to establish in cases of unreliable 
homodiegetic narration that the disclosed meaning of the 
text must be grounded in the mode of its narrative 
transmission, a mode which I term immanent. 
The argument of this thesis then seeks to explain the 
dynamics of that special ambiguity manifest in unreliable 
homodiegetic narratives without following the conceptual 
research programmes suggested by either pole of the concept 
of the implied author. Instead, by suggesting an amendment 
to Stanzel's narrative typology, the thesis engages with the 
problem of unreliable homodiegetic narration, providing a 
theoretical account of the dominating control exerted by the 
immanent narrative situation. 
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3.3 'Showing' and 'telling': aspects of the immanent 
narrative mode 
Revelation with regard to a homodiegetic narrator's 
unreliability may also occur in another less palpable 
fashion when the reader/receiver is made aware, by means of 
specific textual signals, of the presence in the narrative 
situation of an immanent voice. This is essentially a ~~ 
- ~ 
revelatory voice which 'shows' rather than 'tells'. Its 
technical virtuosity lies in the fact that it permits of a 
simultaneity in the presentation of the narrative situations 
rather than the consecutive progression of a 
homodiegetic/authorial kind. By virtue then of the unique 
stereoscopic vision which such a presentational process 
v 
engenders, the reader/receiver is made to confront not one 
but two narrative situations simultaneously~ whose 
superimposition, moreover, allows for the dramatic 
revelation of the first person narrator's psychic make-up. 
The prese~tational process as outlined above comprises two 
separate narrative voices but permits the reader/receiver 
the simultaneous apprehension of, on the one hand, details 
presented ('told') by the first person narrator and, at an 
impacting, therefore more sophisiticated meta-level, on the 
other hand, the apprehension of details rendered ('shown') 
by the . immanent voice. As I have indicated ( and to 
corroborate the 'telling/showing' distinction which I see as 
operating when this narrative situation applies), when the 
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immanent narrator's presence comes into focus, it is without 
any conscious activity of 'telling' on its part ( that is, 
its status must be regarded as being distinctly different 
from the modus operandi of conventional authorial 
narrators ), yet it bears a marked resemblance to the 
authorial narrator's function in that the activity of 
telling lies submerged - is implicit - in the act of 
revelation. I call this 'presence' immanent because of its 
~ 
omni-present qualities: it is pervasive and covert; and it 
must be a narrative voice in that only a narrative voice of 
some kind can mediate between the realm of the presented 
world and that of the reader/receiver. 
The origin of such a distinction in literary criticism 
between the function performed by a limited homodiegetic 
narrator ( or, as the case may be, an authorial narrator ) 
and an immanent narrator can of course be traced back to 
E.M. Forster's differentiation between 'telling' and 
'showing' (1927) or between what Stanzel calls 'reportlike 
narration' or 'scenic presentation' (1971). In his 
adaptation of the concept for his more recent publications, 
Stanzel uses the terms 'teller-characters and 
reflector-characters' v (1978; 1984). A teller-character, for 
Stanzel, is the speaker of the narrative words while the 
reflector-character is the knower of the narrative (1984). 
There are obvious conceptual parallels, too, with . . 
Rimmon-Kenan's focalisers ( external and internal ): her 
notion, derived from Genette (1980), will receive further 
72 
critical attention in the explicatory chapters ( 4,5 and 6 ) 
of the second half of this thesis. Stanzel, by confining his 
distinction to concretizable characters within the 
presentational process or the presented world seems to me to 
preclude the undertaking of a fundamental examination of at 
least this narrative possibility~ That is, his schema ( as 
it is presently conceived) seems to deny the critic the 
means by which the perspective on the presented world of the 
reader/receiver is made to blend with that of the 
hypostatized reader <projected by means of a matrix of 
text-based signals); and calls in question the credibility 
of the first person narrator when there is apparently no 
mediator in either domain to whom can be ascribed 
responsibility for any adjustment of the perspective to 
encompass and surpass that of the homodiegetic narrator. In 
other words, Stan~el~s concretized 'person' does not allow 
for the accomodation by the reader of such a stereoscopic 
vision as is warranted by the immanent narrative mode, and 
, 
his theoretical account, I suggest, suffers accordingly. 
3.4 Analysis of 'You Should Have Seen the Mess!': an 
example of immanent narration 
The selection of Muriel Spark's short story, 'You Should 
Have Seen the Mess!' (1972), was occasioned not by any sense 
of its aesthetic worth but rather by its seeming to provide 
pre-eminently, an example of the . immanent narrative 
situation. In addition, it is by no means familiar to 
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critics in the field who tend to select primarily from the 
Great Tradition of literary works, according their narrative 
situations a status that it is difficult to assess without 
particular, and often distorting, colouration. A relatively 
obscure narrative such as Spark~s presents no preconceptions 
that might necessitate elimination and provides the 
narratologist with a wholly unchartered domain through which 
to move, unhampered by any earlier, reified topographical 
pointers. 
Spark~s narrator in this short story is Lorna Merrifield. 
She is the ~experiencing self~ whose perceptions draw the 
I receiver into the fictional world. The ostensible narrative 
situation is, thus, first person, or homogieg~tic, central: 
I am now more than glad that I did 
not pass into the grammar school 
five years ago, ~lthough it was a 
disappointment at the time. 
<p.301) 
In these opening lines Spark establishes Lorna Merrifield~s 
distinctive voice and we are given some indication that this 
narrator will evolve towards a stance somewhat remote from 
(that of quasi-detached objectivity which, conventionally, 
governs the relationship of narrator to the events he/she 
narrates. (7) An early-warning signal is provided by her 
idipsyncratic use of the adverbial phrase, ~more than glad~ 
which, when coupled with her unvaried use of simple sentence 
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structures, and the repetition of whole linguistic units 
with very little by way of qualifying embellishment, 
indicates that her perceptions, conveyed as they are by a 
constricted linguistic ability, are bound to be, at best 
subjective and in general severely limited. In short, her 
powers of description are markedly curtailed by her 
linguistic inadequacies, the latter forcing the receiver 
into an awareness of the ironic tension .in the narrative ~ 
between her own utterances and her comment that she was 
~always good at English, but not so good at the other 
subjects!!P <p301). 
In addition to these linguistically based character 
signals Spark further delineates her narrator, 
stylistically, by means of what may be referred to as a 
pre-phonetic < Ruthrof, 1981:p 51 ) pointer; that is, the 
double exclamation mark. The emphatic nature, for example of 
the exclamation, ~ ••• not so good at the other subjects!!~, 
allows the reader/receiver an insight into one component of 
the narratorPs psyche which places the reader/receiver in a 
position to encompass the discourse of Lorna Merrifield, the 
homodiegetic narrator, and perceive a state of mind which 
her own utterence merely implies. She does not state that 
she is embarrassed by her inability to ~pass into the 
grammar school P; in fact, given in the text is the 
diametrically opposite view that she is ~more than glad!!~ 
that she did not. The reader/receiver, however, shifts 
position in the conventional relationship of inferiority to 
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• 
the unfolding of the events by the mediator. This 
conventional relationship is wholly inverted, so that by the 
conclusion of the opening paragraph, reception takes place 
from a vantage point that is superior, vis-a-vis the 
narrated events, to that of the mediator. The inference 
which the reader/receiver draws is that Lorna Merrifield is 
perhaps unconsciously mortified by her failure, her veneer 
of gratitude being merely a defensive rationalisation. In 
short, the interpretation of the presented world filtered 
through the consciousness of a highly subjective and 
fallible mediator is not to be trusted: the hypostatized 
reader~s perspective, enhanced by its having the added 
stereoscopic dimension, coerces the reader/ receiver towards 
a ~three-dimensional~ corrected vision of the whole. What, 
though, is the mechanism that underlies this process and 
which Spark has employed to produce this dual perspective 
for her hypostatized reader? It is a method that involves 
the positioning in the discourse of a number of signals 
\ 
which I call ~translational indices~ and which direct the 
hypostatized . / reader towards the reception of the 
homodiegetic narrator~s discourse as fallible~The gain, for 
the author of the narrative is the important one of a subtle 
revelation of character: the emergent indices permitting the 
author to ~show~ rather than ~tell~ as she develops the 
character of her mediator in the narrative situation. 
In arriving at a decision about Lorna M~rrifield~s 
limitations, the receiver has been confronted by a number of 
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such indices. As outlined above, they are, firstly, the 
initial manifestation of her distinctive narrative voice, 
emerging in the presentational process via such textual 
signals as the double exclamation mark, her repetitive use 
of simple sentence constructions, her idiosyncratic use of 
adverbial phrases ( ~far from~, ~more than~ ) and a 
characteristic prissiness made manifest in her use of 
evasive linguistic formulations ( lavatories are termed 
'facilities' and she says of Willy Morley, for instance that 
'he did not attempt to go to the full extent~: p306 ). 
The deployment in the narrative of these signals sharpens 
our focus ( at the micro level ) upon the mediatory 
character of Lorna Merrifield. The result is that at the 
macro level we reach conclusions about the narrator which 
derive directly from the immanent narrative situation. For 
example, the reader concludes that the na~ration is highly 
subjective and unreliable and that this unreliability stems 
from her superficial, materialistic focus upon external data 
and impressions. In the following excerpt, 
I am glad that I went to the secondary modern 
school, because it was only constructed 
the year before. Therefore, it was 
much more -hygienic than the grammar 
school. The secondary modern was 
light and airy ••• the grammar 
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school you should have seen 
the mess! 
(p 301) 
a subtle and ironic counterpoint to the narrator~s 
percepions is provided by the hypostatized reader~s 
projected value stance where secondary modern and grammar 
schools are concerned. For the narrative to have any ironic 
point the hypostatized reader must align him/herself with 
./ 
grammar school education and not with secondary modern 
schooling if the ironic thrust of the story is to be 
adequately received. Any other orientation by the 
hypostatized reader would entail a reduced reading - on its 
own terms ~ of the narrative: failure to respond adequately 
to the strictures determined by the translational indices 
would entail a uni-dimensional perspective upon the 
presented world which would preclude the recognition of the 
narrow base of the homodiegetic narrator's discourse. The 
,/ 
receiver would not, in short, be alerted to the presence of 
/ 
Li the immanent voice in the unfolding presentational process 
o~ this particular narrative situation. 
Lorna Merrifield's gimlet-eyed focus upon walls, floors 
and window-sills is at its best a metaphoric revelation 0+ 
her superficiality_ At its worst, technically speaking, it 
is a somewhat heavy-handed ramming home of a point 
creditably ( and humorously) established the moment the 
reader/receiver adapts him/herself to the framework of 
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reception generated by the text for the hypostatized reader. 
In repetitions such as those in this excerpt, ~He was a 
good-looking boy, I will say that ••• To look at he was 
quite clean in appearance!~ (p 304) one senses though the 
intrusion ( that is if Spark~s oeuvre as a whole provides 
the interpretative abstractions with their context · ) " of 
authorial values which undermine, even obscure, the more 
subtle balance created between the homodiegetic and immanent 
narrators. (8) The reader/receiver, moreover, discovers that 
the narrator~s limitations of consciousness extend to her 
perceptions of other, related spheres, but that they all 
have their source in the central characteristic, that of 
superficiality, which Spark is at pains to establish. For 
example, once the Darbys have befriended her, Lorna reveals 
her lower-middle class (Fussell,1984) values in her shocked 
response to their chaotic household: 
I had to wait in their living 
room, and you should have seen 
the state it was in! There 
were broken toys on the carpet, 
and the ashtrays were full up. 
<p 303) 
However the implied reader ( as opposed to the hypostatized 
reader ) may respond in reality to untidiness, grubbiness, 
or injunctions to ~Shut your gob, you little bastard .!~ or 
not to ~pee over the cabbages ••. [but] on the lawn~ <p302), 
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there is little doubt at this juncture in the narrative that 
the Darbys are meant to receive a positive evaluation, 
merely because the negative judgements are Lorna~s, her 
~ redentials by this time, having been firmly eroded. Neat 
juxtapositioning of narrative details such as ~She was very 
nice to me~ <p 303), followed by a remarkably unsympathetic 
description of the Darby's home and immediate environment 
point us away from Lorna Merrifield as a reliable centre of 
orientation for the narrative, and towards the Darbys with 
their cluttered, untidy, but apparently unrestrained 
life-style. Lorna~s values, in themselves by no means 
unworthy, but as she reveals them, hopelessly limiting and 
limited, are further elaborated upon in the incident with 
old Mrs Darby. Her revulsion at Mrs Darby's being housed in 
such a ~tumble down cottage~ serves a two-fold function: 
1. It reveals Lorna's genuine sympathy for and sense of 
responsibility towards other people. 
2. But it is overlaid by the limitations set on her by her 
class-affiliations. What she sees as a place unfit for human 
habitation is, in fact, a fourteenth century cottage which 
she compares unfavourably with the Council house she and her 
Mum and Dad occupy. 
Thus, the hypostatized reader is required to re-interpret 
Lorna Merrifield~s commentary here and subsequently ( when 
she describes her hopeless relationship with Willy Morley) 
in order to arrive at an accurate reading of the presented 
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world; a reading which is manifestly at variance with that 
which would be encountered were the mediatory presence of 
Lorna Merrifield the sole means of access to the data of the 
presented world. To make sense of this corrective element in 
the presentational process, and to maintain ontological 
consistency, it becomes necessary to postUlate a contiguous 
narrative situation operating in conjunction with that of 
the first person but which is responsible fo~ relaying to 
the receiver, the presented world as it is, and not as Lorna 
Merrifield sees it. It is by being alerted to such an 
occurrence in the presentational process that one will 
arrive at an accurate description of the technique employed 
by authors in narratives of this nature. 
The immanent voice, then ( or to maintain Stanzel~s 
terminology, the immanent narrative situation ), is 
responsible for the receiver~s reception of the presented 
~ world in its entirety. It cannot be countered that this is a 
matter merely of authorial manipulation, as this would be to 
commit the inadmissable error of blurring ontological 
realms: the realm of the author is logically separate from 
that of a chosen mediator or narrator. Spark, in order to 
achieve certain narrative goals, has employed 
simultaneously - not one, but two nar ative situations so 
that the receiver of the narrative can arrive at a reading 
of the text that encompasses that of the first peron 
narra~or. The , pr~e oT ~his voice is ascer~ained by means 
of translatio~ indices ( a narratological concept to be 
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elaborated in chapter 3 ) which allow the reader to correct 
the given details, accomodating in the process the 
astigmatic perspective of the first person narrator so that 
the 'true' reading is obtained. These indices may be of many 
kinds, it seems, ranging from the micro- to the macro-level 
in textual analysis ( as will be demonstrated in chapter 4, 
particularly), and involving the minutiae of punctuation 
and typography at their most ~asic level: however, at their 
most subtle, they call upon the reader/receiver to respond 
to a complex interweaving of values and mores which coerce a 
re-reading of what is tangibly 'there' in the narrative. 
Two kinds of translational indices which I have omitted 
to point to above but which it seems to me are ce~to 
the narrative's success or failure derive from comedy. 
Such comic conventions as repetition - of phrases, whole 
sentences, even situations - with its cumulative and rather 
predictable effects; and in -this short story, alienation, 
are effectively deployed. In chapters 3 and 6 Goodman's 
(1979) notions of exemplification and expression are 
introduced as technical terms to explicate the kind and 
nature of the translational indices in selected unreliable, 
homodiegetic narratives. Spark's use of the conventions from 
comedy may be placed, effectively, against the interpretive 
grid provided by Goodman. She manipUlates the conventional 
notion pf alienation in a most interesting fashion -so that a 
peculiar reversal occurs in the final paragraph of the 
story, drawing the reader/receiver inexorably away from 
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his/her recently established centre of orientation with the 
immanent narrator and back again towards Lorna Merrifield. 
This violent pendulum swing of the mood of the narrative 
allows Spark to achieve a complex poignancy which derives 
its quality from the recognition by the reader/receiver of 
the nature and effectiveness of the alienation from the 
homodiegetic narrator: the distance compounded of 
translational indices which succeed in erodi'ng the reader/ 
receiver's sympathy for the apparently superficial 
homodiegetic narrator. It is a gulf which narrows alarmingly 
when a glimpse is permitted of Lorna's desperate 
unhappiness. Against the apparent resolve of the last lines 
of the narrative: 
I agree to equality, but as to me 
marrying Willy, as I said to Mavis, 
when I recall his place, and the good 
carpet gone greasy, not to mention 
the paint oozing out of the tubes, I 
think it would break my heart to sink 
so low. 
(p.307) 
is set the almost parenthetic ~I was upset as usual~ (p 306) 
which hints at levels of experience that Lorna~s account has 
not, until then, permitted the reader to deem possible. The 
strength of the short story lies' in the effect this 
conclusion has on the ( by this point in the narrative) 
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alienated receiver, and its roots lie in the contiguous 
co-existence of the two narrative situations. v' 
4. Conclusion 
Two sets of perceptions, then, can be seen to light the 
presented wor I d of th is narr a"t i ve: those of Lorna 
Merrifield, the homodiegetic and limited narrator, and those 
of the immanent narrator ( whose corresponding posit10n, ~ 
~
narratologically speaking, can be described as extrp-
diegetic.) It is the presence of the latter which determines 
how we receive Lorna 7 s decision not to marry Willy Morley. 
By her own lights, her resolution is a positive one ( 71t 
would break my heart to sink so low. 7 ) but for the immanent 
narrator, it is a negative decision. Willy Morley's 
potential has never been fully appreciated by Lorna who, 
depite the hint we are given of the struggle underlying her 
decision about her future, allows her first thoughts about 
him ( 'He was young, dark, with a dark shirt, so one could 
not see right away if he was clean. 7 : pp 305-306 ) to remain 
fundamentally her last. 
The presence in a narrative of the immanent voice is one 
of the components of irony, and its isolation for criticism 
constitutes an important addition to the analysis of the 
mode. I stress this to avoid what would be a confounding and 
unilluminating identification of the ironic mode with the 
immanent voice. This voice in itself is not ironic but its 
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presence and the contrasting world that it reveals provide 
~ 
the tension that constitutes the ironic mode. Further, in 
order to anticipate such criticism, 1 can vindicate the 
description of such a phenomenon as a narrative situation 
because it meets what are the requirements for it to be a 
narrative voice, namely that it mediate between a 
reader/receiver and the presented world and that the 
reader/receiver arrive at his/her g~asp of the presented 
world as a consequence of a presentational process which 
V has, as its source, this phenomenon. This should circumvent, 
1 feel, any inclination to identify the voice in question 
with a loosely conceived ironic mode. 
To conclude let me add that while Muriel Spark~s 
ostensible subject, deriving from the first-person narrative 
situation might be conceived of as an exploration of the 
experiences of Lorna Merrifield, the deployment of an 
immanent narrator allows her to to- reveal her narrator~s 
inner landscape ( here, a comparison might be drawn between 
the perspectives permitted by the dual narrative situations 
in this tale and those of standard internal/external 
focalisation) so that the reader has the advantage of a 
superior centre of orientation which would not be 
immediately accessible to the unsophisticated reader and 
without which, reception of the short story would be 
severe~y circumscribed. 
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That the presented worlds of these narratives arise out 
of a process that is fundamentally mimetic is perhaps more 
clearly to be understood when once the scope and nature of 
the construct which I term the translational index is aired. 
That the reader/receiver apprehends more than is contained 
in the mere utterance or discourse of a narrator such as 
Lorna Merrifield in a narrative of this kind, bears 
testimony to the existence of an immanent voice, whose 
presence, once experienced in the reading process, may be 
ascertained by those elements in the discourse which prompt 
reception in stereoscopic vision - of an augmented 
presented world; one whose being presupposes the 
reader/receiver's ideological and creative alignment with 
the grid provided by the text for the hypostatized reader.In 
chapter 3, the world(s) thus created are placed under 
observation and their mode of existence analysed. 
NOTES 
1. See for example Stanzel (1971,1984) whose terminology 
and typology provide the framework within which the argument 
of this thesis is to be located. Booth (1961), Scholes and 
Kellogg (1968), Cohn (1978), Chatman (1978), Iser (1978), 
Genette (1980), Prince (1982), and Rimmon-Kenan (1983) have 
all contributed, conceptually, to the theory of narrative 
and provide this thesis with its context. 
2. Although H.G. Ruthrof, The reader's construction of 
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narrative, extends and expands his model. ( See particularly 
chapter 4 pp.65ff. > 
3. It is, perhaps, worth mentioning here that there are 
possibilities for an author inherent in the phonetic stratum 
which are 'set into a function~ (Ingarden,1973:p 65 ) when 
the reader/receiver apprehends the determinate word sounds. 
There exists, moreover ( and the significance is examined in 
detail in chapter 3 >, the possibility of, in addition to 
the construct of a pre-phonetic stratum, what may perhaps be 
termed a para-phonetic stratum, so that a poet such as 
George Herbert, in ~Easter Wings~ or 'The Alter', for 
example, may arrange the physical lines of print in such a 
way as to coerce the perceiver to gestalt an image .that has 
semantic value, but which is not, in an acceptable sense, 
phonetically based. Normally, however, the phonetic stratum 
is registered only fleetingly and the receiver transcends 
this level almost as it is admitted to consciousness, 
arriving instantly at the level of word and sentence 
meanings in the literary work. If, as Ingarden says, the 
semantic stratum can be defined as ~everything bound to a 
word sound which, in conjunction with the sound forms a 
work~ ( 1973:p 63), then it appears that his schema does not 
accommodate the semantic contribution made typographically 
by the creative manipulation, on an author~s part, of either 
the ~para-' or the ~pre-phonetic~ stratum - the visual 
dimension of a literary work. They are both, undoubtedly, 
strata that must be accorded consideration in any inclusive 
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account of the literary work of art, and they are the source 
- as will be demonstrated - of a number of significant 
translational indices. 
4. In her assessment of his most recent work, Theorie des 
Erzaehlens (1981), Dorrit Cohn has vindicated Stanzel~s 
theoretical investigations, after the less than enthusiastic 
reception of his Narrative Situations in the Novel (1971). 
My terminology is drawn largely from Stanzel~s rather than 
Genette~s whose analytic specificity has an attraction 
somewhat different from Stanzel's more 'synthetic' (Cohn, 
1981:159) approach; the latter's being more suitable to my 
undertaking. 
5. See Berti! Romberg's exhaustive account of this type of 
narrative (1962). He does not, however, isolate an immanent 
narrative situation. 
6. I ' think it pertinent to return, at this juncture -
briefly to Stanzel's remark about the significance for 
fiction of Kant's epistemological view with regard to the 
apprehension of the presented world by the reader/receiver 
(1971: p 22). The context in which the comment was made was 
a chapter on the authorial narrative situation, but first 
person narrative also permits the aesthetic deployment of 
such a mediator ( that is, a highly 'conscious' narrator, 
such as Zeitblom in Mann's Dr Faustus) who provides a 
remarkably sensitive perspective. 
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7. This is not to deny that first person narrators very 
often reveal idiosyncratic quirks and character traits. 
These I regard as affecting the narrative more or less 
effectively when measured against the ~norm~ of conventional 
( apparently detached ) objectivity. (David Copperfield 
would provide an instance of such apparently impartial 
narration.) 
·8. It should be noted that reception of this narrative ( as 
with other ~un~eliable~ narratives) can vary: a knowledge 
of the other writings of Muriel Spark can elicit a sense of 
the distastefulness of this story. What some receivers would 
regard as the humour of the piece could be experienced as an 
unpleasant, satirical quality by others. I think, however, 
that despite momentary 'lapses' in narrative consistency, 
one could argue for a tonal quality, in the narrative, far 
removed from patronage and more closely aligned with empathy 
for the narrator. These are finer points of analysis, and 
are not of direct concern to me here. It is perhaps the 
comic undertow that causes an adverse reaction in some 
readers. Reception is then coloured by a mocking and 
patronizing quality in the humour and fails, fully, to 
encompass the revelation that the story aims for. 
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Chapter 3: Translational Indices 
Using Ingarden~s notion of the 
Literary Work of Art as a 
stratified intentional object; 
and Goodman~s concepts of exem-
plification and expression, a 
typology of translational indices 
is offered. 
1. Introduction 
Having argued in the previous chapter for, among other 
things, the necessary presence in the text of a covert 
sign-system that would enable the reader to justify the 
establishment of the success/failure conditions that must 
apply to the referential acts of the unreliable narrator, in 
this chapter, an attempt is made to provide an argument for 
the systematic classification of the differing kinds of 
translational indices. In addition, those areas of the text 
where such translational indices could be encoded will be 
provisionally identified. 
What is needed in order to avoid relying solely upon 
anything as vague as a generalised sensitivity an the part 
of the reader to the presence in the text of such signs as 
are indicated above is a theoretical account of the ontology 
of the literary work of art which will allow the 'logical 
geography' of the text to be surveyed comprehensively. The 
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demand on such a theory would be two-fold: not only must it 
identify those discrete areas of the text available to the 
author for encoding the necessary sign-system, but it must 
also give an account of the kinds of signs that can sensibly 
be employed in these previously identified areas of textual 
discourse. A point of departure would seem, therefore, to be 
best served by the theoretical account of the literary work 
of art given by Roman Ingarden (1973a and b> and ampli~ied 
by Wolfgang Iser of the Geneva School (1974,1978), as well 
as H.G. Ruthrof (1981); all of whom offer accounts of the 
literary work of art that are essentially phenomenological. 
As has been established, the translational indices in 
question cannot be found within. the discourse of the 
unreliable first person narrator. To all intents and 
purposes the meaning of this discourse is co-extensive with 
the explicit intentions of the narrator who is only 
perceived as being 7unreliable7 from a meta-critical vantage 
point: a point which only becomes available to the critical 
receiver once the covert sign-system has been identified 
(the immanent voice being predicated upon this system.> This 
appears, initially, to have extremely damaging consequences 
for a thesis that demands the identification of 
translational indices which govern an interpretative act on 
the part of the reader: in some sense, it can be argued, the 
entire d~scourse is nothing but a sustained conjunction of 
the unreliable narrator 7s speech acts, apparently having as 
a consequence the impossibility of the text, thus 
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understood, providing any vehicle for the encoding of the 
required covert sign-system. However, such an understanding 
of the ontological status of the literary work of art is a 
severely limited one and, moreover, is one which renders 
nonsensical any attempted coherent reading of homodiegetic 
narratives of the kind in question here. 
2. The location of the translational indices: Ingarden's 
strata amplified. 
My argument essentially seeks to establish the existence 
of three separate ontological realms, all outside the overt 
discourse of the first person narrator. The first of these 
( or what I term 'realm 1')is to be found in an amendment to 
Ingarden's ontological strata, first attempted by Ruthrof in 
his identification of a 'pre-phonetic' stratum ( 1981). What 
he designates pre-phonetic might perhaps more usefully be 
termed 'para-phonetic' ( as I suggested in chapter 2, note 
3 ), taking into account such typographical pointers as the 
exclamation mark used to signify meaning in the discourse of 
the immanent narrator in the Spark short story discussed in 
chapter 2. I would add to this stratum those meaning units 
such as the features of the product itself ( that it is a 
book, with a title, by an author unknown or of some renown, 
are all pre- or para-phonetic signals which contribute to 
our ~ullest understanding of the meaning of the text.> The 
second realm ( 'realm 2'), explicated utilizing Nelson 
Goodman's analysis of exemplification (1978> finds the 
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necessary realisation of translational indices situated 
within two ~areas~ of the literary work. These are as 
follows: 
1. Firstly, they are to be found in the tension that exists 
between the properties exemplified by the presented world 
( itself derived from the first person narrator's 
referential acts) and the first person narrator's 
misperception of these exemplifications. A threatening 
interpretative asymmetry, running throughout certain first 
person narratives,finds its resolution in the establishment 
of a dominant epistemological order, which renders suspect 
the first person narrator~s interpretation of the world 
he/she is describing. What is being identified here, in 
fact, are the grounds for the necessary introduction of the 
success/failure conditions for the referential acts of the 
first person narrator. 
2. Secondly, the indices are locatable in the dramatic role 
played in the unfolding of the novel by both the exemplified 
property mentioned above, on the one hand, and the 
misperception of it entertained by the unreliable narrator, 
on the other. 
The final ontological realm ( 'realm 3' ) exists between the 
unconscious exemplification of values that the first person 
narrator~s interpretative acts reveal and the value 
structure of the hypostatized reader, controlled by the 
indices contained in the second realm. 
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The placement of translational indices in these three 
distinct realms constitutes the emergence of a second and 
epistemologically primary presentational process whose 
function is revealed as a reconstituting of the 
reader/receiver~s understanding of the presented world. This 
world was previously given by the mediation of the first 
person narrator; and this reconstituted presented world 
becomes the evidential base for the reader~s encompassing 
experience of the first person narrator~s unreliability. 
This primary presentational process is the mode of mediation 
of the immanent voice, which reveals the presented world as 
it is, and not as it appears to the first person narrator. 
In his seminal phenomenological exercise, The Literary 
Work of Art (1973a), Ingarden argues that any literary work 
of art contains a minimum of four ontological ~layers~ ( 
and though they were presented in chapter 2, they bear 
repeating at this juncture.) They are: 
1. The stratum of verbal sounds and phonetic formations 
2. The stratum of semantic units 
3. The stratum of schematized aspects where states of 
various kinds portrayed in the work come into 
appearance. 
4. The stratum of the objectivities portrayed in the 
intentional states of affairs projected by the 
sentences (1) 
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A typology that allpws for reception of the literary work 
of art as a layered entity has the undeniable advantage of a 
precedent in a comprehensive explication such as Ingarden 
undertakes, and of being apprehended as a logical 
ontological progression. Both Ingarden and Ruthrof (1973a; 
1981) initiate narratological investigation, but have 
themselves not refin~d, adequately, the sequential 
progression in the activity of reading that forms part of 
the reader~s experience of, in particular, unreliable texts. 
Implicit rather than explicit, the encoded signalling they 
explicate in their works requires further exegesis and 
refinement if its contribution to interpretation is to be 
understood by readers of homodiegetic narration of this 
specific type. 
As I argued in chapter 2, in opposition to Ruthrof for 
whom it appears unproblematic (1981:p 51) the second stratum 
of a literary work requires theoretical amplification. For 
Ingarden, the semantic stratum is of central significance, 
since it is required for the other three and yet determines 
them so that they have their ontic bases in it: 
... the stratum of meaning units ••• 
provides the structural framework for 
the whole work. By its very essence it 
requires all the other strata and determines 
them in such a way that they ••• are dependent 
in their content on its qualities. As 
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elements of the literary work they are thus 
inseparable from this central stratum. 
(1973a:p 29) 
The entry of sentences into the literary work is governed by 
the linguistic sound formations of the first stratum, but in 
addition, this ~external, fixed shell~ ( Ingarden,1973a: 
p59) of the first stratum .is amplified by such elements as 
Ruthrof details: ~ typographic aspects of words and larger 
linguistic units [which] for ~he reader ••• are 
indispensable aspects and [which] ••• have a potentially 
significant role to play in the total polyphony of aesthetic 
value qualities.~ ( 1981:p 51 ). In keeping with a 
phenomenological ~layering~ of the process of apprehension 
on the part of the reader/receiver, I prefer to regard this 
as -a pre-phonetic stratum, one which bears significantly 
upon the process of presentation as I shall subsequently 
demonstrate. 
In chapter 2 we saw how with the introduction of 
sentences into the schema, a number of issues - their source 
to be found in the problematical area of semantics - were 
raised. In the transition from sentences taken as mere 
sentences, to sentences asserted by speakers ( that is, to 
judgements) the postulation of a fictive speaker or voice 
was shown to be logically inevitable if sense was to be made 
- in the semantic · stratum of asserted sentences in the 
fictional work. The fictive voice may be apparent and 
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tangible ( as in conventional homodiegetic narration such as 
that of Great Expectations) or, as I have demonstrated it 
may be immanent ( as in ~You Should Have Seen the Mess!~). 
Whichever of these two states of affairs pertains, it is a 
necessary condition of their ontological existence that they 
form part of the presentational process: in other words that 
they contribute to reception on the part of the 
reader/receiver by setting into function the process whereby 
the presented world is signified. 
Recalling the assertion in chapter 2, that for reference 
to be activated, a speaker must be introduced into the 
semantic schema, it can be reiterated that Strawson~s 
distinction (1959) between asserted and non-asserted 
sentences applies when we examine the semantic stratum of 
the literary work of art. In other words, when the reader 
confronts a ~judgement~ - where questions of truth or 
falsity come into play - as opposed to a mere sentence, a 
concomitant ontological feature of the process is the 
fictive speaker of that sentence: such a speaker being 
presupposed by the judgement thus described. By this means 
it becomes apparent that an enriched notion of the semantic 
stratum is required if the full nature of reception such as 
is involved in the complex production of the immanent 
narrative situation is to be understood. 
To return, though, to the pre-phonetic or para-phonetic 
stratum ( as I have designated it ) and in the light of 
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Ingarden~s statement that all the levels he discerns in the 
literary work of art have their ontic bases in the second 
stratum and are determined by it ( 1973a:p 60), let us 
examine how facets of a pre-phonetic level in the literary 
work of art contribute to a semantic dimension and, more 
importantly, see how they can be said to suggest the 
existence of an immanent narrator. In short, let us argue 
for their possible function in the narrative as 
translational indices in what I have termed realm 1, that 
is, encompassing Ingarden~s first stratum. 
2.1 Realm 1: indices in the pre- or para-phonetic stratum 
In the short story, 'You Should Have Seen the Mess!' Lorna 
Merrifield is the ostensible - homodiegetic - narrator from 
whom emanates the discourse that comprises the narrative. As 
I argued in chapter 2 the reader/receiver of the discourse 
rapidly moves to an encompassing position which presents a 
clear disjunction between the narrator~s perceptions and 
those of the receiver. The argument there demonstrated that 
it was logically necessary to postulate the existence of the 
immanent narrator in that specific narrative situation. At a 
very fundamental level ( that is, on Ingarden~s -augmented-
schema ) I am suggesting that there operates in this 
narrative a cue to the presence of the immanent voice. This 
is in fact the exclamation mark of the para-phonetic level 
which serves the function of alerting the reader to: 
1. Lorna's characteristic vehemence 
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and 
2. An ~absence7 which is nevertheless 
and, perhaps, paradoxically, responsible 
for bringing into being in the text the 
reader 7s cog~izance of its 7presence~. 
Why the existence of such a typographical feature as the 
exclamation mark cannot be attributed to Lorna Merrifield is 
clear: she is the utterer of the apparent discourse, but not 
its scribe. ( We need to be clear here about ontological 
occupancy - the narrator and the author must not be 
confounded. This is not to say that such narratives cannot 
be scripted by their narrators: they would then take the 
form, say, of diary entries, letters, or manuscripts. ) This 
suggests the existence of the immanent narrator; and it is 
to the existence of such a construct, and its accessibility 
via a feature of the pre-phonetic stratum, that I must ' now 
argue more fully: in short that it is, as I shall 
demonstrate, an index to the existence of the immanent 
voice. 
The question arises, when once the receiver has become 
aware of the existence of a multiplicity of discourses 
( where there is apparently only the one ) as to how they 
become features of the presentational process. The more 
obvious of these features, indicating the existence of the 
discourses, are the typographical ones, such as the 
exclamation mark or - in the case of more radical 
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typographical manipulation - the asterisks ( as in Robert 
Coover's Pricksongs and Descants: 1969 ) and black pages, 
graphics and ellipses which comprise much of the meaning of, 
for example, sterne's Tristram Shandy. It can certainly be 
argued that the narrator in the latter is the self-conscious 
scribe of his story, but it becomes less evidently possible 
to equate the teller of the story with its writer when one 
confronts, for example the para-phonetic exclamation mark of 
the presentational process in 'You Should Have Seen the 
Mess!' Lorna's is a discourse that has an obvious orality 
( when compared, say, with Tristram's more overtly written 
discourse: 'As my life and opinions are likely to make some 
noise in the world, and, if I conjecture right, · will take in 
all ranks, professions, and denominations of men whatever, -
be no less read than the Pilgrim's Progress itself ••• ' [Vol 
1 Chapter 4: p 38] ) which militates against the reader's 
ready acceptance of the ' typographical markers as intended b~ 
the narrator herself. A subtle interplay between the 
narrator's discourse and that of another - subliminally 
recognised in the first instance, but of significance to the 
decoding of the textually based signals of the narrative 
begins to come into existence. What we are witnessing is the 
emergence of a set of referential acts of an agent whose 
communications do not function within the immanent discourse 
of the unreliable narrator; that is, whose referential acts 
are not a form of denotation. This notion of 
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non-denotational reference will be expanded and defended in 
the ensuing section. 
The reader is gradually initiated into the realisation 
that he/she is becoming committed to a constructionalist 
epistemology where the world that is apprehended is built up 
out of just such non-denotational referential acts. This 
emergent - silent - discourse reveals itself as a primary 
presentational process through whose referential acts the 
presented world is given as it is and not as it is perceived 
by the ostensible narrator. It is to the semantics of this 
silent discourse - constituting realm 2 - that I will now 
address myself ( and in doing so I shall inevitably augment 
Ingarden~s second stratum.) 
2.2 Realm 2: indices in the semantic stratum 
Fortunately there exists for my purposes something of a 
trail-blazer in the conceptual schema propounded by Nelson 
Goodman (1978). His analysis of non-denotational referential 
modes provides my enterprise in this section with a 
legitimate terminology; but, more importantly, it allows me 
to explicate and to refine to a greater degree the function 
of translational indices at this level of apprehension by 
the reader. Goodman maintains that: 
The worlds of fiction, poetry, painting, 
music, dance, and the other arts are 
built largely by such nonliteral devices 
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as metaphor, by such nondenotational means 
as exemplification and expression, and often 
by use of pictures or sounds or gestures or 
other symbols of nonlinguistic systems. 
(1978: p 102) 
His provocative account of fictional ( and other ) 
~~orldmaking~ yields for my purposes two concepts that are 
particularly useful, namely the ~nondenotational~ 
exemplifications and/or expressions that, nevertheless, 
activate reference. As Goodman puts it: 
Works of art, though, characteristically 
illustrate rather than name or describe 
relevant kinds ( of thingsJ. Even where 
the ranges of application - the things 
described or depicted - coincide, the 
features or kinds exemplified or expressed 
may be very different •••• a poem with no 
words for sadness and no mention of a sad 
person may in the quality of its language be 
sad and poignantly express sadness. The dis-
tinction between saying or representing on 
the one hand and showing or exemplifying on 
the other becomes even more evident in the 
case of -abstract painting and music and 
dance that have no subject-matter but 
nevertheless manifest - exemplify or express-
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forms and feelings. Exemplification and 
expression, though running in the opposite 
direction from denotation ••• are no less 
symbolic referential functions and 
instruments of worldmaking. 
(1978: pp 11-12) 
The terms that provide this section with profound 
illumination are Goodman~s ~exemplification~ and 
'expression'.There are obvious parallels to be drawn between 
the point he is making and that which Stanzel makes in his 
article (Novel,1978) where, drawing on the much earlier 
distinction made by E.M.Forster (1927), he -establishes as 
one of his narrative ~oppositions~, that between telling and 
reflecting (2). Stanzel's intuitive recognition of a 
particular oppositional mode can be amplified to the overall 
advantage of the concept by admitting into the framework of 
the typology Goodman~s rigorously argued concepts. The 
latter's terminology lends credibility to the perhaps 
somewhat limited concept of ~showing~: Goodman, in fact, 
provides us with an account of the type and kind of concept 
that 'showing' is. 
Exemplifications and expressions, then, serve a 
significant ref~rential function which is of particular 
interest when we are confronted by the unreliable 
homodiegetic narrative situation. In these narratives it 
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becomes apparent very quickly that the projected states of 
affairs exemplify properties which the narrator 
systematically misreads. 
In unreliable narratives of the kind I have in mind a 
fundamental opposition is set up between denotative 
reference ( activated by the ostensible modes of depiction 
and description ) and non-denotative reference ( as 
indicated above, those of "exemplification and expression ). 
The denotative domain of reference will be located primarily 
in the discourse of the first person narrator. However, as 
we have clearly seen, another, parallel and 
epistemologically primary, discourse exists in the immanent 
narrative situation and it does so as a result of a mode of 
reference, specific not only to works of art, but to any 
action that conveys meaning in a manner that may be 
described in this fashion. Such an opposition between 
denotative and non-denotative modes of reference, especially 
as it applies to the literary or other work of art, provides 
a basis for understanding the ontological status of the 
immanent voice. Exemplification and expression are, I 
believe, the primary translational indices of the immanent 
narrative situation. 
Granted the fecundity of Goodman's model for explaining 
the mechanics of unreliable homodiegetic narration, a number 
of his concepts can be imported into the typology being 
developed here. Like Goodman, my concern is with 'certain 
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relationships among worlds' and with 'how ••• particular 
worlds are made from others' ( 1978: p 7 ). The processes, 
then, that occur when worlds (on Goodman's model) are made, 
are those such as: 
1. Composition and Decomposition, by which is meant taking 
apart and putting together again, or the division of wholes 
into parts, then back into wholes again. 
2. Weighting, or, as Goodman puts it, emphasis - which 
yields 'hierarchies rather than dichotomies' (p 12) - is 
capable of producing a world or worlds by means of a 
distribution of the stress pattern which might otherwise 
yield merely a uniform, one-dimensional and constrained 
'world' 
3. Ordering, upon which Goodman claims all measurement is 
based, is another means of worldmaking. Constructions of any 
kind involve this process, and as in the measurement of time 
are 'built into a world' rather than 'found in it' (p 14). 
4. Deletion and Supplememntation, which Goodman paraphrases 
as 'weeding out and filling - actual excision of some old 
and supply of some new material' (p.14) 
5. Deformation, or distortion which involves a process that 
goes beyond mere weighting, creating ( as caricaturists are 
inclined to ) a world that stems from a variation that 
extends the imaginative bounds 'magical[lyJ'. (p 16) 
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Most of these processes ( examples of them which have 
particular significance for literary criticism will be 
elaborated below ) can be seen in operation when the 
immanent voice is active; they function, at the broadest 
level, as tr.anslational indices to the existence of the 
7world~ projected not by the first person narrator but by 
the immanent narrator. In chapters 4,5 and 6 the exact 
process of this indexical function will be charted by way of 
selected textual examples. 
Contained within these categories, though, are those of 
~expression~ and ~exemplification~ as described above. 
Goodman discusses them briefly under the section on 
~weighting~ (p 12 ) as ~symbolic referential functions and 
instruments of worldmaking~. In this latter sense, a world 
is exemplified, for instance when the narrator in a 
homodiegetic narrative describes a situation ~A~ but does 
not see, and therefore does not describe the situation ~B~ 
which the receiver of the narrative is nevertheless able to 
discern in the very description of ~A~. This act of 
reference has, thus, been achieved non-denotatively. 
2.3 Realm 3: controlled imputations as indices 
The presentational process by means of which the immanent 
.narrative situation is generated is an extremely complex 
one, resting as it does upon a kind of control of the 
hypostatized reader~s imputations. These imputations on the 
reader/receiver 7 s part become part of the endeavour to 
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produce a concretization of the presented world (B) that 
derives from the non-denotational ( non-linguistic, even ) 
referential ~acts~ of the immanent narrator. Nicholas 
Wolterstorff (1980) points out that what is exemplified for 
Goodman is nevertheless always a property: 
••• And he [GoodmanJ says that an 
entity exemplifies a certain property 
just in case it possesses that property 
and also refers to it. Mere possession is 
not enough, nor is mere reference enough. 
What is required is possession plus ref-
erence. 
(p345) 
Wolterstorff then proceeds to quote Goodman as stating that: 
'To have without symbolizing is merely to possess, while to 
symbolize ~ithout having is to refer in some other way than 
by exemplifying~ (Goodman:1978, p 53; Wolterstorff:1980, p 
345 ). This section of Wolterstorff~s critique of Goodman is 
somewhat densely presented, but its significance for my 
thesis at this juncture lies in its explication of the 
nature and extent of the exemplification or expression. The 
properties in the second-order narrative that are 
concretized by the reader in the act of reception are 
exemplifications of the states of affairs ( Ingarden~s 
fourth stratum ) of the narrative. However, they are not 
merely properties of these projected states of affairs but 
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constitute exemplifications by dint (in Goodman~s sense) of 
reference being made to them, albeit obliquely, via the 
expressed contrast set up between the perceptions of the 
homodiegetic narrator in the first - order narrative and those 
of the immanent narrator of the second-order narrative. It 
is the recognition of this tension between the 
first-person~s perception of the presented world and the 
reader/receiver~s . encompassing perception of the totality of 
this world ( which includes as an object within the 
presented world the homodiegetic narrator him/herself plus 
his/her attitudes and beliefs, both appropriate and 
inappropriate, both true and false) that constitutes the 
justification for talking about the presence of the immanent 
voice. The generated tension structured by this complex 
interplay of perceptions becomes in fact one of the main 
locations for the realisation of translational indices in 
the second realm referred to above. 
The false beliefs and inappropriate attitudes of the 
first-person narrator often form a dramatic matrix whose 
subsequent participation in the unfolding drama of the 
narrative provides the other area of realm 2 where 
translational indices are realised. With the recognition of 
the original matrix of flawed characteristics entitling the 
reader/receiver to postUlate the presence of immanent 
narration, the discovery of this matri x itself entering into 
the patterning of a new world contributes further evidence 
for the justification of the postulation of the presence of 
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immanent narration. At the same time it underscores the 
validity of the original recognition of the flawed matrix. 
Thus, what is at first advanced as a hypothesis, on the 
basis of a descried exemplification, becomes established 
retrospectively just as the new "reading' - based upon this 
hypothesis - systematically deepens both the significance 
and the coherence of the narrative. This amounts to a form 
of 'Popperian tentativeness' (Popper: 1959}, whereby the 
reader first conjectures that he/she might be confronting an 
immanent narrative situation. The first apparent index 
encountered does not render the conjecture ( that the 
immanent narrative situation is present ) a fact: that is, 
the conjecture is not immediately verifiable. Rather, the 
first apparent index constitutes the initial test of a 
series of attempted falsifications that ultimately provide 
the r~ader/receiver with the epistemic warrant required by 
his/her conjecture for its validation. 
3. The function of the hypostatized reader in the 
transmission 
The location or placement of translational indices in the 
immanent narrative situation can be seen, then, to range 
through all the strata desig~ated by Ingarden as fundamental 
to the existence of the literary work of art. But of 
paramount importance in the entire schema, is the active 
participation of an alert reader/receiver. The relationship 
between Author and Reader, moving as it inevitably must 
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across ontological boundaries, once mediation has been 
activated, is tangibly more complex, demanding 
concretization not only of the projected states of affairs 
of a presented world, but of a presentational process and a 
corresponding, second-order world that gains ontological 
precedence; even correcting the perceptions we may have 
arrived at via the referential acts of the homodiegetic 
narrator of the first-order narrative situation. 
Reception, then, or what I explore under the rubric of my 
realm 3, is fundamental to the notion of a translational 
index such as exemplification or expression, and will often 
involve, in the activity of concretization, the revelation 
of attributes, say, of the unreliable narrator"s psychic 
structures that are, on any other model, narratologically 
inexplicable. This is not to dispute that such assessments 
are an aspect of any "sensitive" reading of the text, but it 
is an attempt to explain the operational mode of such a 
dimension of unreliable homodiegetic narration. 
It can be argued, moreover, that a hypostatized reader, 
as the idealised limit to which the reader/receiver must 
aspire,exists in fact only in narratives of the above 
kind: that is, those that exhibit some form of unreliability 
as outlined above. The reason for claiming this lies in the 
fact that a clearly delineated relationship between 
reader/receiver and mediator is fundamental to the existence 
of the immanent narrative situation. The non-linguistic, 
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non-denotational reference that underpins this narrative 
situation requires an agent ( the hypostatized reader ) who 
is capable of constituting the presentational process and 
the projected world which is exemplified by the utterances 
of the first person narrator's discourse. A receiver, thus, 
in order to constitute accurately the process and world 
being generated by this discourse, must bring to bear 
often a prescribed set of socia-cultural determinants, in 
order that the exemplifications or expressions might refer 
properly: in other words, 'the schematic guiding system' 
( Ruthrof,1981: p 57 ) comes into existence in order to 
propel us toward the meaning determined by the author, but 
only as a result of a reciprocal, socially and 
psychologically determined stockpile of 'intertextual and 
everyday typifications of both process and world which 
guarantees the possibility of ••• approximation [to the 
author's meaning intention]' (Ruthrof,1981: p 57.> 
By his term, exemplification, Goodman could be seen to 
mean the possession by an entity or state of affairs of a 
property which has itself been singled out by its 
encompassing sign-system. Wolterstorff quotes Goodman's 
example of exemplifying as ' ••• that of a tailor's sample 
[which exemplifies] various properties of the cloth from 
which it is cut' ( 1980: p 345 ). Goodman's other way of 
worldmaking ( in a non-denotative sense) and the- concept 
which I employ here as a second indexical type, is that of 
expression. As it pertains to narratives of the kind being 
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considered, it involves radical involvement on the part of 
the hypostatized reader in an approximation towards the 
author~s ~meaning intention~ in order that allowance be made 
for the intersubjective availability of the narrative~s 
~full~ meaning. 
Where the entity that exemplifies or expresses one of its 
properties is itself a knowing subject, certain 
interesting consequences for the presented world follow. 
These are clustered around the possibility that arises where 
the knowing subject could him/herself be unaware of certain 
properties that he/she exemplifies. It is important to 
stress that it need not only be the case that the agent 
remain unaware that a property he/she exemplifies counts as 
an exemplification ( within the logical framework generated 
by the narrative situation he/she could not, in fact, 
~know~ ): it is also possible for the agent or knowing 
subject to remain ignorant of the very possession of the 
property itself. This ~betrayal~ of aspects of the agent~s 
psychic make-up through his/her unwitting expression of its 
components can reveal to the reader details of the presented 
world of the narrative of which the homodiegetic narrator 
must necessarily be unaware. Such knowledge as the reader 
receives is, of course, mediated through the presentational 
process of the immanent voice. It is this second-order 
presentational process that . by rendering the particular 
property of the homodiegetic narrator an instance of 
exemplification begins to integrate these selected data of 
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the presented world into the 'master narrative'. Here the 
final stratum of Ingarden's schema is articulated, but with 
a degree of complexity made possible by the activation of 
non-denotational and non-linguistic referential modes which 
operate at the meta-level of presentation. 
Wittgenstein's 'showing/telling' distinction aligns 
itself quite neatly with the above (1961 [1921]: 4.022). It 
also has the advantage of revealing to the receiver the 
inner world of the unreliable homodiegetic narrator. Thus 
through controlled foregrounding of exemplifications, the 
second-order presentational process cohering around the 
immanent mediator transmits the presented world as it is ,to 
the reader, while concomitantly constituting the 
stereoscopic vision explored in chapter 2. The final 
support for the presence of immanent narration in a 
particular homodiegetic narrative will be found in the 
networking of translational indices which mutually 
underwrite the significance and coherence of the 
master-narrative. 
4. Conclusion 
Until this point blanket reference has been made to the 
'unreliability' of the homodiegetic narrator in narrative 
situations of the kind under observation. In chapter 4 I 
will discuss a typology of limitations that have been, until 
now, subsumed under the broad generic concept of unreliable 
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homodiegetic narration. By applying the theoretical model 
which has been developed above to selected types of this 
particular narrative situation, I shall refine by way of 
exegesis a typology of the limitations to which I have drawn 
attention. The application of the typology to selected 
examples, given the fecundity of its insights for critical 
exegesis, provides a persuasive vindication of the 
theoretical position which, thus far, . it has been the object 
of this dissertation to construct. 
NOTES 
1. See the summary offered at the beginning of The Cognition 
of the Literary Work of Art (1973b). 
2. My underlining. See, also, Wittgenstein (1961 [1921]: p 
20.) 
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Chapter 4: The Concept of ~Unreliability~ 
In an attempt to vindicate by praxis 
the theoretical claims made in chapters 
2 and 3, a typology of limitations is offered 
under the generic concept of unreliability. 
An extreme example of unreliability of 
this kind, where insanity is used as a 
limiting device ( in a short story,~X~, 
by Malachi Whitaker), is critically evaluated 
in the light of the theory. 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter an attempt will be made to outline some 
of the parameters within which the major theoretical thrust 
is being undertaken. A concept such as unreliability has 
been a part of narrative form as long as tales have been 
told, but for the sake of clarity, it seems necessary to 
establish in what light I presently regard the concept; and 
to what specific ends I shall put it. A brief history of the 
term~s evolution in criticism is therefore warranted and the 
reiteration of my position as critic within an augmented 
structuralist framework is also necessary if the moves I 
make are .to be accurately construed. 
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As part of their ideological commitment ( where the 
nature of critical activity is concerned) both F.R. Leavis 
and the New Critics elevated texts that evinced the cardinal 
literary virtue of irony to the ranks of the ~Great 
Tradition~. My interest in irony ( though I acknowledge that 
my critical practice is informed with its own theoretical 
bias~. be it construed as either materialist or 
structuralist ) stems from a concern to establish what the 
narrative mechanism in fact is in certain narrative 
situations which have thus far been treated - broadly and 
somewhat ~loosely~ - as aspects of a kind of first-person 
narrative; involving such disparate elements of the spectrum 
of narrative transmission as what Booth (1961) calls the 
unreliable narrator, and Rimmon-Kenan (1984) refers to as 
the implied author. Recent critics such as Chatman (1978), 
Rimmon-Kenan, Stanzel (1984), Iser (1978) and Fokkema 
(1984), for example, have all implicitly recognised the 
limitations of objective ( text-based) descriptions of the 
narrative process and their approaches reveal the fecundity 
of an augmented approach; one that incorporates both the 
domain of the author and that of the reader/receiver in a 
comprehensive analysis of the relationships in the narrative 
act. However, too heavy a reliance on the the autonomy of 
reception ( and its multiplicity of receivers) or, 
conversely, upon the 'the autonomy of authorial intention , 
can lead to the distortion of the necessarily careful 
(objective) focus of narratological investigation. 
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• 
Something that requires certainly - activation by a 
reader/receiver but which is ( after the creative act) 
intentionally text-based, is present in narratives; and when 
they are of the kind that form the objects of my 
investigation, their particular mechanism requires very 
close analysis if critics are not to slide into the somewhat 
murky realm of cultural or social 'relativity' in attempting 
to explain a product's 'meaning'. 
If the basic narrative situations are, as I believe 
( contra Stanzel ) merely two: 
1. first person 
2. third person 
with figural narration the result of a narrowing of the 
focus of authorial narration, and immanent narration a 
broadening of the focus of first person narration so that a 
satisfying symmetry is discernible in the relationships of 
the types of narrative focalisation generally possible: 
Third Person First Person 
authorial (---------) immanent 
1 1 
figural <---------) first person (1) 
KEY TO ARROWS: 
1 a narrowing of the perspective 
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~------~ an equivalence of the range of 
perspective 
then my theoretical enterprise can be extended and no doubt 
expanded to encompass those instances of third person 
narrative which exhibit unreliability of their particular 
kind. This undertaking is, however, nat a part of the 
present enterprise, though it may prove a profitable area to 
explore in the light of the model being developed here. By 
~unreliable first-person ( homodiegetic ) narration~, here 
however, is meant the anthropomorphised persona, qualified 
by the adjective unreliable, which functions as the 
mediatory presence, and which filters the presented world 
before transmitting it to the receiver. Unlike third person 
( omniscient/heterodiegetic ) narration, where the functions 
of the narrator are less anthropomorphically delineated, and 
the mediator occupies either the presented world QC the 
presentational process, the unreliable homodiegetic 
narrator, as was suggested in chapter 2, functions in the 
ontological realms of bath process and world. 
The unreliable narrators of homodiegetically transmitted 
fiction can be arranged, initially, according to their 
degree of what James called ~inconsci~nce~ along a continuum 
( although, as I argue at the end of this chapter, the 
inconscient narrator is only a sub-class of unreliable 
narration ), providing the critic with a sense of the 
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accretion of complexity possible in the use of the 
technique. At one end of the continuum could be placed a 
manifestly unreliable narrator such as that of Malachi 
Whitaker in 'X' ( whom we discover is insane ): at the 
other, could be placed the self-deceived narrators of Henry 
James's The Aspern ·Papers or The Ambassadors. Cqnscient but 
deceiving narrators will conclude the continuum of 
unreliability. (2). 
2. Unreliability: a survey of the concept's literary 
etiology 
In focussing now on the concept of unreliability and 
chartin9 its evolution as a critical term ( a manoeuvre 
necessary to the location of my position in the debate) 
perhaps the best definitional point of departure is Wayne C. 
Booth's: he has devoted a sizable component of his seminal 
work, The Rhetoric of Fiction (1961 ) to the notion of 
unreliability, and from his mapping of the terrain I shall 
move on to more contemporary discussions of the notion, 
including those of Stanzel (Theory of Narrative 1979, 
transl.1984) and Rimmon-Kenan ( Contemporary Poetics 1984). 
The theoretical refinement of this particular mode of 
narration, given the level at which I am operating, however, 
moves beyond the broader demarcation of the territory that 
these narratologists have attempted and goes same way 
towards resolving a problem that Stanzel recognises, but for 
reasons of economy, no doubt, subsequently does not engage 
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with (1984: p 151 ); that is, against what framework -
Stanzel talks of the norms of the implied author - such a 
notion as 'unreliability' is to be measured. In chapter 3 I 
attempted to provide the theoretical underpinning for such 
an undertaking ( identifying the 'norms' in the text of 
which Stanzel speaks and which establish the existence of 
the immanent narrative voice) and in Chapters 5 and 6, 
analyses of representative narratives will provide a further 
endorsement by praxis of the ontological claims of an 
immanent narrative mode. 
Booth's focus in his section of the Rhetoric of fiction 
which deals with unreliability is upon the short stories of 
Henry James who, perhaps,pre-eminantly among writers in the 
realist mode, sought to project in his fiction a world 
whose parameters were often clouded by the doubtful 
observations of a narrator who could, in the final analysis, 
not be trusted to tell the truth. As Booth makes clear, this 
is a deliberate technical manoeuvre on James's part, 
reflecting 'a desire for "gradations and superpositions of 
effect" that will produce "a certain fullness of truth"' 
(1961: p.339), but which will be grounded in the '''troubled 
vision'" of an unreliable narrator that has a reflector 
quality (Stanzel's term). (3) Booth then demarcates 
further, while commenting critically on James's failure to 
grapple theoretically with 'one large segment of his own 
work' (1961:p 340), narrative territory that involves 
'stories narrated, whether in the first or third person, by 
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a profoundly confused, basically self-deceived, or even 
wrong-headed or vicious reflector~ (p 340). It is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to provide a comprehensive 
assessment of the basis for such a choice on the part of 
~ames, in particular ( possibly, his stated intention to 
create worlds within a realist framework would be a point of 
departure for such an enterprise): however, that he worked 
in this mode, and was aware, as Booth puts it, of the 
~dramatic role of inconscience itself~ ( though he never 
articulated it with any fullness) is born testimony to by 
several works in the James canon, notably The Aspern Papers, 
J The Turn of the Screw, The Ambassadors, What Maisie Knew 
and the short story which Booth, himself, undertakes to 
analyse, ~The Liar P• James was palpably aware of the 
potential effect of this line of approach to the narrative 
situation: in the entries he makes in his Notebook for a 
tale entitled PThe Next Time P, James comments: 
••• say it~ a woman [set up in 
contrast to the main protagonistl 
She succeeds - and she thinks 
she~s fine! MightnPt she be the 
narrator, with a fine grotesque 
inconscience? So that the whole 
thing becomes a masterpiece of close 
and finished irony? 
(Quoted, Booth,1961: pp342-3) 
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James~s ~inconscient~ narrator,here, is what Booth and 
others have termed, subsequently, unreliable: and one of the 
goals of my undertaking is to establish more fully what is 
to be understood by the ~dramatic~ or revelatory role played 
by the deployment of an unreliable narrator in a narrative 
act that normally assumes the submission of the 
reader/receiver vis-a-vis the mediator as regards the events 
narrated in the text. To do this requires a more inclusive 
notion of unreliability than that exemplified in such works 
as those of James listed above. 
In applying his teller-character/ reflector-character 
distinction to the unreliable narrative situation and 
producing an argument for reliability as a criterion useful 
only if limited to teller-characters, Stanzel minimises the 
role of the reader/receiver ( Chatman~s narratee ) in those 
narratives ( like Benjy~s in The Sound and the Fury ) where 
the conventional tyranny of the narrator is deliberately 
undermined. Reception, albeit relatively unstable critical 
terrain at present, must be accorded status of paramount 
importance to the narrative act in such narratives and is 
determined exactly by the level of ~inconscience· of the 
mediator.Contrary to Stanzel~s stated position (1984: p 152) 
the question of unreliability in narratives of the above 
kind becomes a -central, indeed pivotal, one for ~meaningful 
interpretation~ (Stanzel, 1984: p152). Booth perceived ( and 
elaborated incisively upon) the ~double focus~ prevalent in 
some of James~s tales ( notably The Turn of the Screw and 
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~The Liar~: Booth,1961: pp 347-354; 364-371 >, but in 
attributing the effect to ~an incomplete fusion of original 
subject with the new subject that develops once a flawed 
narrator has been created to reflect the original~ (1961: p 
346), he begs the critical question, which is: What 
precisely is the encoded technique that is being employed in 
such narrative situations? 
Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan~s discussion of unreliability as a 
narrative device (1983: pp 100-103) takes careful cognizance 
of the positions of both Booth and Seymour Chatman. However, 
her criteria for unreliability ( a narrator~s ~limited 
knowledge, his personal involvement, and his problematic 
value-scheme': p 100 ) are by no means _inclusive and she, 
like Booth before her, concedes finally that ~even a passage 
[ from Ambrose Bierce~s 'Oil of Dog~ ] with so many markers 
of unreliability is problematic~ (1983:p 102). 
Susan Sniader Lanser, on the other hand (1981:p 170), 
regards the granting of what she terms ~mimetic authority~ 
to the narrator, as quintessential to the narrative act: 
Whenever possible ••• some degree of 
mimetic authority is granted to the 
narrating voice even if it is granted 
skeptically; readers conventionally try 
to "make sense" of ( infer felicity in ) 
the most frustrating instances of narrative 
incompetence. 
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Like Rimmon-Kenan, Lanser resists a direct encounter with 
the pressure on the text of post-modernist techniques which 
deprive the reader of the narrator~s mimetic authority (4) 
which would validate the orientation of the reader/receiver 
vis-a-vis the mediator. And it is precisely because the 
reader"s reception of "' incompletel.y fused"' narratives 
presents problems that the underlying technique requires 
exposition and explication. With Lanser, I agree that the 
primary impulse in the engagement of a mind with a literary 
( or other ) work of art is towards coherence; towards the 
establishment of "'a relation between minds~ ( 1981: p 174 ) 
that presupposes order, and it is to the nature of the 
underlying order, the narrative and textual markers 
( indices ) that provide a structure for coherence, that the 
theory must now address itself. If, as Christopher Butler 
argues (1984: p 2) interpretation has its base "'in a number 
of principles that underly all communicative exchanges"', 
then there are serious implications for a less than rigorous 
examination of the fundamental or informing structures upon 
which the discourse in question is predicated. Such 
formulations of the nature of this particular narrative 
process as that it is a product of the "norms" of the real 
author, or that it is a construct reified by the reader on 
the basis of a discrepancy between the values ( of the 
implied author ) projected in the text and those of the 
receiver of the narrative transmission, slide over such 
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complex narratological concepts as the position and nature 
of the hypostatized reader or the narratee and the ~real~ 
receiver ( to restrict the problem for the moment solely to 
the area of reception. ) Implicit in approaches of the kind 
that diminish the complexity of the matrix of relationships 
in the narrative act, and impossibly problematic for 
criticism generally . is a kind of cultural and societal 
relativism which would seriously undermine a workPs 
intersubjectively available meaning. As William Ray argues 
in his introduction: 
Literary studies qua discipline 
might best be defined both as an 
accumulated system of rules and codes 
within which every instance of inter-
pretation ••• must occur, and as an 
ongoing collective act, each utterance 
of which is necessarily different and in 
a sense in opposition to all others. No 
two readings can be said to be exactly the 
same, just as no critic can claim to have 
seized absolutely the authorPs meaning. 
(1984: p 2) 
It is somewhere within this almost irresolvable tension 
between the ~instance and the system· (Ray,1984: p 2) of 
meaning - that the locus of analysis is to be found. Thus 
the minutiae of textual relationships, finely graded along 
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the continuum that comprises the act of narrative 
transmission, require our observation and understanding. In 
this regard, Whitaker~s short stort, ·X·, occupying as it 
does, a space at one end of the continuum that comprises 
unreliable homodiegetic narratives, is especially fecund for 
the corroboration by example of the theoretical position 
outlined in chapters 2 and 3. 
3. ·X·: an example of unreliable homodiegetic narration 
Malachi Whitaker, ·the Bradford Chekhov·, as she was 
hailed in the thirties, contrived narratives very much in 
the realist mode, dealing with the apparently trivial, but 
fundamentally significant, events ( usually in the domestic 
situation) affecting working class families in England just 
prior to the Depression. She contributed to the Adelphi 
among other periodicals and journals, and describes, 
somewhat whimsically, in an essay entitled Beginnings 
included in the Paladin collection, her meeting with John 
Middleton Murry who subsequently, during the thirties, 
published her stories to consistently positive reviews. 
Culled from her four volumes of short stories, a selection 
has been recently collected by Joan Hart (5), from which ·X· 
has been selected- because of its paradigmatic representation 
of a narrative mode which can be called ·immanent •• 
The homodiegetic narrator of the story situates her 
discourse ·presently· in the past: that is, she casts her 
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narrative back from the temporal vantage point of the 
present: 
1 have never seen my harp since. I 
have an idea that my sister cut the 
strings with a linoleum knife some 
time before she died. I know now that 
I could have had it repaired, but 1 did 
not think of that at the time. I have 
not yet found x. The world seems to 
have closed in, and there are not many 
places left in which 1 can look for it. 
(p 114) 
The shift in the tense of the verbs that occurs in this, the 
final paragraph of the narrative is from the past to the 
present. The entire utterance, therefore, is informed by the 
flash~back technique, coercing the reader/receiver of the 
narrative along a temporal continuum that leads from the 
narrator~s recollected past to the constraints of her 
experienced present. The opening sentence of the narrative, 
~I slept in the same room as my sister until she died P 
(p 110 >, successfully foregrounds both the climax of the 
tale - and in this respect the teller of the story reveals a 
sophisticated control of structure and the build-up of 
tension - and introduces the motif of Pinconscient P 
proximity which is to lead to murder. Moreover, a linguistic 
assessment of the surface structures of her discourse 
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reveals the dominance o~ simple sentence construction, and 
immature lexical choice. ( It is largely monosyllabic. ) 
Within a very short span, then, the analyst is alerted to 
a number o~ potential discrapencies that must bear upon 
reception o~ this text. There is, ~or example~ a clear 
disjunction to be ~ound in, on the one hand, the subtlety o~ 
the narrative act o~ transmission - ~oregrounding, tenSion, 
the introduction o~ moti~s - and the linguistic simplicity 
o~ the discourse on the other. As the receiver orientates 
her/himsel~ to each successive utterance, the semantic 
i mplicatures demand interpretations that can, by no 
narratological sleight o~ hand, be traced to a source in the 
homodiegetic discourse. As the ~irst-order epistemological 
ground o~ the apparent discourse is eroded, a second-order 
epistemological discourse ( which is dominant because it 
ampli~ies the meaning o~ the narrative as it corrects it ) 
becomes discernible: the immanent narrative situation 
appears to be ~unctioning. 
Several translational indices which reinforce such a 
conclusion are scattered throughout the various levels o~ 
this story; and Whitaker presents the narratologist with all 
three o~ the ontological realms, de~ined in chapter 4 -as 
l ying outside the overt discourse of the homodiegetic 
narrator. The receiver is left in no doubt that this is a 
narrative of an exceedingly limited consciousness ( the 
narrator, imagining hersel~ to be a flying black pig, rips 
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out her sister's throat at the climax of the story) and by 
implication, the entire narrative is projected from a 
s patial domain concretized in the last paragraphs as - we 
infer - an institution of some kind: in short, the narrator 
is mad. We are not, however, permitted access to this 
conclusion via the first person discourse: her discourse 
contains the indices to the second- order epistemic system 
which she is unable to perceive. We reach the conclusion 
that she is insane only in the light of several markers 
which she ·· herself cannot comprehend. 
Incomprehension is fundamental to the narrator's 
perceptions about herself ( a pattern of observations which 
throws light upon the degree to which she can be defined as 
~ reliable~). At first glance, the statement that ' ••• my 
heart began to move all about my body • •• into my calf. I 
thought, How shall I get home with my heart in my leg?' 
(p 110) is disturbing, but the hypostatized reader, not yet 
in a position to jettison ( or qualify) the statements 
being made by the homodiegetic narrator; and orientated by 
an apparently realistic discourse and context ( ~I slept in 
the same room as my sister until she died~, being the 
deceptively banal opening sentence of this narrative ), 
finds him/herself suspending judgement until further 
a ccretions have annealed reception of the narrator~s 
d isc·ourse, enforcing a modification upon it. That this 
narrator~s sensory integrative functions are aberrant is 
corroborated by her own avowals: 
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I did not like the throaty sound of 
the water ••• (p 110) 
her oddly variant aural response ( for one thing) 
reinforced by the further statement: 
••• I would sometimes run my hands 
over the strings [ of her harp l, from 
the bass where they said gubble bub 
bub gubble up to the highest notes 
which just went pee ting. 
(p. 111) 
Olfactory functions, too, playa role in alerting the reader 
to this narrator~s deviance: 
The smell of hen-food used to make my heart 
move about my body. Once, I know, it nearly 
got out of the tip of my left ear. · (p 111) 
(Even when she herself questions the validity or accuracy of 
such an observation: 'How can that happen when the heart is 
so large and the ear so small?' she continues, p. 111.) 
Extending and enhancing the pattern of sensory 
integrative dys~unction, touch can be seen to function as a 
pointer to the narrator's unusual sensitivity: she describes 
her face .as having ' ••• no cheekbones at all', and continues: 
I have looked in the mirror, and felt 
for them, and not found them, and 
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thought 'When I am a skeleton, I shall 
be quite unlike all the other skeletons'. 
But I have only patted my cheeks lightly, 
very lightly. Perhaps they are underneath. 
(p. 111> . 
Her claim that she 'wanted to do so many things' ( p.lll) 
and the juxtaposition . of her desire to learn algebra ( hence 
the variable 'X' of t~e title, the symbolism of which will 
be explored further below) with an equivalent desire to 
' fly without wings, just by moving [her] elbows backwards 
and forwards, and dropping from a cliff or a high window' 
(p. 111), sounds the first clear alarm that the signals 
which project the states of affairs in this narrative, are 
not entirely trustworthy. Undermining the matter-of-fact 
tone of the narrator's utterance, and projecting in the 
process a second-order epistemic system which enforces for 
the receiver a stereoscopic perspective on the presented 
world, is her unreliability. Ironically, her sister's first 
utterance, embedded in the context of the narrator's 
homodiegetic discourse, carries a weight of insight into the 
psycho-pathology of this mediator which we, as receivers of 
this narrative transmission, will only be able to 
corroborate entirely once the climax has been reached. In 
describing how her sister had interrupted ( by 'roughly' 
grabbing her hair ) her singing to her harp, the mediator 
recalls the direct speech as: 'Shut up! Do you want 
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everybody to think you are mad?~ (p. 111>. Shifting 
perceptions now become an integral feature of the mediator~s 
discourse, and accurate reception of the events becomes a 
challenge for the reader, even as its achievement is 
undermined. The narrator comments, for example, that 
contrary to her sister~s perception that she is mad, she 
herself had ~ ••• begun to think [her] sister was mad~ 
(p 111). 
Unlike Muriel Spark~s narrative, discussed in the earlier 
chapters, translational indices are confined largely to the 
s emantic stratum of ~X~ and then, when the exemplifications 
begin to become apparent, to the strata of portrayed 
objectivities and states of affairs. There may be a 
suggestion of a pre-phonetic pointer in the title of the 
story - ~X~ gestalting a mathematical variable as it 
s imultaneouslx. suggests a blank at a metaphoric level - but 
this is not a particularly fruitful line of investigation in 
this narrative. However, the second-order epistemic system 
becomes clear to the reader/receiver, as a result of the 
exemplification process engendered in the other strata that 
Ingarden defines. If, by way of reminder, we recall 
Goodman~s assertion that 
••• exemplification involves reference 
by what possesses to the property poss-
essed, and thus that exemplification 
though obviously different from denotation 
132 
( or description or representation ) is 
no less a species of reference. 
(1978: p.32) 
then the symbolic reference that is fundamental to the 
process of exemplifi~ation can be seen to be occurring in 
the process that enforces on the reader/receiver a 
re-alignment of his/her orientation: that i~, when the 
narrator~s unreliability has been established ( up to page . 
111 by dint of the accretions of perverse sensory 
descriptions and incipiently deviant avowals of the kind 
outlined above ) and the presented world of the first person 
mediator finds its epistemic position being superseded by 
another ~world~. 
It is naturally possible to arrange the indices and the 
projected ( second-order ) ~Horlds~ in a number of 
suggestive patterns, but allowing for translational signals 
of a linguistic and/or lexical kind to remain - for the 
present - unexplicated (6), the world ( in Goodman~s sense) 
that is projected as an alternative one to that which the 
ostensible narrator presents, and which derives from the 
f raming context of the immanent narrative situation, can be 
determined by arranging the utterances of the homodiegetic 
narrator ( whose semantic units, alone, are responsible for 
the text~.s meaning potentialities) against the implicatures 
which have as their fundamental source the immanent voice. 
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To suggest merely three such possiblities for patterned 
grouping, exemplification could be examined as it affects: 
1 . the relation between the sisters 
2. the narrative's climax 
3. the narrator's perceptions about herself 
Correction of the first per~on narrator's utterance or 
observation < Column A ) is provided by the exemplificatory 
process of the immanent voice ( Column B ) in the following 
comparative analysis: 
(i). The Relation Between the Sisters 
A First Person Narrator 
'1 am sure my sister did not 
like me.' <p.110) 
'If there was anything to or-
ganize, ••• anyone's feelings 
to be trampled on, she would 
volunteer for the job.' (p111) 
'She would pull things togeth-
e r that had almost fallen to 
B Immanent Narrator 
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True. But reasons for her 
dislike are to be found 
in the narrator's insens-
itivity which borders on 
lunacy. 
She has friends and is 
popular, so the 'tramp-
Iring]" is reserved ~or 
her sister, the narrator. 
She was constructive 
and/or socially sensitive 
pieces~ (p. 111) 
~In some ways she was like a 
horse.~ (p 112) 
PMy sister began following me 
around in a way I did not like~. 
(p.112) 
p ••• I would sing a great deal 
to my harp. I know I sang very 
loudly, but I did not think it 
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and aware. 
The sister is athletic, 
blonde, the ~norm~. She 
has physical strength 
(plays tennis and rows) 
but the animal qualities 
of a horse are the 
dubious projection of the 
narrator. 
Her sister becomes in-
creasingly perturbed by 
her aberrant behaviour. 
The singing to the harp, 
particularly, reveals the 
fear of public exposure 
of the derangement of the 
narrator. ( This could be 
self-serving, but might 
also be construed as a 
protective measure: she 
continues to sleep with 
and watch over the narr-
tor.) 
The noise, tuneless 
and incessant, by the 
narratorPs own admission, 
mattered.' <p.lll) 
'This was strange to me, as 1 
had begun to think my sister 
was mad'. (p 111) 
'[My sister] would sleep though 
the light went off and on a 
hundred times, and though 1 
turned back the sheet to see if 
she had turned into a horse as 
m~ny more.' <p.113) 
(ii). The Narrative 7 s Climax 
A The First Person Narrator 
'1 looked up and saw a sort of 
must be regarded as a 
severe strain on the 
nerves of the older 
sister. 
A lack of personal 
insight on the part of 
this narrator precludes 
her recognition of the 
signals that denote ab-
errant behaviour. 
Sleep, for her sister is 
severely hampered. They 
share a bed, and she man-
ifestly wants to inhibit 
the narrator 7 s 
destructive potential.But 
she is subjected to her 
darker sibling's obsess-
ive, repetitive behaviour 
night after night. 
B The Immanent Narrator 
The narrator distances 
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pig flying about. It was a 
thin black pig,and it kept 
smiling at me, and it had teeth 
just like mine." (p 113) 
"All at once [the pig] swoop-
ed down to my sister"s neck 
and began . to bite an-d make 
horrible growling noises." 
(p.113) 
" [I] ran about trying to 
catch the flying pig in [the 
drawer]." (p.113) 
herself from her action 
by objectifying her beha-
viour, and making it that 
of an imaginary flying 
pig. 
The narrator herself is, 
in fact, the "pig" that 
bites into the neck of 
her sleeping sister and 
kills her. 
There is nothing flying 
about the room: the pig 
is a psychotic figment of 
the narrator"s imagin-
ation. 
( iii). The Narrator"s Perceptions about Herself 
A The First Person Narrator 
..... it seemed to me that my 
heart began to move all about 
my body. Sometimes it even got 
into my calf. I thought, How 
shall I get home with my heart 
in my leg?" (p.l10) 
B The Immanent Narrator 
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The bizarre physical and 
anatomical distortions 
experienced subjectively 
by the narrator ( and 
given the "realist" over-
lay of the presented 
world) suggest, early in 
~I did not like the throaty 
sound of the water nor the 
dank smell of it ••• ~(p.ll0) 
and 
~Now, I have no cheekbones at 
all." (p.ll1> 
"When I am a skeleton, I shall 
be quite unlike all the other 
skeletons" <p.ll1> 
~ I wanted to learn algebra, 
and, like many other people, 
I wanted to fly without wings." 
(p.l11> 
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the narrative that the 
judgements of the narr-
ator are suspect. 
utterances of this kind 
must be read as surface 
signals of the narrator~s 
sensory integrative dys-
function, that is of her 
psychotic disorder. 
At a superficial level 
the narrator reveals a 
number of physical de-
ficiencies which, how-
ever, mask the nature 
of her mental de-
ficiencies. 
The cognitive slippage 
evinced by this type of 
sequence reveals her 
disconnection from the 
"world" projected by 
her narrative. 
In keeping with the essentially ~constructionist' 
methodology utilised in this dissertation, the patternings 
and juxtapositionings suggested above demonstrate that the 
exemplifications are ( as must be the case ) entirely missed 
by the ostensible homodiegetic narrator: the aspects of the 
world that they indicate, derived from Ingarden's ~states of 
affairs~ (stratum 3 ) and 'portrayed objectivities' 
( stratum 4 ), remain outside the cognitive sphere of the 
homogiegetic narrator. But they are nevertheless exemplified 
via the attention drawn to them by the fact of the 
homodiegetic narrator's blindness to so obvious a set of 
properties of situations which she herself has described. 
These and similar indices establish the existence of the 
covert discourse of the immanent narrator. 
The translational indices in this short story ( notably 
the exemplifications ) constrain the implications and/or 
inferences within a relatively narrow band of potential 
meanings; and I would suggest that a recognition of this 
delimititation is of paramount significance for 
interpretation, and would sub vent the kind of dilemma 
expressed by Booth ( 1961:pp 353-354 ) who feels that 
interpretations of narratives of this kind must, inevitably, 
reveal large areas of indeterminacy as regards meaning. The 
immanent voice in 'X' in fact coerces the receiver of the 
narrativ~ transmission into concretizing the lacunae very 
specifically: the entire utterance of the homodiegetic 
narrator requiring recasting in the light of the second 
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order epistemological perceptions that her unreliability is 
a function of her madness. 
4. A typology of unreliable homodiegetic narrators 
A Inconscient: 
(i) Insane. ( The narrator in ~X~; Benjy, in 
The Sound and the Fury) 
V (ii) Childish. ( Huckleberry Finn) 
(iii) Naive. ( Lorna Merrifield ) 
(iv) Self-deceived: straddling categories. 
B Conscient 
( The narrators of ~Haircut~ 
The Aspern Papers or The Good 
Soldier ) 
(v) Deceiving. ( The Duke in ~My Last Duchess~: 
although he exhibits marked 
elements of self-deception as 
well. ) 
(vi> Manipulative. <Lucy Snowe in Villette) 
To conclude the discussion of unreliability which has 
provided this chapter with its focus, a typology such as the 
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one above indicates the range of degrees of unreliability 
available to writers who wish to deploy the immanent 
~arrative situation. The typology includes the case of 
self-deception, a category of unreliable narration which I 
explore in chapters 5 and 6: self-deceived narrators are 
inconscient in virtue of their being deceived, conscient in 
virtue of their active participation in the deception to 
which they willingly fall victims. 
In an attempt further to elaborate the subtleties of 
unreliable homodiegetic narration,I shall in chapters 5 and 
6 provide narratological exegeses of instances of both 
self-deception and deception, the latter falling outside of 
the Jamesian category of ~inconscience~ but still within the 
category of unreliability. James~s concept refers to the 
narrator's knowledge of his own inner states, while the 
concept of unreliability refers to the epistemological 
barriers that stand between the reader/receiver and the 
narrator. One of those barriers is often the inconscience of 
the narrator him/herself. The fully conscient, deceiving 
narrator can on these grounds be regarded by the 
reader/receiver as unreliable. 
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NOTES: 
1. Authorial and figural narrators on the one hand, and 
immanent and first person narrators on the other" correspond 
to Genette~s external and internal focalisers in this 
graphic depiction of the relationships between the types of 
narrative situation. Like immanent and first person 
narration, authorial and figural exhibit ontological 
similarities, with figural being, in effect, merely a 
conventional narrowing via the imposition of limiting 
strictures upon the range of authorial ~omniscience~. 
2. In answer to the question: Why is the corrective in 
these narratives not a feature or function of an implied 
authorial stance ( Iser, Rimmon-Kenan, Yacobi ) against 
which or from which receivers of the text re-orientate 
themselves vis-a-vis the narrated events, I must reply that 
the answer lies in the logic underpinning narrative 
transmission itself; its mediatory generic point of 
departure which implies a ~speakerP, either literally ( a 
teller-character) or metaphorically ( showing or ' 
exemplifying). 
3. BoothPs source here is footnoted as ~Preface to "The 
Pupil"~ in The Art of the Novel ed. R.P. Blackmur ( New 
York, 1947), pp 153, 154; and is to be found in The Rhetoric 
of Fiction:1961, p.339. 
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4. Coover~s ~The Babysitter~ ( Pricksongs and Descants: 1969 
), for example, deprives the reader of a satisfying 
construction of the presentational process, not to mention 
the presented world; drawing into both the process and 
presented world, the elements of incoherence that 
distinguish the plot of this narrative. Each paragraph 
suggests another vantage point - for the receiver - from 
which to view the presented world. 
5.The Crystal Fountain and Other Stories: 1984. London: 
Paladin 
6. Although I have not attempted an extended analysis of a 
novel such as Huckleberry Finn, such elements of the second 
order discourse of the homodegetic narrator as linguistic 
choice and idiolect are readily perceived to function as 
important features of the exemplification process in texts 
of this kind. See also the analysis in chapter 6 of the 





Chapter 5: A Critical Exploration 
of ~Haircut~ by Ring Lardner and 
~My Last Duchess~ by Robert Browning. 
An analysis of two modes of narrative 
transmission wh~ch involve narrators 
who modulate between positions of 
deception and self-deception. 
The discourses provided by Robert Browning and Ring 
Lardner in their narrati.ves, -My Last Duchess~ and ~Haircut~ 
respectively, share a generic feature: they are both 
monologues, uttered by narrators in the first person, both 
of whom may be deemed unreliable, but to varying degrees. 
Lardner~s Whitey, a barber in a small town in the U.S.A., 
rapidly emerges as deficient in his observations upon the 
events that suffuse his utterances, while the Duke of 
Ferrara, subject, the reader imputes, to massive delusions, 
comes to be regarded as unreliable insofar as his judgements 
about the actions of the duchess are concerned; which 
in~erence on the part o~ the reader/receiver radically 
undermines the conventional relationship between receiver 
and mediator. As has been suggested in the previous 
chapters, the apparent first-order discourse of the 
homodiegetic narrator is superseded in the reading process 
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by a second-order ( epistemologically primary ) discourse 
that derives from the stereoscopic perspective afforded by 
the textual signals comprising the immanent narrative 
situation. 
2. 'Haircut' 
These signals ( the translational indices ) are 
theoretically locatable at all levels of the literary work. 
I n 'Haircut', however, they are to be found primarily in the 
semantic stratum, in that of the portrayed objectivities, as 
well as in the states of affairs projected by the work. 
Their nature inheres in the disjunction or tension that 
arises between the properties ( of characters, actions and 
events ) exemplified in the discourse and the homodiegetic 
narrator's misperception of them. The unconscious 
exemplification of values revealed by ' WhiteyP s character 
and the value structure of the hypostatized reader, 
controlled, however, by the intersubjectively available 
meaning units of the second stratum, offer another field in 
which the receiver may locate the indices suggesting the 
presence of the immanent mode of narration. In his account 
of JimPs actions, the narratorPs peculiar remoteness ( not 
to say pathological insensitivity) becomes a device of some · 
potency in colouring the projected states of affairs, with 
the narratorPs misreading of Jim~s behaviour assuming itself 
the dramatic role of properties exemplified, so that the 
~real~ nature of this small-town comedian can be ascertained 
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with relative ease by the receivers in the reading process 
( no less - we assume - than must be the experience of the 
ostensible narratee, who though he remains a silent auditor 
of Whitey's rambling monologue is nevertheless the 
text-based receiver of the discourse ).(1) 
While Lardner's story ultimately defies easy 
categorization it does, initially, present as a 
heavy-handed, almost clumsy attempt in the black-comic mode. 
It lacks, comparatively, the subtle veneer of 'My Last 
Duchess'. However, interpretation ( aided by an awareness of 
the range of the indices ) suggests a progression in the 
narrative from the ostensible simplicity of its 
surface-structure ( a bigoted, insensitive lout relates the 
cruel escapades of the town joker) toward a realisation on 
the receiver~s part - that a complex fusion of identities 
between the narrator and the protagonist of his tale has 
occurred at the deep structural level. The apparent 
slightness is thus re-evaluated in the light of the pointers 
to the second-order presented world, providing the discourse 
with its ballast. As an instance of unreliable homodiegetic 
narration, this short story ( like the Browning monologue I 
shall also examine) is superbly suited to explication of 
the kind offered by the theoretical position outlined and 
argued for in the the previous chapters. 
Within a few paragraphs the receiver of this narrative 
( distinct from the narratee or hypostatized receiver whose 
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existence is inferred from Whitey~s ~You~re a newcomer, 
ain't you?': p 392 ) has been alerted to the potentially 
unreliable nature of the discourse. Deriving from the 
idiolect which characterizes the narrator's utterance 
( linguistic formations such as 'ain~t', deviant formations 
such as 'set everybody to laughin~', and the use of the 
double negative, '1 ain~t had nothin' to drink', as well as 
i diosyncratic pronounciations such as 'theayter' pepper ~is 
speech ) is the awareness that the mediator is meant to be 
realised as occupying a specific social stratum within the 
presented world; and once the fact of unreliability is 
established - by the translational indices which will be 
outlined below - the idiolect can be judged by the receiver 
to have been an ideologically biased, but nevertheless 
significant, pointer toward the limitations that the 
narrator subsequently demonstrates. The linguistic 
deviations are sig~ifiers or markers of variations from a 
conventionally accepted norm: in this narrative, the 
deviation indicates a lower-order discourse ( and by 
extension existence ) in both the presentational process and 
the presented world. But this is to anticipate somewhat the 
conclusions that I must argue for. 
The narrator's unreliability emerges though not so 
much through his idiolect ( although this is obviously an 
indicato~ ) but through its revelatory semantic dimension. 
Whitey's focus is - from the outset - upon the superficial 
relations between individuals in his community, and the 
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degree of his own superficiality is measured by his 
readiness to offer details of their community life that have 
been come by through gossip. His discourse refers to over 
twenty characters all of whom are alluded to in a similarly 
prying fashion and in a quite unabashed tone during the 
course of his narration • 
The crux of the first-order narrative ( Whitey~s ) 
concerns the· ~antics~ - for the amusement of the barber and 
other cronies - of Jim Kendall, whom we discover shortly 
after the story~s opening in medias res ( a conventinal 
device of this kind of monologue whether in poetry, drama or 
narrative> has 'got killed' (p 392). As with ~X', this 
cer.tainty deprives the ostensible discourse of a potential 
climax, but what is achieved, technically ( or structurally> 
is the heightening of the receiver'S interest in the manner 
or mode of his death. The garrulous barber delays, by means 
of a number of narrative detours, the revelation of the 
manner in which he died, thereby ensuring interest in the 
rising action of the short story, even as his magpie 
approach to what counts as germane threatens to undermine 
his core narration. The receiver and the auditor of Whitey's 
narrative must reconcile themselves to a revelation, in the 
narrator~s own time, of the mode of Jim Kendall~s death 
rather than the fact of it happening. This framing structure 
is by no .means unique to this short story, but Lardner 
achieves another end via such formal patterning which 
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demonstrably illustrates the versatility of the immanent 
narrative situation. 
Whitey's unreliability as narrator ( or focaliser ) is 
not, however, a function merely of his linguistic 
deviations. The receiver is more impressed by the moral 
failure his judgements suggest. Several incidents in the 
first-order narrative force the receiver into a position of 
antagonism vis-a-vis Whitey, notably his regaling of the 
reader with the episodes involving the letters ( sent 
anonymously, and at random, by Jim to husbands whose names 
he would read off bill-boards he passed in his travels as a 
canned-goods salesman ): 
For instance, they"d be a sign, "Henry 
Smith, Dry Goods." Well Jim would write 
down the name and the name of the town and 
when he got to wherever he was goin" he"d 
mail back a postal card to Henry Smith at 
Benton and not sign no name to it, but he"d 
write ••• "Ask your wife about that book 
agent that spent the afternoon last week," ••• 
(p 394) 
The gratuitous malice of this act on Jim"s part is glossed 
over as " ••• a great trick"; the behaviour of a real "card' 
(p 394). The account, moreover, of Jim Kendall's 'outfox[ing 
of] his missus" (p 395) - projected by Whitey as the actions 
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of a ~caution!~ (p 395) - assumes a progressively more 
serious quality which is, however, by no means intended by 
the narrator whose own reading of Jim~s corrupt vengeance 
upon his wife and children suggests his amusement at the 
whole episode. As he indicates in his ability to gloss over 
-Jim's attempted rape of Julie ( 'He finally seen he wasn't 
gettin' nowheres with his usual line so he decided to try 
the rough stuff.':p 398 ); and his apparent accomodatory 
approach to the vengeful duping of Julie subsequent to her 
rejection of him ( not to mention the narrator's 
insensitivity to the cruel delight Jim Kendall apparently 
took in tormenting Paul Dickson, the brain-damaged boy whom 
Jim referred to as 'cuckoo': p 396 ), several episodes 
combine to suggest an orientation by the reader toward a 
position radically anatagonistic to the reception implied by 
the judgements of the narrator. There is no fusion of the 
perspectives of mediator and, receiver so that what the 
mediator projects as amusing or funny is received, rather, 
as malicious, corrupt or depraved and the flashpoint of 
humour ( a function of this perspectival fusion [De 
Reuck:1987al ) is undermined. While the focalised, that is, 
Jim Kendall, is the apparent object of revelation in this 
discours~, several of its qualities point to and reveal the 
workings of the psychic make-up of the focaliser ( Dick 
Whitey) and it is to these that the indices now point the 
receiver who becomes embroiled in a dramatic revelation of 
an intricate nature. 
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The world that Whitey occupies ( and presents in his 
narrative) is one that is opposed, diametrically, by that 
presented by the immanent narrative situation. Whitey~s 
limited perceptions exemplify, at the level of the portrayed 
objectivities and that of the states of affairs, a number of 
features of the presented world of the second-order 
narrative situation. By means of this exemplificatory 
process the reader/receiver re-assesses Jim Kendall, 
the~cardP and the ~cautionP, and finds in him despicable, 
even repellent qualities. Insofar as character-relationships 
are concerned, Whitey~s supportive cronyism ( the alignment 
with Jim, Hod Meyers and the rest) is opposed, structurally 
and at the level of the projected states of affairs, 
morally, by the outsider grouping which comprises Doc Stair, 
JUlie and poor crazy Paul. Several translational indices 
point to the narratorPs rendering of their characters as 
fundamentally suspect; undermined by the exemplification 
process which his own character-attributes imply. Reference 
is secured by means of this process to the second-order 
narrative; that is, the immanent narrative situation. Where 
Whitey and his judgements upon Jim Kendall are central as 
epistemic touchstones to the first-order narrative, Doc 
Stair, Julie and Paul are central to the second-order 
narrative. Similarly, the narratee who remains silent in the 
face of WhiteyPs relentless monologue can also be construed 
as an outsider-figure ( and thereby be aligned with the 
touchstones of the second-order narrative >; one whose 
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tacitly judgemental attitude in no way stems the flood of 
Whitey~s discourse but, seemingly, serves as the catalyst 
for the accounts of the episodes in the small town's recent 
history. As an outsider-figure, the narratee joins and 
swells the ranks of those elements of the presented world 
which provide Whitey's discourse with its fundamental 
opposition. 
As was demonstrated in the analysis of 'X', a table of 
opposing qualities may be set up so that the exemplificatory 
process is clearly discernible, with reference being 
activated by the judgements of the homodiegetic narrator and 
achieved in the 'judgements' of the immanent narrator. Take, 
f or example the following: 
Whitey's Perception of Jim Kendall: pp 395; 397 
A. First Person Narrator 
[Jim] told it all around 
town, how he had outfoxed 
his Missus. He certainly 
was a caution. 
( p 395) 
Now Jim Kendall, besides 
bein' a jokesmith and a 
pretty good drinker, well 
B Immanent Narrator 
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He lacks any quality of 
family loyalty and his 
actions are malicious 
rather than amusing. 
Jim Kendall's jokes are at 
the expense of others and 
are often vicious; his 
Jim was quite a ladykiller. 
(p 397) 
drunken behaviour is des-
picable, and far from 
being a ~ladykiller~ in 
any positive sense of the 
term, he is ( the irony is 
missed by the homodiegetic 
narrator ) capable of rape 
in order to have his will 
with women. 
This is to take merely two examples of the narrator~s 
(mis)perceptions about Jim which the immanent narrator 
relocates in their proper place. The significant feature, 
f rom the technical point of view, is that these 
~ misperceptions~ themselves serve to illuminate ( by means 
of the non-denotational referential function they perform in 
the narrative transmission) the psychic composition of the 
ostensible narrator. 
Lardner has, however, an additional deceptive ploy in 
mind which forms the crux ( that is, interpretatively) of 
the entire presentational process. To re-orientate reception 
so that it encompasses the limited homodiegetic narrator~s 
discourse and encapsulates moreover the epistemically prior 
discourse of the immanent narrator is merely one of the 
aspects of the tale~s structure. An additional dimension is 
given to this short story ( an enhancement, that is, of the 
projected states of affairs ) by the gradual accretion to 
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the ingenuous barber of the more corrupt ( and corrupting ) 
qualities of Jim Kendall. This transition receives its 
clearest markers in the narrowing of the distance which the 
narrator has been at some pains, initially, to establish 
between his own and Jim Kendall's diction: 
Jim Kendall us.ed to call him cuckoo; 
that's a name Jim had for anybody that 
was off their -head, only he called people's 
head their bean. That was another of his 
gags, callin~ head bean and callin' crazy 
-people cuckoo. Only poor Paul ain't crazy, 
but just 'silly. 
(p 396) 
At this juncture Whitey explicitly does not want to 
acknowledge as his own the malicious edge that characterises 
Jim's .diction. Later, however, Whitey begins the subtle but, 
for all that no less unambiguous linguistic slide into Jim's 
forms of perception as manifested in his descriptive 
phrases. Initially, in order to maintain the deception, 
Whitey restrains himself by first uttering, then disowning, 
Jim's distinguishing phrases: 
Well, JimPs habits and his jokes didnPt 
appeal to Julie and of course he 
- was a married man, so he didnPt have no 
more chance than, well, than a rabbit. 
That's an expression of Jim's himself. 
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When somebody didn't have no chance to 
get elected or somethin', Jim would 
always say they didn't have no more chance 
than a rabbit. 
(p 398) 
When the linguistic gap between Whitey and Jim has been 
eradicated and Whitey has revealed his secret ( but total ) 
identification with Jim's warped perceptions, he is capable 
of donning fully the linguistic mantle he was at such pains 
to deploy as a device for the separation of their 
identities: 'Well, it was a couple days later when Jim was 
here in the shop again, and so was the cuckoo' ( p 400 ). 
Here there is no linguistic gap mirroring the separation of 
their identities. The darker chords of this narrative are 
sounded ( indices themselves, locatable in Ingarden's fifth 
metaphysical stratum ) as the receiver realises the true 
nature of the 'ingenuous' narrator. No longer speaking with 
the innocence of his slow-witted ( pre-corruption) self, he 
becomes Jim Kendall incarnate: 
Jim was a sucker to leave a new beginner 
have his gun, let alone a half-wit. It 
probably served Jim right, what he got. 
( p401) 
Whitey's reversion, in the penultimate sentence of the 
short story, to his comic characterisation of Jim ( 'He 
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certainly was a card!~ ) no longer has the ring of an 
unreflective, limited consciousness. Whitey, the receiver 
now realises, must, from the outset, consciously have 
chosen, though in an ostensibly unreflective fashion, a 
path of evil. The choice is prefigured in the only two 
lapses in his comic narrative where, with insight that 
surprises the receiver, he has spoken of Jim~s ~tricks~ and 
~jokes~ as instances of Jim ~ ••• always [getting] even· ( p 
398) and ~ ••• [going] after revenge· ( p 399). 
As will be demonstrated in the analysis of The Aspern 
Papers, there are levels of deception inherent in the 
narrative situations which the location of translational 
indices render less opaque. The narratee in ~Haircut~ - does 
not apparently apprehend what is transparent - by the end of 
this discourse - to the hypostatized reader. Deception in 
James·s novella involves the narrator·s self-deceit as 
well.Such an ~interpretative abstraction· ( Ruthrof, 1981:p 
156 ) provides this short story with a darker core of 
strength which a more superficial reading of the narrator as 
merely limited not evil - denies the receiver. What is 
apparently ·clumsy~ technically speaking can now be seen to 
be imbued with both sophistication and subtlety. Browning~s 
technique in ~My Last Duchess~ similarly rewards explication 
against the framework provided by this theoretical model. 
3. 7My Last Duchess· 
-156 
Critics from Robert Langbaum (1957) to Warwick 5linn 
(1982 ) have generally found agreement about one facet of 
the dramatic monologue: that it serves, in part, a 
revelatory function. Though they express the position 
somewhat differently, Langbaum~s critical stance: 
The willingness of the reader to under-
stand the duke, even to sympathize with 
him as a necessary condition of reading 
the poem, is the key to the poem~s form. 
It alone is responsible for a meaning not 
inherent in the content itself but deter-
mined peculiarly by the . treatment. 
( 1957:p 80) 
is echoed by Slinn~s more than a quarter of a century later: 
Browning seems to me to be a psychological 
dramatist who used monologues to explore 
man as the product of a self-reflexive use 
of language. Consequently my concern is 
with the nature of the histrionic in his 
poetry, with the way characters are 
engaged in verbal acts which dramatise 
themselves, and with the way Browning con-
siders the multiplicity and complexity of 
human personality ••• 
<1982: p ix) 
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These observations are no doubt accurate as far as they 
go, but they do not go far enough~ for they fail to engage 
with the problem ( as I see it ) of the technical 
achievement of the dramatic monologue whose bi-focal 
perspective - on the ~form~ and ~content~ on the one hand, 
and verbal acts which ~dramatise~ on the other - permits of 
the curious simultaneity in the receiver~s orientation 
vis-a-vis the speaker ( what Langbaum refers to as ~sympathy 
and judgement~, pp 69-103 ) in which omniscience is granted 
even as the restrictive nature of the data-base is 
recognised. 
As is the case in unreliable narratives of the kind 
already analysed, the dramatic monologue presents the 
receiver with a mediatory voice or speaker, ostensibly 
responsible for conveying the details ( of whatever kind ) 
of the presented world. Because of the homodiegetic nature 
of this voice or discourse, it occupies, paradoxically, the 
normally discrete ontological realms of process and world. 
But the factor that Langbaum, for instance, cannot 
accommodate on a model that fails to include all the 
variables in the narrative act of transmission ( between 
author, text and receiver ) is exactly how, given the 
ostensible discourse of a single narrator/mediator, there 
can be a discrepancy between ~sympathyP ( for the speaker) 
on the one hand, and ~judgementP ( of the speaker) on the 
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other. He is driven, perforce, to vague formulations that 
border on the affective fallacy in their subjective lack of 
precision: 
Not only can the speaker of the dramatic 
monologue dramatize a position to which 
the poet is not ready to commit himself 
intellectually, but the sympathy which 
we give the speaker for the sake of the 
poem and apart from judgement makes it 
possible for the reader to participate in a 
position, to see what it feels like to be-
lieve that way, without having finally to 
agree. There is, in other words, ••• [al 
split between sympathy and judgement. 
( 1957:p 100 ) 
The mechanisms of reception operating here can be explained 
more precisely on a model such as that developed in this 
dissertation than the intuitive response of Langbaum, above, 
suggests. 
In a manner unique to itself, the dramatic monologue 
presents a situation which nevertheless parallels unreliable 
homodiegetic narration, and the question that confronts and 
initially ( perhaps) confounds the receiver, is: How, with 
only a single mediatory presence one arrives at a 
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perspective on the fictional world that is in 
contradistinction to that of the narrator when the only 
tangible evidence for judgement would appear to derive -
solely - from the discourse of the first person mediator? It 
is not, as has been shown, enough to postulate an ~implied 
author~s~ value stance or norms and ~factors in the text 
[which] indicate a gap between the norms of the implied 
author and those of the narrator~ ( Rimmon-Ken~n, 1983: p 
101), for, inevitably, these formulations omit the notion of 
an immanent discourse, responsible for directing the 
reader~s responses away from the ostensible, homodiegetic 
narrator~s discourse and towards a more encompassing 
perspective that permits of ~judgementsP even as the 
mediator ( arguably ) attracts the receiverPs sympathy. Such 
a corrective function is served by the immanent voice which, 
as in the narratives already discussed, enables the receiver 
to experience a stereoscopic perspective in his/her 
orientation toward the presented world, one which . 
simultaneously permits the assimilation of information about 
the ~two-dimensionaIP presented world of the homodiegetic 
narrator~s discourse, and the fully Pthree-dimensional P 
world that derives from the complex construct of the 
complementary narrative situations. 
Browning~s poem, PMy Last Duchess·, exhibits in almost 
paradigmatic form, the stereoscopic perspective of the 
immanent narrative Situation, the poem·s effect deriving 
from the tension between the dukePs narrative ( an act of 
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~telling~), on the one hand, and, on the other, what is 
revealed indirectly ( an act of ~showing~ ) about the duke~s 
relationship with his last duchess. In other words, the 
receiver is given data that have an overtly subjective bias 
but which are not accepted - by the alert reader - at face 
value. A less subjective and, hence, more detached 
assessment of the duke~s behaviour is arrived at by means of 
the immanent voice which establishes a number of 
translational indices which will coerce the receiver towards 
a more embracing position ( narratologically speaking) than 
that of the biased homodiegetic narrator; receivng the 
duke~s apparent frankness for example as contrivance: a 
deception of the envoy that serves a Machiavellian ulterior 
motive. 
As has been demonstrated, translational indices may 
occur in all the strata of the literary work but are not 
compelled to be present in all four strata for the immanent 
voice to be manifest. In both ~You Should Have Seen the 
Mess!~ and ~X~ the para- or pre-phonetic stratum exhibited 
their presence, although by far the most complex and 
suggestive signals occured in strata 4 and 5 ( of Ingarden~s 
augmented schema), that is, in the realms of the po"rtrayed 
objectivities and the projected states of affairs. Here we 
observed how by means of implicatures ( their ontic bases in 
the semantic third stratum ) and exemplifications ( those 
properties of the states of affairs that have had attention 
drawn to themselves by features of the over-riding 
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sign-system ), the second, more complex presented worlds of 
the narratives in question were constructed in the process 
of co-creativity that forms the quintessence of reception. 
The primary translational index ' in Browning~s 
monologue, however, is provided by ~he emergent character of 
the duchess: the others cohere around her exemplificatory 
function in the narrative. She provides the focal point for 
the attention of both the duke and - by extension the 
envoy for the major part of the poem; and it is the 
translational index that her character embodies, revealing, 
as it does, the finer points of the gradations in the duke~s 
relationship to her, and culminating in the not-so-veiled 
innuendo ~ ••• I gave commands;1 Then all smiles stopped 
together.~ that ensures our fascination with her, even as 
our attention is diverted to the prospective duchess in the 
closing lines of the poem. The exemplificatory function of 
the character of the duchess in the presented world of this 
monologue thus both defines and determines our full 
understanding of the character of the duke. 
What is ~told~ by the duke, is apparently unequivocal: 
the duchess was beautiful, kind and generous with Pa heart 
••• too soon made glad~. Her vitality has been immortalized 
in the painting by Fra Pandolf and commands the admiration 
of the duke; but in the second line of the poem there is 
awoken in the readerPs mind, a burgeoning sense of the 
duke~s limitations ( both as narrator and man) with the 
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framing hypothetical construction, ~as if she were alive.~ 
(2) His conflation of a person with an art-object 
reducing the animate to the inanimate however exquisitely 
wrought - resonates significantly through the poem, ( and 
has a retrospective impact when the hypothetical 
construction recurs, subsequently), providing the reader 
with a confirmatory pointer to the existence of the immanent 
voice. Like the envoy, the receiver is confronted by a 
shocking disjunction that implies another reading of the 
data emerging in the duke~s activity of telling than is 
explicit. This is not to deny the character of the duke a 
degree of manipulativeness: he is by no means limited in the 
sense that Lorna Merrifield and the mediator of the 
narrative, ~X~, are. 
Intriguingly, the duke makes no attempt to disguise the 
virtuous qualities of his last duchess. His egoism, 
monstrous in its unquestioning elimination of a life which 
failed - on his terms - to accommodate itself to a desire 
unexpressed on his part, precludes him from dissembling. He 
is thus oblivious of the impreSSion being made upon the 
envoy ( though an element of low cunning provides the action 
of the duke with its impetus, no doubt) by the deliberate 
juxtapositioning of his last duchess~s gentler qualities 
with his aggressive, but unreflecting, amorality. The force 
of the impact of the poem upon the reader/receiver derives 
exactly from the disjunction between what is ·told~ and what 
is ~shown~; between the exemplificatory function his 
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character now assumes in the ostensible narrative 
transmission and his unwitting projection of the same, 
thereby signalling the transmission by the immanent 
narrative voice. 
As the duke~s account of his relationship with the 
duchess unfolds, culminating with the implication that he 
murdered her, his character is brought, by degrees, into 
sharper focus. The nature ·of the duke~s unreliability is 
then more accurately assessed as self-deceived, for not in 
question are such factors as his aristocracy, his wealth, 
his power - even his cordiality ( he waives precedence as he 
and the envoy prepare to rejoin the ~company below·) and, 
initially, fr.ankness in his dealings with the envoy. These 
features of the duke~s character are, in fact, capable of 
textual corroboration in the homodiegetic discourse of the 
poem and are, moreover, accepted with complacency by the 
duke as being of his very nature and status. But, as a term 
such as ~complacency~ is introduced into the analysis, the 
receiver of the monologue has, in fact, acknowledged the 
presence of the immanent narrative mode; for a judgement of 
the duke, such as the epithet ·complacent~ entails, is not a 
given in the ostensible narrative discourse. It is an 
interpretative abstraction or construct which ensues from 
the corrective perspective permitted by the immanent 
narrative situation. Another such interpretative response 
gives rise to the emotion of outrage ( to take merely one, 
possible reaction ) when the reader/receiver registers the 
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nature o~ the structural juxtapositioning o~ the dukePs 
oblique account of the fate of his last duchess with his 
subsequent ( disingenuous ) focussing of attention upon the 
dowry of his future duchess: 
••• There she stands 
As if alive. Will~t please you rise? We~ll meet 
The company below, then. I repeat, 
The Count your master~s known munificence 
Is ample warrant that no just pretence 
Of mine for dowry will be disallowed; 
To the extent that the duke~s unreliability as a 
narrator stems from his self-deception, a subtler and more 
combinative narrative technique than is usually the case in 
such situations is made possible. The cruder (from a 
structural point of view ) technique of utilising a narrator 
who is socially limited ( Lorna Merrifield), or 
alternatively one who is insane ( tne narrator in ·X·) is 
supplanted, here, by the subtleties that accrue when the 
inner psychic make-up of a character, itself, is an unknown 
factor in the narrative transmission. It is this quality 
which contributes to the exemplificatory process and 
indexically establishes the existence of the immanent 
narrative mode. Such easy dismissal of the homodiegetic 
narrator as • unsympathetic· ( Langbaum, 1957:p 101 ) is 
complicated by the stereoscopic perspective that the reader 
165 
is forced to adopt vis-a-vis the ~ ••• loose-structured, 
transient-natured forms of one-sided talk~ (Slinn,1982:p 2) 
that comprise the monologue form. 
A response, then, say, of outrage, stems from the 
careful deployment in the poem of revelatory juxtapositions 
which, together with the emergent character of the duchess, 
serve as significant translational indices and account for a 
dual reading of the duke~s character as both aristocratic 
and malign; courteous and hypocritical ( contrasted with his 
interest in the dowry, the duke~s subsequent qualification, 
~though his fair daughter~s self, as I avowed / At starting, 
is my object~, rings rather hollow); powerful and 
Machiavellian; a connoisseur of beautiful objects and a -
destroyer of beauty. These variables are not, obviously, 
mutually exclusive, but at one of their poles they would 
chime with the homodiegetic narrator~s self-deceived 
perception of himself ( and, as a result, be strikingly 
limited ) whereas, at the other pole, and incorporating 
features of the first, they would exhibit the complexity of 
the immanent narrator~s perception of the duke. Much the 
same chart as was used to explore the parameters bounding 
the worlds of the homodiegetic and immanent narrators in ~X~ 
could be attempted here: exemplification being the 
translational index that underwrites the relocation of the 
presented world. 
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Throughout the poem the receiver of the transmission, 
though apparently confined to a single homodiegetic 
narrator, is yet able to apprehend such paradoxical 
characteristics as the above by implication and with no 
apparent textual justification for doing so. This activity 
is only explicable given a model that accounts, in some 
fashion, for the 'implicatures' (Grice, in Pratt,1977:pp 
199ff) that lead to an interpretation which is not. 
immediately accounted for by the data base inherent in the 
ostensible narrative situation. Given the fact that 
narrative, by definition, is a mediatory process, the only 
access to the presented world which is permitted the 
receiver is that supplied by narrator(s) who mediate between 
the realm of the author and that of the receiver. As I have 
demonstrated in the previous chapters, it becomes necessary 
to posit the presence of the immanent voice ( its existence 
corroborated , by the translational indices generated by the 
text ) and thereby to accomplish, in the act of reception, a 
comprehensive, more broadly-based perspective on the 
fictional world, admitting of fewer inexplicable lacunae 
such as a more limited critique of narrative technique must, 
inevitably, impose upon the reader. 
The dramatic monologue, with its roots very firmly in 
the narrative mode, becomes paradigmatic of the immanent 
narrative situation, forCing the reader to assimilate both 
perspectives upon the narrated events: that of the speaker 
and that of the immanent voice; and it is their simUltaneous 
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presence in the literary construct that allows the 
narrative, as told, to operate additionally as revelation. 
A comment such as David Daiches~s captures succinctly ( i~ 
unoriginally ), the e~~ect of a dramatic monologue such as 
~My Last Duchess~, when he states that the poem is but the 
~visible part of the iceberg~ (1960:pl003). The entire 
object, narratologically speaking, becomes visible only with 
the directing intervention of the immanent narrator and the 
realisation o~ the parallel narrative situations that 
comprise the mediatory process in this narrative situation. 
Because o~ the guidance provided by the translational 
indices we are predisposed to question the duke~s judgement, 
say, and not to characterise his last duchess as sexually 
naive or incipiently promiscuous. The basis ~or these 
assertions is derived, largely, from the implications and 
juxtapositionings that ensure reception of the duke as 
Machiavellian, destructive, and hypocritical even though the 
more tangible ( because ostensible ) reading should be his 
own: that he is aristocratic, powerful and aesthetically 
discerning. Even the implicit warning he gives the envoy 
(that behaviour o~ this kind in his future duchess will be 
dealt the same treatment as that extended to his last 
duchess) is carried by the duke~s sense of his inviolable 
feudal status. His cordiality in waiving precedence as they 
prepare to rejoin the ~company below~ is -radically 
undermined by the hypocrisy evinced in his attempt at the 
reassurance, directly after a comment on her dowry, that it 
168 
is the Count's 'fair daughter's self' and nat her wealth 
that attracts him. The implicit ranking of his duchess with 
another of his objets d'art ('Neptune ••• / taming a 
h / Wh1"ch Claus of Innsbruck cast in bronze for sea- orse, ••• 
me!' ) functions as a revelatory painter to the depravity of 
the speaker, and bodes "ill for the future duchess whose fate 
has been sealed in the lines immediately preceding their 
descent. 
Slinn's comment that by 
••• writing monologues Browning dramatises 
experience in this sense of being the 
conscious subject of an event, and his 
art is to portray the subtleties of inter-
acting levels and facets of consciousness 
in the midst of such experience. 
(1982: p 151) 
takes into account only one 'level' in the complex 
interaction that occurs between the author, the text and the 
receiver of the narrative transmission. In this monologue, 
the subtleties inherent in the presentational process ( a 
composite of bath the homodiegetic and the immanent 
narrative situation ) allow the reader to access bath 
'levels and facets of consciousness' in the duke and 'levels 
and facets' of narrative transmission that will mare 
brilliantly illuminate the dramatic situation of the 
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monologue. In Henry James~s novella, The Aspern Papers, we 
move ( critically speaking) to the point on the continuum 
of unreliability initiated in the discussion of ~X~ which 
interfaces with ~conscience~ on the narrator~s part, as the 
theory of immanent narration is applied to a sustained 
exercise in self-deception. 
NOTES 
1. Here as in ~My Last Duchess~ a useful distinction may be 
drawn between the hypostatized and the implied reader, where 
the former refers to the construct which arises from the 
textual signals - the narratee (Chatman:1978) . - and the 
latter refers to the receiver of the narrative whose 
existence is to be found beyond the realms of the presented 
world and the presentational process. 
2. My emphasis. 
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Chapter 6: A Critical Explication 
of 'The Aspern Papers' 
An analysis of a mode of narrative 
transmission where the narrator 
modulates between positions of full 
self-awareness and self-deceit. 
1. Introduction 
Henry James, as we saw in chapter 4, was at pains to 
achieve complexity in his narrative transmissions, and to 
this end, developed inconscient narrators which, 
nevertheless, as actors in the presented world, created the 
illusion expectancy for the receiver of reliabil~ty. Tamar 
Yacobi (1987:39) accuses James of disrupting an ~ideal 
balance~, as she sees it, between 'excessive guidance' of 
the kind exhibited in for example eighteenth century novels 
(Fielding's Tom Jones, say), and ~overoriginal guidance, 
which results in loss of control and interpretative 
darkness~. This seems to me a failure not so much of James's 
control of his ~signals~, but rather of the reader~s 
receptivity to their presence in the text. That we can judge 
as inaccurate the interpretation by his contemporaries of 
Daisy Miller would appear to indicate our approximation 
toward a ~truer~ interpretation of the novel; one which has 
its foundation in the greater attention paid to the signals 
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( the translational indices ) in the text that suggest 
circumspection on the part of receivers when attempting to 
evaluate the reliability - or otherwise - of a Jamesian 
character. As in Ford Madox Ford~s The Good Soldier ( which 
is briefly touched on in the conclusion ), the choice of a 
narrator who, ostensibly reliable in his judgements, is 
nevertheless perceived to be fraught with self-deception 
which must render him - ultimately unreliable, is a key 
factor in the ironic patterning of many of James~s tales and 
longer narratives; and an ( enhanced) objective critical 
approach (Abrams,1953) appears to me to illuminate the 
narrative strategies employed by writers who elect as 
mediators narrators with the observer status of Frederick 
Winterbourne, Dowell, or the unnamed editor in search of 
Jeffrey Aspern~s papers. They provide adequate guidance for 
the receiver only up to a point ( and herein lies the trap 
for the reader not alert to this possiblity ); but where 
their judgements about themselves are concerned, we find 
them crucially wanting, so that we reinterpret their 
utterances at such junctures, recasting the presented world 
to incorporate elements of their inner ( psychic ) makeup 
which, preCisely because of this limitation on personal 
insight, they are incapable of delivering as part of their 
presentational process. The immanent narrative situation 
must be invoked, and the translational indices which point 
to the existence of this second-order presentational 
process, isolated, so that the underlying mechanism can be 
172 
determined in order to assist the receiver in the complex 
interpretative abstractions that form a part of the 
reception of these unique narrative situations. On a 
continuum of unreliability that might have the insane 
narrator of 'X' at one of its poles, the narrator of The 
Aspern Papers is to be located at the furthest for, as 
Yacobi notes, the limitations of ·this type of narrator are 
by no means as clear as those, say, of Whitake~~s short 
story or even of Lardner's Whitey: they lie hidden beneath a 
veneer of reliability that provides pitfalls for 
interpretation of the kind experienced by James's 
contemporary readership which .. "found" the familiar pattern 
typical of the [older James] novel' in Daisy Miller, missing 
the fact that the centre of orientation of the presented 
world has been shifted from 'Daisy's sensational story 
into [Frederick Winterbourne"sl "discovery plot .... 
(Yacobi,1987: 39). 
2. 'The Aspern Papers" 
The link exhibited between The Aspern Papers and the 
homodiegetic narratives discussed in previous chapters is, 
at first sight perhaps, not at all clear. Yet there emerges 
as reception is completed an awareness of this narrator's 
kinship with the Duke of Ferrara of the Browning monologue. 
The relationship between the two discourses has no generic 
basis ( as was seen to inhere in that between 'Haircut' and 
"My Last Duchess" ) but is, rather, a feature of the similar 
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patterns of self-deception each narrator displays. Their 
link, therefore, is structural and not generic. It seems 
pertinent to digress briefly, at this point, into a 
discussion of deception as a quality in narrative 
transformations other than those presently in focus. Again 
it is necessary to decide what kind of deception is being 
practised: is it, for example, a deliberate aspect of the 
homodiegetic narrative situation such as occurs in Charlotte 
Bronte's Villette? Here the narrator, Lucy Snow, 
tyrannically manipulates the disclosure of elements 
comprising the presented world, withholding information, so 
that the receiver's position of inferiority vis-a-vis the 
presented world is maintained. This relationship of 
dominance ( on the part of the mediator ) and submission 
( on the part of the receIver ) is clearly manifest in those 
acts of narrative transmIssion which -permit the reader no 
re-orientation vis-a-vis the presented world; no recasting 
of the events so that the submissive relationship may be 
subvented. In Villette Lucy Snowe's unreliability remains 
the distinguishing feature of the presentational process: no 
immanent voice, for example, redirects the reception of 
Lucy's jUdgements. We learn only in chapter 16, and long 
after the narrator has recognised the fact (in chapter 10), 
that the 'frank tread' which she would have followed 
'through continual night, to the world's end' (p 125) that 
first night in Villette was that of Dr. John Graham who 
rescues her from the brink of death in chapter 15, 'The Long 
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Vacation~. Lucy Snowe at no point in the presentational 
process permits the reader an encompassing perspective upon 
the presented world. The disclosures are climactically timed 
for maximum dramatic impact as in the revelation that occurs 
in chapter 16: 
For, reader, this tall young man - this 
darling son - this host of mine - this 
Graham Bretton, was Dr. John: he, and no 
other; and, what is more, I ascertained this 
identity scarcely with surprise. What is more, 
when I heard Graham~s step on the stairs, I 
knew what manner of figure would enter, and 
for whose aspect to prepare my eyes. The 
discovery was not of to-day, its dawn had 
penetrated my perceptions long since •••• I 
found him out soon. I first recognized him 
on that occasion, noted several chapters back, 
when my unguardedly-fixed attention had drawn 
on me the mortification of an implied rebuke. 
(1979:pp 247-8) 
In narratives of this kind it is true that the receiver 
Pcannot count on an alternative representation P 
(Yacobi,1987:23 ) for the tyrannical nature of the 
mediatiory process here precludes the receiverPs 
contradiction of the first-hand report of the homodiegetic 
narrator. However when the receiver is able to distinguish 
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unreliability of the kind inherent in Bronte's novel from 
the kind that is evinced in conjunction with the immanent 
narrative situation, it can be seen that not only is a 
complex narrative transmission discernible, but, moreover, a 
conventional perception about the relationship between 
receiver and mediator ( that it is one that comprises 
inferiority on the part of the reader) can be seen to 
require re-assessment. 
The Aspern Papers exhibits initially qualities of 
presentation not unlike those of Villette. Unreliability 
manifests itself as a feature of the mediatory process only 
gradually and the receiver must be alert ( in the James 
short story ) to the existence of . translational indices 
which are deceptively concealed. The 'Popperian 
tentativeness~ broached as providing the core-structure of 
the methodological underpinning in the previous chapter, 
appears to be almost paradigmatically a feature of reception 
here, as conjecture super~edes conjecture as to the 
existence of the immanent narrative situation; and only in 
the closing sections of the narrative does it appear that an 
epistemic warrant confirming the presence of the immanent 
voice in the narrative as a whole has been given. 
The reader's illusion expectancy of reliability is 
created by means of the narrator's apparently conscient 
narration. He is to be trusted in his role as the 
juggler/articulator of the presentational process, we 
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assume, because of his depth of personal insight. His 
apparent consciousness of his motives in pursuing the old 
women in Venice in order to obtain the cherished papers that 
link Jeffrey Aspern to the last person alive who had known 
him, the ~divine Juliana~ ( p 168) of ~Aspern·s most 
exquisite and most renowned lyrics~ ( p 167 ) deflects 
attention away ' from any early recognition of the narratorPs 
limitations, so that the res~lution or anagnorisis that 
occurs in the reception of this discourse may be all the 
more impressive. Certainly, in his selection of a narrator 
as complex and intelligent - not to say immoral as the 
deliberately unnamed mediator of this discourse appears to 
be, James has set himself a fascinating challenge for his 
exploration of the self-deceiving mind. 
Goodman~s categories for exemplification and/or 
expression may be subpoenaed in order to validate the 
critical commentary which comprises this chapter. They 
derive from the visual arts, largely, but have their almost 
synonomous counterparts in the terminology already in use in 
narratological exegesis. Thus, Goodman~s analysis of Phow ••• 
particular worlds are made from others~ (1979:pp 7-17 ) 
utilising such concepts as the following, which I shall use 
heuristically to examine the kind and extent of the ·worlds· 
being presented in this story: 




4. deletion and supplementation 
5. deformation 
( which were referred to, and explained briefly in chapter 
3 ) may be translated, broadly, as: 
1.1. construction and deconstruction ( the assembly of 
parts into their composite wholes; their division into 
classes or sub-sets of one another. Such activity on the 
part of the critic may ,. , naturally· , affect all or any of the 
~strata~ of the literary work.> 
2.1. foreshadowing/prefiguring/emphasis, which would 
contribute to the structural patterning of a given narrative 
whether in the presentational process or in the presented 
world. 
3.1. plot, or the causal connection linking the sequence 
of events. This could also be extended to include the 
~plotting' of character; that is, its unfolding during the 
course of the disourse. 
4.1. editing: implying the elimination or inclusion of 
variables for greater conciseness of expression at whatever 
level of the literary work. 
5.1. distortion, as in, say, 'fantasy, the grotesque or 
burlesque, where an impact upon the reader is achieved by 
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means of some measure of excess in the presentation of the 
literary world. 
Goodman does not offer this classification as in any way 
cQnclusive, but it can readily be appreciated that, as 
literature ( at one level ) is concerned precisely with the 
creation of worlds, such elements as are typologised. above, 
might be a part of the process. It is hardly surprising then 
to discover that his (incomplete) list has been a part of 
narrative criticism for some time. The useful insight is 
that of exemplification ( as I argued in chapter 3 ) which, 
by dint of the deployment of some or all of the above 
processes of worldmaking, explains theoretically the 
functioning of the immanent narrative situation. Using 
Goodman~s model it is thus possible to explain how a world 
which is not apparently represented nonetheless is 
reconstituted so that it competes for - and achieves - ontic 
precedence in the act of interpretation. The analysis of The 
Aspern Papers will include in its strategem some of the 
~ways of worldmaking~ suggested above, but only as they 
apply ( obviously) to the ~making~ of the second-order 
~world~ which has, as its generator, the immanent narrative 
voice. 
The narrator of this tale is established from the 
outset as cultivated, erudite and aware: also not in 
question are his fundamentally immoral attitude toward the 
acquisition of the papers and his mercenary cast of mind. He 
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is a literary editor of some standing and, together with a 
co-editor, John Cumnor, is bent upon extracting Aspern~s 
private correspondence with her ( the only area of Aspern~s 
life not yet publicly documented) from the now aged Miss 
Bordereau despite her rejection of Cumnor's earlier suits: 
••• No notice whatever had been taken of 
his first letter, and the second had been 
answered very sharpiy, in six lines, by the 
niece. "Miss Bordereau requested her to say 
that she could not imagine what he meant by 
troubling them. They had none of Mr. Aspern's 
papers, and if they had should never think 
of showing them to anyone on any account 
whatever. She didn~t know what he was talk-
ing about and begged he would let her alone." 
(p 159) 
The point however lies not so much in the fact of his 
persistence, but in his consciousness of the degree to which 
he will go in order to manipUlate events to his perceived 
advantage: 
••• 1 can arrive at the papers only by 
putting her off her guard, and I can 
put her off her guard only by ingratiating 
diplomatic practices. Hypocrisy, duplicity 
are my only chance. 
(p 159) 
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Quite apart from his somewhat cynical notions of diplomacy, 
the narrator/editor~s discourse projects a clear image of a 
consciousness fully aware of the immorality of his actions: 
to get the documents he is prepared even ~"To make love to 
the niece"" (p 161), he informs Mrs. Prest. Part I concludes 
on this dramatically heightened note but it has established 
more than merely a climactic moment in the exposition of the 
tale. 
A significant index to the receiver"s subsequent 
understanding of the limitations of this apparently reliable 
narrator lies partially obscured in his comments on Aspern 
and women ( including Juliana ). They serve to validate 
later interpretative abstractions on the part of the 
receiver, in that they are instances of foreshadowing 
( implicit emphasis) or, in Goodman"s terms,"weighting". 
Several markers in this discussion of Aspern prove, in the 
end, to have prefigured our ultimate reconstruction of the 
mediator as unreliable insofar as his knowledge about 
himself is concerned. Aspern"s treatment of Juliana, as 
recounted by the mediator, is glossed over as ..... an 
impression about 1825 that he had "treated her badly"" and 
the poet .. s relationship with other ladies is described as 
""serv[i~g]" ••• several other ladies in the same way". ( p 
156) The narrator"s selection of this . "impression" from 
Aspern"s past, coloured as it is by the dismissive, 
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contemptuous tone he employs, diminishes not only himself, 
but the Romantic hero for whom he is prepared to do ~worse 
still~ ( p 159). This is an early index suggesting his lack 
of personal insight because the immanent voice directs the 
receiver towards the construction of an identity 
relationship between the editor and Aspern; but where the 
editor regards Aspern as nobly Romantic ( • HOrpheus and the 
Maenads!"~:p 156 ) in his relationships with women; and 
himself as wanting when compared with Aspern ( •••• he was 
kinder, more considerate than, in his place ••• 1 should 
have been·: p. 156 ), the receiver, in fact, identifies them 
because of their equal lack of consideration for the 
sensibilities they encounter. The editor/narrator~s 
limitations are thus signalled early; prefigured in this 
crucial exchange between him and Mrs. Prest. 
Perhaps the most obvious deflective move made in this 
transmission ( that is, away from the recognition of the 
narrator as an unreliable mediator ) arises in those 
elements of his discourse that signal, unequivocally, his 
insight into his motives in attempting to take up occupancy 
in the crumbling Venetian villa that the Misses Bordereau 
live in: the editor/mediator~s acquisitiveness. In his 
exchange with Mrs Prest (pp 153-161) there occurs an 
accretion of pointers to his mercenary and manipulative 
nature, all of which serve to weight our reception of him in 
a manner" apparently explicitly contrived: 
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The other idea that had come into my 
head was connected with a high blank 
wall which appeared to confine an expanse 
of ground on one side of the house •••• a 
few thin trees, with the poles of certain 
rickety trellises, ••• visible over the top • 
••• It suddenly occurred to me that if it did 
belong to the house I had my pretext. 
(pp 158 - 159) 
His imagery now - as at other times in his assault on the 
privacy of Juliana Bordereau - is infused with a probably 
conscious martial quality (~ •••. 1 was afraid to meet failure, 
for it would leave me, as I remarked to my companion, 
without another arrow for my bow.~:p 159) and his strategy 
for gaining access to the Bordereau villa is crudely 
articulated: 
The old woman won~t have the documents 
spoken of; they are personal, delicate, 
intimate, and she hasn~t modern notions, 
God bless her! If I should sound that note 
[offer to buy them, directly] first I 
should certainly spoil the game. I can arrive 
at the papers only by putting her off her 
guard, and I can put her off her guard only 
by ingratiating diplomatic practices. 
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Hypocrisy, duplicity are my only chance. I 
am sorry for it, but for Jeffrey Aspern~s 
sake I would do worse still. 
(p 159) 
The mediator, in a sense, wants it both ways. His 
apparently disarming forthrightness, coupled to the fact 
"that this activity is being pursued in the noble interests 
of completing - for posterity - the documentation of the 
life of a recognised literary figure ( ~The multitude, 
today, flocked to his temple, but of that temple [John 
Cumnor] and I regarqed ourselves as the ministers':p 155 ) 
barely conceals the attempt to diminish the more immoral 
dimension of his enterprise by justifying it as knowledge 
necessary to the fuller comprehension of Aspern the poet. 
Nevertheless, the narrator's personal insight seems clear in 
the first part, his 'plan of campaign' (p 154) culminating 
in a decision to '" ••• make love to the niece"' (p 161), made 
in the apparent consciousness of its fullest implications. 
Goodman's notion of 'ordering' which I regard as more 
or less synonymous with the arrangement in sequence of the 
elements of the plot of a narrative can be seen to be the 
construct at work as the first part of The Aspern Papers 
draws to its climactic close. In the ensuing sections 
( 11 - IX ) the narrator's attempt to win Miss Tita to his 
side, thereby ensuring her complicity in gaining from 
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Juliana the correspondence he desires so obsessively, will 
provide the narrative with much of its ballast. More 
important, still, her character - and those aspects of it 
which his discourse will fail to account for, but which the 
receiver will gradually come to discern as fundamental to 
her nature - will function as a translational index, 
revealing, in its relation to that of the urbane narrator, 
several facets of the discourse of the immanent narrator. In 
this, the 'little one, as Mrs Prest called the niece' 
(p 154) plays a role ( narratologically speaking) not 
unlike that of the duchess in Browning's 'My Last Duchess': 
her emergence referring, in an essentially non-denotational 
manner, to the homodiegetic narrator's submerged 
limitations. 
The matter of reception is complicated for the reader 
in his/her attempt to concretize Miss Tita ( or for that 
matter, Miss Juliana ) by the fact that the homodiegetic 
narrator's observations about them appear to be both subtle 
and comprehensive. His first description of the niece 
presents her in her superficial aspect, though naturally 
but not at all disturbingly, for the present 
subjective impressionism on his part: 
'coloured' by 
She was a long, lean, pale person, habited 
apparently in a dull-colored dressing gown, 
and she spoke with a kind of mild literal-
ness ••• Her face was not young, but it was 
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simple; it was not fresh, but it was mild. 
She had large eyes which were not bright, 
and a great deal of hair which was not 
"dressed", and long fine hands which were 
- possibly - not clean. 
(p 163) 
Her response to his affected enthusiasm for their garden 
( ~I must have a garden - upon my honour - I must~:p 163 ) is 
recounted by the editor/narrator with consummate 
discernment: 
She clasped [her handsJ almost con-
vulsively as, with a confused, alarm-
ed look, she broke out, "Oh, don~t 
take it away from us; we like it our-
selves!" 
"You have the use of it then?" 
"Oh, yes. If it wasn~t for that!" And 
she gave a shy, melancholy smile. 
(p 163) 
The narrator~s powers of observation are manifestly acute, 
ranging as they do from the surfaces of the characters with 
whom he interacts to their inner beings: this is especially 
-true of his exchanges with, and analyses of, Miss Tita 
Bordereau. Despite the overt nature ( in the eyes of the 
receivers of this discourse) of his hypocritical 
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relationship with her ( perhaps indeed because of it ), the 
narrator's reliability remains largely unchallenged, thereby 
achieving James's apparent aim of a more complex reversal in 
the reception of this focaliser at the closure of the 
narrative. Until this juncture is reached, the expositionary 
nature of parts 1 and 11 contributes to an impression of the 
narrator as capable of accuracy in his judgements of others 
as well as himself. He speaks, incisively, about 
'contradictions like this in Tita Bordereau which, as the] 
observed later, contributed to make her an odd and affecting 
person'; and of the impression ( he conveys it as a 
conclusion) that 'In Tita at any rate a grateful 
susceptibility to human contact had not died out' (pp 165 -
66). 
If Tita's emergent character is to function as a 
translational index, indicating the epistemically primary 
'discourse' of the immanent narrator, Juliana's exchanges 
with the narrator ( though of a different kind) likewise 
provide access to another order. Suggesting ways that the 
receiver might take in order to reach the complex level of 
interpretative abstractions, implicatures are locatable at 
the levels of the portrayed objectivities and of the 
projected states of affairs. Miss Juliana~s appearance is 
described by the narrator when he first encounters her in a 
manner repolent of subjective impressionism ( and may be 
significantly contrasted with his earlier, more 
dispassionate description of the niece ). Clearly, more is 
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revealed about the focaliser/narrator himself than about 
Juliana: 
1 was really face to face with 
the Juliana of some of Aspern~s 
most exquisi~e and most renowned lyrics. 
1 grew used to her afterward, though never 
completely; but as she sat there before 
me my heart beat as fast as if the 
miracle of resurrection had taken 
place for my benefit. Her presence 
seemed somehow to contain his, and 
I felt nearer to him at that first 
moment of seeing her than 1 ever had 
been before or ever have been since. 
(p 167) 
Only when once he has established his responses to the 
~ideal' Juliana of the poems, does the narrator recognise in 
the actual figure before him ~the terrible relic~ who 
appears ~too strange, too literally resurgent' (p 167). In 
his presentation of Miss Bordereau his judgements, for the 
first time, appear hesitant, stopping short of the fuller, 
more incisive analyses he was capable of in his treatment of 
her niece. This instance of weighting in the presentational 
process or prefi"guring a subsequent, more fully realised 
7limitation P on the judgements of the narrator, is carefully 
controlled so that the reader/receiver 7s sense of an index 
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( one which refers to the second-order presented world, or 
at least suggests the process whereby such a world will be 
seen to come into existence ) is modified by the apparent 
penetration of the almost epigraphic phrasing of such 
judgements as : ~The divine Juliana as a grinning skull~ 
(p 168). Retrospectively, . with the reading process 
completed, this phrase of the mediator carries a degree of 
metaphoric weight that unpacks for the reader/re~eiver at 
the meta-level of this narrative, signifying meanings caught 
up in the complex matrix of life and death imagery; of the 
ideal and the actual, or the Romantic and the objective. 
Though the narrator describes her as a grinning death~s 
head, he in fact ( for all his penetrative qualities) fails 
to grasp that his pursuit of an ideal object ( the Juliana 
of the lyric poems ) is doomed from the outset, in that the 
ideal, by its very nature, must remain essentially 
unattainable. Corrupt and -mercenary as he is, his quest 
( certainly, within the parameters laid down for the 
stereoscopically rendered presented world ) must be futile. 
The narrator~s earlier air of complacency gives way, in 
the discussion they have about the rental of the rooms, to a 
feeling of disquiet. Coupled to his perhaps guilty sense 
that the ~old woman ••• had a fuller vision of [him] than 
[he] had of her' (pp 169-70) is a reluctance to recognise in 
Miss Bordereau a mind as mercenary as his own. He remains, 
in a way, a victim of his Romantic illusions about her so 
that it would appear' odious ••• to me to stand chaffering 
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with Aspern~s Juliana. It was queer enough to have a 
question of money with her at all~ (p 171). This apparently 
conscient quality of the narrator stops short, however, of a 
recognition of the force of the discrepancy or disjunction 
between his perceived interests and his real ones: the 
~divine Juliana~ whose ~presence seemed somehow to contain 
his [Aspern~s],~ making the narrator feel ~nearer to him at 
that first moment of seeing her than (he] ever had been 
before or ever [has] been since~ (p 167) being merely a 
chimera, the pursuit of which allows the narrator an 
identity relationship with Jeffrey Aspern. Reinforced in 
this component of the narrative is a burgeoning awareness on 
the part of the reader that this mediator, for all his 
urbanity and ostensible penetration into the motives and/or 
psychic make-up of his ~interlocutresses~ or, for that 
matter, himself, decidedly lacks self-knowledge. To the 
Degree that such knowledge is wanting on his part, it is 
supplied by the indices which signal the epistemically 
primary ~world~; that which endows the reader/receiver with 
a position of supremacy vis-a-vis the characters and events 
of the (immanent) second-order narrative transmission. 
Several of Goodman~s ~ways of worldmaking~ combine in 
the interlocking o~ the mercenary and Romantic moti~s in 
this narrative. In that they comprise . structurally the 
relationship o~ parts to a whole, they can be seen to 
provide evidence for his composition and decomposition. As 
motifs, the elements that they comprise are indeed 
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weighted, providing the narrator with moments of emphasis 
and foreshadowing that will playa significant part in the 
structure of the entire narrative transmission. Their 
ordering, too, as component parts of the story~s plot can be 
seen to contribute to the making not only of the 
homodiegetic narrator~s world, but also that of the immanent 
narrator. Disjunctions in the reception of these motifs that 
suggest one ~reading~ by the homodiegetic narrator, and 
another. by the immanent narrator, and by extension, entai 1 
therefore the existence of two discrete narrative 
situations, occur frequently once the ostensible narrator as 
a touchstone for the judgements in his discourse is 
perceived to be fallible. His apparent 'self-knowledge~ is 
particularly vulnerable to a radical recasting by the 
immanent narrator in the resolution of the Romantic motif 
with translational indices scattered through the various 
strata of the narrative transmission but deriving chiefly 
from their coalescing around the interaction between the 
characters. 
When the editor/mediator has gained, by such devious 
means as he deemed it necessary to deploy, access to the 
garden and the rooms which might make it possible for him to 
wrest by deception the papers that provide his quest with 
its grai I, and has, moreover, attempted to ingratia.te 
himself with the niece in h{s efforts to achieve his goal, 
there is a return to a contemplation of the raison d~etre 
for his presence. In one respect he remains consistent and 
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to a degree, at least, ~honourable~: he ~ul~ils his promise 
to 7smother the house in ~lowers7: p 182 ( the martial 
imagery emerging - signi~icantly - in this section o~ the 
discourse in such phrases as: 'batter the old women with 
lilies~ and ~ bombard their citadel with roses':p 182.) It 
is especially illuminating in that at this point in the 
narrative, having placed it in the Romantic moti~, the 
indices of earlier episodes ~ind a resolution that had 
earlier been pre~igured. What keeps him patient in his long 
drawn-out seige o~ the Bordereau 'citadel' is Aspern's 
the revived immortal ~ace in which 
all his genius shone o~ the great poet 
who was my prompter. I had invoked him and 
he had come; he hovered be~ore me hal~ the 
time; it was as i~ his bright ghost had re-
turned to earth to tell me that he regarded 
the a~~air as his own no less than mine and 
that we should see it fraternally, cheer~ul­
ly to a conclusion. 
(pp 180-181) 
Certainly, the point o~ the presentation in this extract is 
to establish the '~raternity~ o~ the narrator and Aspern. He 
regards 
••• his eccentric private errand [as] a 
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part of the general romance and the general 
glory I felt even a mystic companion-
ship, a moral fraternity with all those 
who in the past had been in the service of 
art. They had worked for beauty, for a 
devotion; and what else was I doing? 
(p 181> 
Their identity-relationship is subjectively experienced by 
the editor/narrator, but that it is a moral one must be 
seriously questioned by the reader/receiver. By his own 
admission, the narrator has practised deception on the two 
old ladies, and moreover, has cynically embarked upon a path 
that will win him the trust and confidence of the vulnerable 
niece ( he describes her, himself, as ~of a yielding nature 
and capable of doing almost anything to please a person who 
was kind , to her~ : p 208 ). In his treatment of Miss . Tita 
there is an obvious parallel with the way Aspern had 
"served" Juliana: the discrepancy lies in the narrator~s 
judgement of himself as 
with whom he is aligned 
like Aspern and the Romantic poets 
~work[ing] for beauty, for a 
devotion~. The ~moral fraternity~ to which he aspires is 
rendered suspect by the disjunctions in his observations 
upon his own actions which he would elevate to the level of 
the sublime, and the immanent narrator's projection of his 
judgements as reprehensibly self-serving. In moral terms, 
the immanent narrator makes it clear, the mediator can not 
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claim that the end justifies the means. A corollary to this 
~judgement~ which emanates from the second-order discourse, 
is that the question of Romanticism with its egocentric 
focus upon the individual, is highlighted. The discourse of 
the homodiegetic mediator is. thus reconstituted as 
emanating from a second-order narrative situation, but one 
which - as we have seen - has epistemic precedence 
permitting, as it does, an encompassing vantage point for 
the reader/receiver. 
The reliability question does not of course· end there: 
indeed the Romantic motif raises another problem. The 
mediator~s attempt at a fusion of the identities of himself 
and Aspern in their pursuit of beauty is undermined at that 
point in the narrative where he presents an account of 
Aspern which places him in the tradition of the American 
Adam; of a time and place 
when our native land was nude and crude 
and provincial, when the famous "atmos-
phere" it is supposed to lack was not 
even missed, when literature was lonely 
there and art and form almost impossible, 
he had found means to live and write 
like one of the first; to be free and general 
and not at all afraid; to feel, understand, 
and express everything. 
(p 186) 
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The gulf that separates Aspern and his biographer is 
unequivocally there. In the matter of their treatment of 
women, they exhibit similarities but in the profounder realm 
of morality and art and the relationship of the one to the 
other, the narrator seems confused and is manifestly wrong 
in his judgement that their 'fraternal' link is a shared 
moral enterprise. The means that he employs to gain the 
Aspern papers from Juliana can in no way, as I indicated 
above, find moral justification. The narrator of this 
discourse, for all his apparent sophisticated urbanity and 
penetrating insight, is severely limited, and it is this 
full realisation on the part of the reader/receiver of the 
extent and depth of his self-deception ( which James's 
narrative patterning has kept partially concealed from the 
tale"s inception ) that is to be found in the resolution of 
the discourse(s) that emanate contrapuntally from the editor 
and the immanent narrator. The extent and nature of his 
self-deception becomes especially clear in the conclusion of 
the mercenary motif which has, at its emotional ( and 
indexical ) centre, the emergent character of Miss Tita. 
After he has established himself in the villa of the 
Misses Bordereau, three months elapse without any contact 
with them, time spent by the narrator, consciously, even 
voyeuristically watching for the two old ladies who appear 
just as consciously to be avoiding him: 'In these windows no 
sign of life ever appeared; it was as if, for fear of my 
catching a glimpse of them, the two ladies passed their days 
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in the dark.~ <p.182). Determined that they must therefore 
have something ~to conceal~, and supremely inconscient of 
the index this provides to his own behaviour < which he does 
not judge harshly, but merely rationalises as an editor~s 
need to discover ~esoteric knowledge~: p 181 ), the 
narrator presents his experience of the peculiar absence of 
the women, using images that play with the artful linking of 
structural features ( the windows ) and 'seeing~ in a manner 
that foregrounds, again, the mediator~s ability to discern 
and assess acutely: 
Their motionless shutters became as express-
ive as eyes consciously closed, and I took 
comfort in thinking that at all events though 
invisible themselves they saw me between the 
lashes. 
<p 182) 
He comes across Hiss Tita in his bower one summer night in 
July and sets in motion the full force of his charm in order 
to win her to his side. The subsequent encounters between 
them mark a gradual, but inevitable re-alignment on her part 
with his interests, although she experiences a great deal of 
distress ( noted by the mediator but ignored as he serves 
his own interests ). A curiously disingenuous comment from 
him provides a pointer to his capacity for self-deception, 
though, and comes after he has requested her 'to have 
faith~: 
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I could not say more, though I should have 
liked to, as I saw that I only mystified her; for 
I had no wish to have it on my conscience 
that I might pass for having made love to her. 
Nothing less should I have seemed to do had 
I continued to beg a lady to "believe in me" 
in an Italian garden on a midsummer night. There 
was some meri"t in my scruples, for Miss Ti ta 
lingered and lingered: 
(p 194) 
To some extent the narrator~s crudely manipulative intention 
to ~make love to the niece~ (p 161) is modified by this 
apparent sensitivity to her feelings, but his grand plan to 
acquire the documents with Tita~s assistance is better 
served by this discretion: he can, in fact deceive himself 
( which he does ) into believing that his conscience is 
clear, by just such a hesitation, carefully planned and 
executed in the broader interests of his campaign. His 
manipulative approach to this woman ( whose ~simple 
solemnity~: p 194 and ~shy impatience ( like that] of a 
child~: p 204, reinforce reception of her character as 
vulnerable in the extreme) is consciously contrived: 
however, the excessive cruelty of his behaviour toward her 
is not a given in the first-order discourse but is, rather, 
an exemplification, arising out of those indices which 
suggest a recasting of the homodiegetic narrator~s 
197 
judgements in a mould shaped by the immanent narrative 
situation. 
What the narrator regards as ~this last indiscretion. 
I think it was the worst thing I did~ (p 231), that is his 
attempt to burgle Miss Bordereau~s secretary on the night 
she is taken deathly ill, reveals his appalling 
insensitivity. In the moral universe projected by the dual 
narrative process of this story, his manipulation and 
rejection, finally, of Tita Bordereau is the ~worst thing~ 
he does. His peculiarly impressionistic subjectivism is 
capable - briefly - of transfiguring her, but by this 
juncture in the narrative, his perceptions are being wholly 
reconstituted by the translational indices, so that the 
epiphany-like experience he goes through after her proposal 
of marriage ( her own strategem to permit her a morally 
acceptable way of giving him the Aspern papers - ~Anything 
that is mine - would be yours, and you could do what you 
like. I couldn~t prevent you - and you would have no 
responsibility~: p 244 ) is reworked by the reader/receiver 
as just one further rationalisation on his part of his modus 
operandi in acquiring the papers: 
••• as I came into the room I saw that she had 
drawn this inference [ that he declined her 
proposal of marriage], but I also saw 
something which had not been in my forecast. 
Poor Miss TitaPs sense of her failure had 
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produced an extraordinary alteration in her, 
but I had been too full of my literary 
concupiscence to think of that. Now I per-
ceived it; I can scarcely tell how it 
startled me. She stood in the middle of the 
room with a face of mildness bent upon me, 
and her look of forgiveness, of absolution, 
made her angelic. It beautified her; she 
was younger; she was not a ridiculous old 
woman. This optical trick gave her a sort of 
phantasmagoric brightness, and while I was 
still the victim of it I heard a whisper 
somewhere in the depths of my conscience: 
"Why not, after all - why not?" It seemed 
to me I was ready to pay the price. 
(p 250) 
His powers of self-deception reach hallucinatory levels with 
the prize so nearly within his grasp. However, the 
reader/receiver is by this stage fully aware ( as a result 
of the accretion of indices that corroborate a reading of 
this narrator as the victim of his subjectively biased or 
distorted impressions ) that the attempt to objectify his 
experience in no way alters its nature. The second-order 
discourse reconstitutes his actions as those of a cruel man, 
his almost beatific experience in his last encounter with 
her as, rather, a subjective extension of his obsessive 
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greed to acquire the Aspern papers. The editor/mediator 
exits from his discourse in the ostensibly mercenary mode he 
( consciously) established in part 1, but his attempt to 
assuage his conscience by means of a financial transaction 
- which works for him leaves the reader further attuned to 
his loss of epistemic status in this narrative; for he is 
unaware that his consciousness carries the strictures and 
limitations of unreliability, exte~ding from the 
presentational process, where, in the final analysis, he 
performs only a limited act of narrative transmission, to 
the presented world, where his perceptions and observations, 
so apparently astute in the opening pages of the story, are 
gradually eroded in the process that reveals the 
authoritative emergence of the second-order discourse, that 
is, the immanent narrative situation. 
The final utterance of the editor/mediator reveals his 
shallow insensitivity in that, having destroyed the hopes of 
Miss Tita Bordereau, and indeed her existence as a woman, 
his own concerns remain the limited and obsessive ones of 
our earliest encounter with him ( now revealed in all their 
tawdriness ): 
I wrote to her that I had sold the picture, but 
I admitted to Mrs Prest, at the time ( I met 
her in London, in the autumn >, that it hangs 
above my writing table. When I look at it my 




The depth of insight of which he seemed manifestly capable 
in part 1 of this novella is clearly absent in these final 
paragraphs. The editor-narrator 7 s judgements are superseded 
by those of the immanent narrator, with the emergence as a 
structural feature of the former 7 s ignorance of his motive 
functioning as a complex index to the existence of the 
second-order, epistemically primary, 7 wor ld 7 • Henry James, 
in his endeavour to render fictional ~reality~ in the 
modernist mode, has written a narrative which, 
pre-eminently, achieves the implicit goal of the immanent 
mode: the subtle evocation, by means of the inversion of the 
conventional relationship between the mediator and the 
hypostatized reader, of not one presented world, but two: a 
technique which, as has been demonstrated in the last three 
chapters, may form one of the most fascinating means of 
rendering irony in narrative. In the conclusion I suggest 
something of the potential of this technique as I have 
explicated it in this thesis - for achieving a fuller 
understanding of the structures of irony: and I relate the 
insights drawn from the analysis of immanent narration to 
some of the other primary modes of narration that Stanzel 
(1955) discerned in his earliest work in the field. 
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CONCLUSION 
Henry James, despite his masterful control of the 
heights of ironic subtlety,was by no means the only writer 
of stature to experiment with the immanent mode. A similar 
degree of profundity and technical sophistication is to be 
found, for example, in Ford Madox Ford 7 s The Good Soldier 
(1915). Like the editor-narrator of The Aspern Papers, the 
narrator here presents in the first instance as 
insightful, sensitive and deeply moral. However, fissures in 
this carefully constructed, apparent urbanity appear, in 
retrospect, to the alert reader/receiver as early as p 69 
where, speaking of his wife, he says: 
For I hate Florence. I hate Florence with 
such a hatred that I would not spare her an 
eternity of loneliness. 
Later, however, on p 113, he comments: 
From that day to this I have never given 
her another thought; I have not bestowed 
upon her so much as a sigh ..•• She just 
went completely out of existence, like 
yesterday 7 s paper. 
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It is in telling ( and ironic) juxtapositions of this kind, 
though placed 44 pages apart, that indices to a deeper 
personal corruption than he is aware of are to be found. 
When the intelligent mind is shown to be deceiving itself 
as Ford Madox Ford makes clear - the reader/receiver is 
treated to the experience of the full complexity of the 
stratagems employed in a man~s attempt to hide from his own 
gaze. 
Narrati ves which bear testimony to the pre.sence of an 
immanent voice are to be found experiencing their hey-day in 
the so-called modernist period. It is certainly no accident 
that novels and short stories that focussed upon the 
opacities and ambiguities of experience should be written 
just when critical debate in the domain of the 
Anglo-American ( objective) New Criticism should itself be 
addressing the questions raised by concepts such as irony, 
and constructs inherent in the internal patternings of 
literary works. Their approach, however, wa~ usually merely 
descriptive, though they often used the concept of irony as 
a term central to their technical vocabulary. They did not 
really explore ( or indeed adequately account for ) the 
complex mechanics that underly its affective achievement. 
Perhaps in a community where unanimity of sensibility 
obtains, such mere pointers to ironic structures as form the 
core of so many of the analyses undertaken within the ambit 
of New Criticism may suffice. In an age, though, of both 
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greater cultural disintegration and diversity more than such 
pointers is required. Finally, a more analytic audience 
demands that, under pressure, the arguments that support the 
postulation of an ironic presence be advanced. 
Although I have been concerned with homodiegetic 
narrative here, tempting possibilities exist for the 
application of my theoretical model to other forms of 
narrative transmission. Some third person ( figural ) 
narrative situations ( What Maisie Knew springs to mind), 
especially where the focaliser is a child or one that 
suffers from some intellectual or social limitation like 
those explored in chapters 4,5 and 6, may also benefit from 
explication of their . internal structures in terms of the 
theory of the immanent voice. 
Finally, if my research over the last few years has 
revealed a~ything, it is that literary criticism can no 
longer in conscience ignore the profound advances made in 
the philosophy of language. The re-emergence of such an 
attractive figure as Renaissance man seems to be the 
concomitant of what academic bureaucracy refers to as the 
need for greater inter-disciplinary co-operation. The 
solipsism that threatened to engulf the Descartian mind of 
modern man has transpired in the twentieth century~s 
realisation that the human life form, itself, is an 
essentially solipsistic one. If, however, we recall the 
classical assertion that ~man is the measure of all things~, 
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surely, then, . the relativism of the age may be regarded as 
profoundly less disturbing to the degree that we recognise 
our essential community. 
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